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Abstract 
Property has long been a focus of anthropology because of the impact that different 
legal and cultural concepts of ownership have on people's everyday lives. This thesis, 
based on ethnographic research conducted in Xi'an, China in 2005, focuses on 
intangible property and the market for pirated discs. It thus addresses intellectual 
property (IP), the recent and ongoing creation of new categories of ownership and 
thus commoditization, through the intersection of legal conceptions of daoban 
(literally, "pirated edition") and zhengban (literally, "correct edition") and the 
everyday morality of the movie and music market. What makes this research 
especially intriguing is the gap that exists between the non-indigenous laws marking 
such goods illegal and the social norms which allow guilt-free trade in them. The 
thesis, concentrating on the local contexts of consumption and sales of daoban, 
describes Chinese conceptions of intangible property paying attention to retail 
business, police actions, and daoban’s conceptual borderlands. It concludes with a 
look at how change is and is not occurring in China and the often-unintended 
consequences of the interactions of structures and agents that drive such change. The 
thesis advocates for a more active role to be played by anthropology in understanding 
the forces that push to convert IP from a constructed regime into a "natural" part or 
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Introduction: 1 China and Intellectual Property 
In this thesis, I seek to study what intellectual property (TP) means in China and to 
what extent Western ideas of IP have been accepted at a local level. While this is a 
means to better understand why Chinese consumers continue to violate IP laws at 
such high rates, it also is meant more broadly to understand how the hegemonic 
expansion of this new regime of intangible ownership proceeds. Focusing on China, a 
civilization with a long history of invention but with no indigenous equivalent of 
Western IP and how current Chinese consumers view the ownership of intangible 
things, may also provide an example of a different way to view these issues that does 
not rely on or react to IP. The thesis explores the local meanings of the key Chinese 
concepts of daoban and zhengban through the eyes of local consumers and retailers. 
By situating "piracy" not in the discourse of IP supporters or that of its challengers in 
the West, but rather in its essential local context of business and petty illegal 
economic activity, the thesis provides a basis for understanding broader conceptions 
of intangible property and its contestation in China. 
In 2003, according to the National Copyright Administration of the PRC 
(2004), the Chinese government seized 68 million pirated discs. The Motion Picture 
Association of America (2004) estimated their losses of "potential revenue" for that 
I These terms are roughly equivalent to "unlicensed" and "licensed" editions respectively. T wi l l return 
to define these terms later in this Chapter as well as throughout the thesis. 
same year in the neighborhood of 178 million US dollars. According to the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) "piracy in China for all categories of 
copyrighted materials exceeds 90 percent [of all products sold, and] in the music 
sector, piracy hovers at approximately 95 percent" (Rosen 2003). It is then not a 
surprise that China is a target of bilateral and multilateral attempts to crack down on 
such unauthorized copying. It may, however, be a surprise to know that this pressure 
is not recent. The Qing dynasty was the first to be forced to adopt foreign IP 
protection laws and this process began as early as their defeat in the Opium War in the 
19th century. Later governments in China, over time, were forced to do largely the 
same. 
It was thus that China was introduced to one of the defining features of our 
time, the fast growing "knowledge economy." This knowledge economy is founded 
on the idea of ownership of intellectual property or "IP." Without IP, or something 
like it, the very idea of making profits directly from a market in ideas would be 
impossible. IP's beginning and expansion has effectively been the creation of new 
categories of ownership. In the past, we could not own things like songs, stories, 
minority dances, seed germplasm, or modified DNA. It wasn't that we didn't have 
them. We just could not individually own them as we could tangible property. Now 
not only can these be owned, but they also can be bought, sold, licensed, and stolen. 
And this is the origin of "piracy." 
While numerous studies have examined the role of IP from an economic or 
legal perspective and an increasing number also approach the discussion from a 
political perspective, we have little idea of how this change in categories of ownership 
plays out at a local level. Perhaps this lack of understanding is a direct result of the 
process having already taken place. For many in the developed world, we have grown 
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up in a world that takes this ownership of ideas for granted. It is only then on the 
fringes of this expansion of IP into cultural rights, farmers rights, ownership of DNA, 
and in new technologies like downloadable music and securable CDs that we take 
note of it at all. In China, a place with such a high rate of "piracy," how do people 
conceive of the ownership of intangible property? How do people perceive disc 
piracy? 
While it may seem quite obvious what an economic, legal, or political science 
approach to IP would entail, this M.Phil, thesis, based on three months of participant 
observation and interviewing in Xi'an, China, seeks instead to make use of an 
anthropological approach. At first glance, IP lends itself more to a study of 
international politics, domestic interest groups, innovation rates across industries, or 
variations among different countries' legal codes and their ramifications. So what is 
an anthropology of IP? 
One aspect of an anthropological approach to IP is anthropology's primary 
methodology, that of intense, on the ground, participation with and observation of 
informants knowledgeable of the subject. Fieldwork alone, however, does not make a 
project anthropological. A second aspect, then, draws on the emphasis in American 
f 
anthropological circles on the primacy of "culture" and the fact that this project does 
indeed seek to understand cultural and social norms. Yet it does not seek to say that 
disc piracy is simply a result of some sort of reified "culture of copying." While I 
intend, throughout this thesis to highlight specific cultural aspects of the consumption, 
enforcement, and perception of piracy, these cultural aspects are selectively and 
situationally drawn upon and they work within the constraints and encouragement of 
different levels of local and international structures. In this way, while the specific 
cultural elements may be unique to Chinese societies or simply to Mainland Chinese 
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society, the overall structural issues and the backdrop of the expansion of categories 
of ownership is a global phenomenon which anthropology also can address. 
The third and perhaps most important element of an anthropological approach 
to IP concerns the type of research questions that are asked. Through ethnography and 
analysis, this approach aims for a holistic perspective which brings in the various 
contexts of the issue at a local level for a more complete picture. While such a local 
perspective has a narrow geographical scope, it also, as a result, has the ability to cast 
a wide net in watching how local actors interact with TP in the course of their daily 
lives. Furthermore, by investigating shared cultural knowledge rather than individual 
characteristics, the small geographic area and sample size is still relevant to larger 
debates occurring at the national level or among different developing countries. 
Thus I seek to portray and analyze disc piracy in its local cultural, historical, 
economic, and political contexts. I seek not only to engage in a discussion of Chinese 
conceptions of IP, but also to lead the reader to question how exceptional the Chinese 
case really is. By investigating how Chinese people view IP, we can, in turn, openly 
question how we ourselves see it. This ability to reflect on IP is made especially 
important because of the way we conceive of problems metaphorically. Seeing 
"copying" as "piracy" both facilitates and limits how we understand and react to it 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980), a point I will return to in Chapter 2 and throughout this 
thesis. IP's seemingly inexorable and driverless advance into new realms should be 
debated openly and decisions made deliberately rather than made through appeals to a 
mythical "natural" right. 
2 For the difference between cultural and individual level data see (Bernard 2002:141-142). 
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What is Intellectual Property? 
Before I begin to talk about IP in a Chinese context it is essential to note that 
IP itself is one thing only in name. While it is true to say that IP is the idea of owning 
intangible things or ideas and that the kinds of such intangibles that can be owned are 
growing, it is also a bit misleading. IP is actually a blanket (or umbrella) term 
originating, according to Vaidhyanathan (2001:10)，in the 1969 creation of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) that was meant to encompass several 
distinct (previously existing) concepts of non-material property. It primarily includes 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets; but, depending on specific laws or 
advocates' positions, it may also include design rights, cultural property, and farmer's 
rights among others. Patents cover the ownership of inventions; trademarks the 
ownership of names, and copyright the ownership of artistic or creative works. This 
thesis will deal primarily with copyright. In concentrating on one kind of IP, however, 
it will also have larger ramifications for how people look at ownership of intangible 
property at a more abstract level. 
The problem is that while each of these describes the ownership of knowledge 
or intangibles in some way, they each act quite differently from one another. For 
instance, patent protection is meant only for 20 years, while copyright protection now 
works 70 years after the author dies, and trademarks have no time limits as long as 
they are used continuously. Furthermore, even within these categories, IP works 
differently and has different effects depending on the industry. Thus copyright 
protection of Stephen King's new novel not only plays out very differently from 
patent protection on a new AIDS drug or trademark protection for Mickey Mouse, but 
also very differently from copyright protection for the latest Microsoft Office 
software. The relative costs of research and development associated with the newly 
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protected creation, the effect that preventing others from using the creation has on 
future creation, and the relative need that people have for the product (among other 
factors) all have an influence on how the same IP laws play out differently in different 
products and sectors. IP protection might spur on innovation in one field, while 
significantly inhibiting it (or having no effect at all) in another. 
Adding to the confusion, while the concept of IP is primarily a Western idea 
and although its use within the West is no longer a cause for much questioning, the 
specifics of the definitions vary considerably from country to country. This means 
that what categories are covered by protection as well as the extent to which they are 
covered differs depending on the country, even within Europe (Cornish 2004).3 While 
WIPO and TP's later inclusion in the WTO have begun a process of global 
standardization, one cannot overestimate the amount of difference that remains in the 
formal legal codes, let alone in their implementation or in individual's daily practice. 
In the realm of patents, Cornish (2004) introduces the idea of IP as a compact. 
This compact, between society and inventors (or potential inventors), provides the 
inventor the promise of a monopoly on her invention for a limited period of time in 
return for her full public disclosure of that invention. This provides the public domain 
with the knowledge while at the same time providing a profit-based incentive for her 
to do the inventing in the first place. 
Copyright is an extension of this compact into the aesthetic realm of creation 
—into books, music, videos, and software. As with patents, "critical attacks on 
copyright abound" (Cornish 2004:41). These attacks are coming based primarily on 
3 The contestation comes in reference to what can be protected under IP. There is current debate as to 
whether databases and other collections of information (like phonebooks) can be copyrighted. On the 
one side, it would reward those who make the collections and would allow them to profit from those 
activities. On the other hand, it would potentially remove them from the public sphere and access to 
collections of information about the human body among other things could be limited. A second front 
on which patents are being disputed is in the area of patenting life forms. The United States has, 
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new technologies like the Internet which undermine some of the assumptions behind 
IP while also making it considerably simpler to copy material. Digital technologies 
allow users to make unlimited copies of a file (the digital form of just about any* 
copyrightable work) without losing quality. While this makes it easier to copy and 
send to friends or customers over email, it also puts at risk IP's artificial creation of 
scarcity (Shaw and Shaw 2003). 
Here we touch on one of the primary issues of contestation over intellectual 
property. Since my giving an idea to someone else does not negate the existence of 
the idea in my own head (unlike giving a tangible object away), then knowledge can 
be shared freely and there is no natural scarcity. Without scarcity, the economics of a 
monopoly on the product, knowledge, or idea ceases to make sense. Of course, 
knowledge is not free per se, only its distribution is. The creation of knowledge still 
requires significant research or compiling of data. It further may require analysis to 
make that data or research useable to others. It is this investment that then is to be 
rewarded by restricting the flow of knowledge to create an artificial scarcity. The 
reward then, is supposed to go to the author of the piece. Unfortunately, given the low 
bargaining power of most beginning artists, they tend to quickly pass along the rights 
to their works to large and small production companies in return for immediate 
support (Cornish 2004:43,42; Granstrand 1999:24-27). 
Thus via policy and laws meant to spur on innovation for the good of society, 
copyright and patents entail the creation of a scarcity in knowledge that then allows an 
author or inventor to profit from their ideas. The price of the monopoly goods is paid 
through its system of judicial precedence allowed such patents on genetic modifications to life forms 
from seeds to animals, while many other countries refuse to allow such protection (Garmon 2002). 
4 Books, music, video, and software can all easily be changed into digital versions and then copied. 
Paintings, sculptures and other works of art can be photographed and reproduced but it is arguable as to 
whether the photograph is a copy as a considerable element of the original pieces are their 3D qualities 
and their textures which can, as of now, only be reproduced with moderate success. Some might also 
7 
in return for the full disclosure of the work to the public such that others can 
eventually build off of that knowledge. Importantly for how it works in practice, this 
right is transferable 一 the author or inventor can, and often does, sell these rights to 
other companies who then hold such a monopoly until it expires.^ 
Chenggong Music and Movies 
These more abstract notions of innovation, scarcity, and intellectual property, 
however, are only a small portion of the picture. For the vast majority of people in 
China (and around the world), the way they interact with IP is through products like 
CDs, VCDs, and DVDs that contain their favorite songs and films. To better 
understand IP in its Chinese context let's begin to consider the case of Chenggong 
Music and Movies, the main site of my fieldwork, before returning to a broader 
discussion of copying, "piracy," and IP in China, 
Xiao Xiang, a migrant teenager, opens the garage door entrance to let the boss 
into Chenggong Music and Movies in the mornings. Wang Ge, the boss takes all of 
the cash with him at night, but like the other shops on the street, one employee sleeps 
inside to keep an eye on the merchandise. Together Xiao Xiang and Wang Ge move 
various display racks, pricing posters, and chairs out of their storage places and onto 
the sidewalk just in front of the shop. They fold up the boy's bed and store it in a back 
room owned by the same state-owned company who rents them their space. By 7 am, 
argue (and substantiated to an extent by the difficulties that online "e-book" stores have had) that a 
book also has physical qualities that make its digital copies something less than the original. 
5 The length of time that a copyright or patent's monopoly wi l l last is the object of considerable 
contention between countries. It also has been extended in most Western countries as time has gone on. 
In the United States it began as 14 years (for patents) and now for copyrights it has been extended to 
the life of the author plus 70 years (Lessig 2004: 133-135). 
6 Partly due to the illegality of daoban (and in part due to standard anthropological practice), I have 
used pseudonyms throughout this thesis. I have also changed certain details about Wang Ge, Wang Jie 
and their store based on my experiences with other stores in the area to give an accurate representation 
of the disc market in Xi 'an (not a precise description of their particular shop). 
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the store is open for business and I join Wang Ge on the sidewalk in the shade of a 
tree talking and waiting for customers. 
Wang Ge and his wife Wang Jie opened the store almost a decade ago in the 
same place they are now. When they began they did not rent the whole space, but 
rather a small corridor (about 4 square meters) whose former walls have been opened 
up as they expanded outward. They began selling only cassette tapes which they 
copied themselves. Now, though they still have a two deck tape player, the only 
copying they do themselves is for the occasional son or daughter of a friend studying 
English. Their DVDs, CDs, VCDs, and cassette tapes are all purchased from 
wholesalers complete with the jewel cases, cover art, and liner notes already 
packaged. A few years ago, Chenggong，s tape business was sold out to Xiao Zhang, 
an old friend of Wang Ge. Xiao Zhang pays rent for the space that his cassette racks 
take up in the shop and he also helps to take care of the entire shop (along with Xiao 
Xiang) when Wang Ge needs to go out. Around the same time that Xiao Zhang took 
over the tapes, Wang Jie left the daily running of Chenggong to open her own small 
business selling freshly cut flowers a few blocks away. Although she closed that 
business in 2004, she leaves Chenggong primarily to her husband preferring to spend 
time with her family and keep an eye out for future business opportunities. 
Given the open-front style of Chenggong, air conditioning is impossible and 
the fan installed in the roof provides little relief from Xi'an's summer heat. The style 
does however allow Wang Ge and Xiao Zhang to watch their entire store from the 
shade of a line of trees located next to the street across the sidewalk from their store. 
Opening hours generally found them, as well as their resident anthropologist and most 
other local shop owners, sitting in folding chairs under these trees. 
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Throughout the day a variety of customers stop into Chenggong. If they were 
looking at cassette tapes, or if neither Wang Ge nor Xiao Xiang were around, Xiao 
Zhang would get up to help them. Most of the time however, it was up to Xiao Xiang 
to ask them if they were looking for anything in particular. When he ran into a 
particularly difficult customer or had any other problem he would call over Xiao 
Zhang or Wang Ge to take over. During the lagtime between customers, we spoke 
about intangible property, current events from the daily newspapers, and the lottery. 
Nearly every day I was there at least two or three friends of Wang Ge would stop by 
to chat (often about what numbers they should play in the official "welfare" lottery) 
and smoke a cigarette. The most frequent of these, whom I also was able to speak 
with, was the boss of the state-owned company from which Wang Ge rents his store 
space. Other friends included someone in the local police bureau, a lawyer, the lottery 
saleswoman down the street, and people who have or used to have shops nearby. 
Chenggong, the main site of my fieldwork, is, in many ways, both a typical 
small business and a typical Chinese disc store. It is located in Xi'an's central walled 
district, off the main roads but close enough to have steady foot traffic passing by. 
Surrounding it on either side stretch various sundry clothing stores, barber shops, 
restaurants, and an Internet cafe or two. Around 80% of the music is Chinese 
language with the rest being an odd mixture of currently popular Western titles and 
perennial Chinese favorites like Michael Jackson, the Backstreet Boys, and Richard 
Marx. The movie selections are predominately from Hollywood, but may have 
German, French, or Russian titles and are increasingly mixed in with Japanese, 
Korean, and Chinese productions. Importantly, despite what he may claim to 
customers, Wang Ge sells mainly unlicensed or, daoban discs, although he also has a 
few poorly selling zhengban (licensed) titles which accumulate dust in a corner. 
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Lost in Translation 
Piracy 
The term "pirate," which is now commonly used to describe people who 
illegally copy or sell other people's intellectual property is, of course, merely a 
metaphor. However, its use by the music and movie industries in particular has made 
it a powerful metaphor to denounce all forms of such copying, as I will explore 
further below. Given widespread copying in China, however, the disc trade and 
"piracy" in general have much more of an ambiguous quality that is reflected in the 
pseudonym, Chenggong, T chose for Wang Ge's store. 
By most historical accounts, Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功）was born in Japan as 
the son of a Japanese mother and Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝晉!)’ a notorious Chinese 
merchant/pirate who lived at the end of the Ming Dynasty and was co-opted into the 
Ming army. As one of the last of the Ming loyalist warlords, Zheng Chenggong led 
his forces in retreat from the mainland to attack the Dutch administered island of 
Taiwan. This was meant to be a base for his sailing exploits up and down the coast of 
mainland China as well as a jumping off point for either retaking the mainland or 
establishing a separate kingdom through expansion into the Philippines (depending on 
which account you read). As a reaction to increased trading in Taiwan and raids by 
Zheng, his successors, and other less affiliated pirates, the Qing shut down and 
forcibly evacuated major mainland ports and coastal regions at the end of the 
seventeenth century. 
By accounts from the Nationalist government (KMT), Zheng Chenggong 
could be seen not as a pirate, but as their forebearer, the first to flee the mainland to 
Taiwan as a loyal force pledging to regroup and eventually retake the mainland in the 
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name of the true rulers (themselves). Increasingly independence oriented Taiwanese 
might see him as the "first" wave of Chinese migrants who made it safe for them to 
live on Taiwan (by crushing both the Dutch and the aboriginal peoples). For Japanese 
colonial rulers of Taiwan, Zheng's Japanese mother made him a fitting character to 
hold up as a unifier of Taiwanese and their new colonial masters. Even for the 
Communist mainland government, Zheng provides a nationalist example of 
patriotically fighting away the non-Han occupiers (both the Dutch and the 
Manchu/Qing) and as the person to bring Taiwan "firmly" in as a part of Chinese 
territory. Zheng can then be seen as a liberator or a new colonizer. He can be a hero or 
a villain. More than is usually the case, the various historical accounts produced by 
different sides clearly distort or gloss over aspects of his life which do not fit the 
image they would like to present (see Pastreich 2003; People's Daily 2002^). 
In short, this man's life and career as a pirate, warlord, or Ming loyalist reflect 
the ambiguous nature of the term "pirate" itself, even as it refers to its original 
n 
meaning, that of boat-based attackers. Successive dynasties in China repeatedly 
referred to any group of people living outside of mainland areas under imperial 
control (such as the Japanese and people living on Taiwan) as barbarians and often as 
pirates. Furthermore, Murray (1994) describes a common cycle along the coast of 
Fuji an province wherein when times got tough economically, many land-based 
villagers and fisherman along the coast would take to the seas alternately fishing and 
pirating to eke out a living. As Lawrence Crissman succinctly put it in his description 
of Taiwan at about this time, "Pirates (who were otherwise local fishermen) infested 
7 Note in this article that Zheng's birthplace has conveniently been moved from Japan to Fuji an 
province a place more in keeping with nationalistic sentiment. 
8 Taken in the context of my application of Zheng Chenggong's name to Wang Ge's store, the words 
Chenggong (.成功）themselves translate into English as "success," thereby adding to the ambiguity by 
reminding us of the central role thai business plays in the disc market, an aspect 1 wi l l return to in detail 
in Chapter 3. 
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the coast, and robbers and bandits (who were otherwise local peasants) roamed 
inland" (1972:254). 
When the term began to be used for unauthorized copying of intellectual 
property it again was used primarily by those who saw their rights as having been 
violated. It was used not necessarily as a reaction to something that was already 
illegal, but as a way to describe analogously an offense which these publishers, 
keeping in mind their own best interests, felt should be illegal. While IP holders now 
use "piracy" as a common term, they also enhance this description by drawing on 
more potent analogous crimes which are relevant to today's historical and political 
climate. 
It is thus that we see increasing references to organized crime, gangsters, and 
terrorism being linked to "piracy." One example of this is the anti-piracy clip that was 
featured before films shown in Hong Kong in 2005 where a series of gangsters and 
other shadowy figures tell the camera "thank you" in their own gruff languages. The 
clip is followed by a message telling people piracy is a crime, it is stealing, and it 
helps criminals. This usage has been coupled with a push to make the punishment "fit 
the crime," meaning that since "piracy" now should be analogous to terrorism, it 
should be punished significantly more severely and efforts to circumvent copyright 
protection mechanisms (whether or not it is done in order to allow copying based on 
legally proven "fair use" justifications) become a breach of security and a federal 
offense in the United States (under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or DMCA, 
for instance). 
In China however, "piracy" is not such a clearly evil thing at all. To allow 
readers to view the practices described in this thesis in the ambivalent manner that my 
informants saw them, I have chosen to use the Chinese word “daoban” (literally 
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"pirated version",盜版）rather than "piracy" to describe the product of unlicensed 
copying. Despite the fact that the term itself most likely came directly from a 
translation of the English word, the term in Chinese has also been subject to cultural 
conceptions of the practice it describes and has meanings and connotations which the 
English term does not. By sticking with the Chinese term, my hope is that non-
Chinese speaking readers will be able to leave some of the metaphorical baggage that 
their native terms possess behind. In a legal sense, the opposite of daoban is zhengban 
(正片反）which literally means "correct version" or "straight version" and describes a 
licensed copy. I do not plan, at this time, to offer a definition of either daoban or 
zhengban beyond the literally meaning of the words provided above. Instead, I invite 
the reader to see the entire thesis as an attempt to ethnographically define these terms 
and others to which they are related.'^ 
Copying 
One of the first difficulties that I ran into in preparing for my field work was 
trying to explain my project, which was very clear to me in English, in Mandarin, the 
language I would conduct it in. Translating the word "copy" into Chinese was a bit 
tricky; translating the various words approximating "copy" back into English, without 
losing or confusing their nuances, is even more tricky. While Chinese, like English 
has many different terms to describe different kinds of copying, there is no 
overarching term for the whole category of such actions. This means that while 
copying a book or copying a name brand clothing design both involve copying and 
thus would be seen as related, there is no one term which could be used, even 
9 As these two terms are key terms in this thesis and because my aim is to use them as an alternative to 
the loaded terms we traditionally would use in English, I have decided to italicize them only on this 
first usage. As either daoban or zhengban come up in the remainder of the text, I wi l l treat them as 
English words whose contextual definition the thesis seeks to build. I f there is any doubt as to the 
meaning of Chinese language words used in this thesis, I have included a list of romanizations, 
characters, and the page numbers where I initially use them in Appendix I. 
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imprecisely, to encompass both actions. While a foreigner, given leeway for his less 
than native Chinese, might be able to express himself using only one or two of these 
words in all situations, doing so necessitates large amounts of contextual clues and 
often runs the risk of misunderstandings. 
The two major aspects to Chinese words for copying is that they revolve 
around the process of copying and are generally specific to categories of materials 
being copied. Thus where kaobei (拷貝)，a word most likely coming from the sound 
of the English word copy, involves a quick and complete (usually digital) transfer 
from original to copy, fanhan (番羽片反）describes a result of a process by which 
someone studies the original and then remakes a copy from scratch with their own 
tools. This emphasis on the process makes its most obvious appearance in words like 
kelu (亥!j錄)’ emphasizing the scratching or carving part of recording a CD much like 
the word "burn" in English, or yinzhi (印製),evoking a sense of copying by making 
an imprint or stamp. Some of my informants would occasionally refer to the process 
of making daoban as dao guo lai (盜過來）or daoyong (盜用）’ which both literally 
mean to steal (to bring here or to use). Most informants who used dao guo lai, 
however did not seem to stress anywhere else this idea of stealing. They were instead 
drawing on the dao from daoban which has, as I will describe in Chapter 3, only an 
ambiguous connection to stealing. Another common term is mofang (模仿)which 
indicates imitation and can deal with anything from a rock band covering other 
people's songs to a person who pretends to be someone else to use their identity. 
The second aspect then, as the last term suggests, is that these terms are often 
limited to a certain type of material. Mofang deals primarily with people, kaobei (like 
doaban) is restricted to electronic/digital products like DVDs, fanban is usually used 
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for clothing and shoes, and linmo (臨摹）is generally used in reference to paintings or 
calligraphy. Within the realm of copying other writing there are several words to use 
including chao (f少)’ meaning to copy words and encompassing anything from 
plagiarism to transcription to copying off a blackboard in school; chaoxie (f少襲)， 
describing acts of plagiarism or borrowing from other's works; and piaoqie (剽竊)， 
another slightly stronger term for plagiarism. The term with the broadest range that I 
have found in speaking to Chinese friends is fuzhi (複製）meaning literally to "again 
make," but even this is generally not used to refer more broadly to kinds of copying 
which have their own more specific words. To complicate matters cross-culturally, 
different Chinese speaking areas, especially for scientific terms, have different 
terminology. For instance, in Taiwan Dolly the cloned sheep is known as afuzhi-
sheep while in the mainland it is known as a kelong-shQ&p (克隆 
As a result of these specificities to the terms and the lack of an overall generic 
term for copying behavior, different behaviors and different terms can have widely 
varying connotations. Thus linmo, because it is linked to a tradition of painting where, 
as I describe below, copying was seen as a sign of respecting the original, it has little 
to no negative connotations. Other terms Vike fanban, as opposed to kaobei, describe a 
process of copying where the copier, similar to the painter who copies someone else's 
painting, must use her own skills and considerable effort to make the resulting copy. 
Photocopying, fuyin (複印)’ and daoban on the other hand, requires little of one's own 
effort and this, as I will describe in more detail in Chapter 5, can have an effect on 
how people perceive the offense. 
In a more abstract sense also, the problem of translating the central idea of 
"copying" from English to Chinese and back echoes another a common translation 
Kelong is a term approximating the sound of the English word "clone." 
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question that must often be posed to anthropologists. As William Alford, an American 
legal scholar of Chinese IP, put it, "one might well question the soundness of 
inquiring about a 'Western' subject in an 'Eastern' context" (1995:7). Alford goes on 
to resolve this issue for himself by noting both that the laws he studied in China 
originated in the West and that, due to globalization, the East and West are now so 
inextricably linked, especially in matters of IP, that refusing to look at the East would 
be disastrous {ibid.:S) to an understanding of IP worldwide. 
To his justifications I will add here the one I found most compelling as I 
struggled to explain my research to various friends. While they might disagree with 
my approach, by and large, Americans and Europeans I have discussed my project 
with find IP and disc piracy to be an intriguing topic of research whose time is long 
overdue for serious study. Most Chinese I discuss it with however, found it difficult to 
understand what, exactly, I am researching. Once they seem to understand it, they 
wonder why in the world I would want to do that." IP, despite my informants 
knowing that daoban is a thorn in the side of China's international diplomacy, is a 
topic defined in China by its absence. This stark contrast in perceptions leads me to 
believe both that my study may be in danger of missing important elements and that 
studying Chinese conceptions of IP is all the more important. If IP is uninteresting 
and somewhat invisible to my Chinese friends because of its absence in their lives, 
then what else about it may be invisible to me, but so obvious to them that no one 
mentions it? While I have not yet resolved this dilemma, I will return to it again in 
Chapter 5 in light of what I found in Xi'an. 
‘'• While my Mandarin was good enough to express myself on most points during the research, I 
worried that this impasse was primarily due to language. As a result, I wrote up a short Chinese 
abstract to explain my project which was then read over and corrected by both Mainland and 
Taiwanese friends in my department. When those two paragraphs also failed to get a reaction more 
similar to that of my Western friends, I worried that perhaps it had been written in too much of an 
academic style and thus was less accessible to my informants. The question was solved in my head 
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An Historical Perspective 
While China during much of its dynastic history was a leader in science, trade, 
and technology, including in such IP-relevant arenas as mechanical engineering, 
martial technology, magnetism, and wooden-block printing (Needham 1981), it did 
not develop an indigenous equivalent to intellectual property (Alford 1995).'^ In 
Europe, with the rise of the printing press and mass publications, there gradually came 
into being a political and social consensus that authorship and invention should be 
rewarded through the granting of property rights that were to be defended by the state. 
Such great inventions, even invented (as was the printing press) centuries earlier in 
China, did not produce either such life changing revolutions or a similar focus on 
authorship and rewards (Needham 1981: 121). As they developed in Europe, these 
limited term property rights were seen as an incentive (profit) that would spur on 
innovation and thus increase the accumulated knowledge of humanity. In China, long 
lists of authorial/inventive pedigrees existed (Needham 1981: 109) but, through the 
twentieth century however, efforts at registering and identifying authors or at halting 
unauthorized copying were aimed almost exclusively at the maintenance of dynastic 
power with all else (including property or innovation interests) being at most 
tangential (Alford 1995:17-18). In making clear this difference in intentions, Alford 
draws attention to the need to go further than examining similarities in laws or 
declarations and instead taking into account how and why these laws are formed as 
well as what happens as they are implemented in society {ibid.\l). 
however when a Chinese friend of mine, doing research in Southern Taiwan explained that she had told 
her own informants of my project only to receive the same bewildered reaction. 
As one of the most comprehensive analyses of Chinese intellectual property law from both an 
historical and a contemporary (through the early nineties) perspective, this section wi l l primarily rely 
on Wil l iam Alford's 1995 work. His work deals with much more than I wi l l detail here and it is a 
valuable resource for anyone interested in IP beyond economic modeling and descriptions of laws. 
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Historical Approximate IP Related Developments^ Period D ^ 
Zhou 1100 BCE • Evidence of identity marks on commodities 
Qin 221 BCE • Government concern over distribution of writlen works 
，nn T3 f^ Tn 
Han • Prohibited unauthorized reproduction of the Classics 
200 CE 
CE • Prohibited unauthorized reproduction of calendars, 
almanacs 
Tang • Also prohibited unauthorized reproduction of state legal 
Prior to 907 CE pronouncements, official histories, "devilish books" 
(Buddhist/Taoist) 
• Private printers must submit works for review/registration 
(its efficacy would ebb and flow over the next centuries) 
, … 、 • Prohibited in addition to the above, reproduction of Sons 1009 L b . , , , ‘ 5 imperial exam model answers, maps, inner government 
papers. No publishing of pornography or inappropriate use 
of imperial names 
• Treaty of Nanking ending the Opium Wars 
1842 CE * Applied Treaty Power's laws rather than Chinese laws for 
criminal (and often civil) offenses involving foreigners (and 
some Chinese Christians) 
Qing • Mackay Treaty with Britain to protect trademarks 
• This bilateral treaty followed on the heels of a multiparty 
1902 CE treaty ending the Boxer Rebellion 
• Other bilateral agreements with Treaty Powers followed 
with the USA one including copyright protection 
• Copyright Law (exceptions for national security; permits to 
Republican ^923 c E allow censorship were significant elements; foreign vs. 
(K。L) domestic differences in rights granted) 
• Two track process for patents (no specifics for copyrights): 
1) Certificates and money rewards for inventions which 
become property of the state, 2) individual patents with 
royalties 
• Payments were reduced significantly. Cultural Revolution 
1963 CE period meant most people played down any individual 
accomplishments. 
Communist 1984 CE • Patent Law (national interest still is paramount) 
(CCP) • Copyright provisions in General Principles of the Civi l Law 
1986 CE (vague section saying copyright would be respected 
according to the law) 
• Copyright Law (large fair-use exception for state organs 
and entities in the course of their duties) 
• Copyright Law is revised (to include Internet distribution 
2001 CE rights and address new technological related issues, state 
organ/entity exception is made somewhat smaller). 
* Sources: Compiled from Alford 1995 and the China IPR Law website 
Table 1: Dates of IP Related Developments in Chinese Civilization 
A quick glance through Table 1 turns up numerous examples of prohibitions 
of various sorts of unauthorized copying. In general, successive dynasties built off of 
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the provisions and laws imposed by the dynasties they succeeded. Thus where the 
Han dynasty had prohibitions on the reproduction of the Classics, the Tang added 
prohibitions on reproductions of calendars and almanacs as well. Alford explains that 
the degree of prohibition on reprinting information depended largely on the relative 
threat such information might pose to the ruling political order. Calendars and 
almanacs were keys to both prognosticating and linked to the very legitimacy of the 
emperor. Reprinted calendars could be used to predict the fall of a ruler, prove a 
dynasty had lost the Mandate of Heaven, or to legitimize a rebellion all through date 
and astrology based divinations. Other texts, like pornography or Buddhist and Taoist 
scriptures during Confucian dominated times, were seen as contrary to the moral basis 
the state was attempting to instill and maintain in its subjects and thus were 
completely prohibited. The metaphor of the emperor as the ultimate father figure 
present in Confucian relationships in turn gave him the legitimacy and the duty to 
control the dissemination of information preventing confusion and protecting morality 
(Alford 1995:23; on "father figure" metaphors see also Lakoff 2002: 65). 
Finally however, there was a large portion of materials that were neither 
orthodox nor heterodox and thus were largely ignored. The state did not bother to 
regulate, prohibit, or encourage such publications and its treatment depended on the 
local situation and the relations between local officials, the publishers, and the authors 
{ibid.\2A). Within this third category, from the Song dynasty there is evidence that 
guilds and clans which engaged in certain industries (like tea, silk, and cloth) marked 
their goods with particular symbols. They then attempted, largely ineffectively, to use 
guild mechanisms to prevent others from using the same marks or brands. In some 
places, the state allowed guilds to work as monopolies and to enforce these types of 
branding rules, but the state did not do this as an attempt to regulate competition or 
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establish a market. As many of the people granted monopolies and most of the guild 
heads were themselves local officials or influential gentry, such mechanisms were 
allowed to work primarily as a way to maintain local power structures which, in turn 
supported the state {ibid.\\6-\l). 
The Treaty of Nanking which ended the Opium War in 1842 is commonly 
noted as the beginnings of pressure on China to adopt IP. Although this treaty did not 
specifically mention the protection of trademarks or other IP, by allowing 
extraterritoriality it allowed foreign powers to decide such cases under their own laws 
rather than those of China. At the same time however, even the British in 1842 
classified cases of inferior quality tea being sold under high quality brands as cases of 
consumer fraud rather than IP violations. By the first decade of the century, 
following the defeat of the Boxer Rebellion and the invasion of Beijing it brought 
about, the foreign powers negotiated bilateral treaties that would impose the first 
trademark and copyright laws on Qing dynasty China (Alford 1995:32-34).'^ In the 
process of this negotiation, as would be common in the Republican and Communist 
periods as well, the foreign powers made no attempt to convince the Qing government 
why IP laws might be benefit China. The laws were forced in exchange for a not-to-be 
fulfilled promise on the part of the Treaty powers to relinquish their right to 
extraterritoriality (Alford 1995:49). 
While the Republic of China (ROC) also enacted comprehensive Western 
style copyright and patent laws (within a few years of their retreat to Taiwan), it is 
also important to note that there was little change in daily practice between the ROC 
and the Qing periods. Courts reached their verdicts more on the basis of morality than 
13 Interestingly, this did not mean that Chinese drafters of the laws naively took the laws Westerners 
proposed wholesale. Early codes represented by the Jiangnan Bureau of Commerce codes protected the 
first Chinese imitations of Western technology or techniques. The length of time this patent was given 
for varied based on how important that technology was to China (Alford 1995:46). 
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based on the existence or nonexistence of IP registration, a point I will return to later 
in this section. Finally, the laws of the Republican period on the mainland, continued 
the trend set by earlier efforts at prohibiting unauthorized copying by subsuming any 
idea of authors rights beneath the greater importance of controlling information and 
securing the legitimacy of the state. 
Developments in the Communist period also must be looked at in relation to 
how the laws were put into practice. At the beginning of this period, the CCP 
government enacted its own patent laws which provided two options for inventors 
wishing to claim them. The first provided only personal recognition and monetary 
rewards for inventions which then became the property of the state and the second 
allowed for individual patents and royalties. While this two-tracked patent system and 
later copyright provisions appear to grant rewards as an incentive for innovation, in 
practice these rewards were rarely claimed and the law seems to have been 
constructed in such a way thai rewards would not be claimed. One requirement for an 
outright individual patent, for instance, was not having relied on state or company 
resources. As the danwei (work unit) system, which organized a person's life from 
housing to jobs and even to marriage and family planning, was an all encompassing 
state organ, it would have been impossible to claim to have invented or written 
anything without having relied on state resources. This meant that, for Chinese 
citizens, qualifying for an outright patent was not a practical option (Alford 1995: 57-
64). 
Furthermore, given the political climate (especially during the Cultural 
Revolution) it would have been quite dangerous even to claim a reward as one would 
need to publicly claim credit for an innovation. Most instead attributed the work to the 
work unit as a whole. In fact, only 10 people applied for either type of award in the 
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system's first 8 years (Alford 1995:57). At the same time that individual intellectuals 
were publicly scorned and sent to learn from farmers however, state sponsored 
invention did occur. It was during this period for instance, that China produced its 
own nuclear weapons. Interestingly then, Confucianism and Marxism (or Maoism),丨斗 
for very different ideological reasons, share the idea that innovation, both tangible and 
intangible, result from social rather than individual production. Thus neither stressed 
an idea of private ownership. 
In another perhaps inadvertent echo of previous Chinese regimes, the 
Communist Party (CCP) saw copyright and IP provisions primarily as a way to censor 
texts according to ideological content. The Party was seen as a necessary filter to 
control information which would reach the masses in order to guide them on their 
path to communism. Thus anything against the commitment to the socialist road, the 
leadership of the CCP, Mao and Lenin-Marxist thought, or the people's democratic 
dictatorship was censored. Also texts advocating the splitting of the 56 nationalities 
(independence leaning), violence, theft, or pornography was also prohibited (Alford 
1995:79). The state, including state owned monopoly publisher Xinhua copied 
copyrighted works without permission and unauthorized copies of international news 
articles were translated and reprinted for circulation at the highest levels of 
government {ibid/M). Finally, this period also brought denunciations of trademarks 
as a symptom of the commodity economy and thus of the disease of capitalism. 
Goods were sold in uniform packages with generic but revolutionary brand names like 
"East Wind" or "Red Flag." Similar to issues of fake goods in China today, both the 
ingredients and the quality of these goods varied widely {ibid.: 64). 
'4 Paul Mooney (2006) writing an article about cheating in China quoted the following from Mao 
Zedong on shared creation and copying: "At examinations whispering into each other's ears and taking 
other people's places ought to be allowed. I f your answer is good and I copy it’ then mine should be 
counted as good." 
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The Past, Sharing, and Censorship 
As compared to Europe, the role of legal codes and laws themselves in 
dynastic China were quite different. Such written codes of conduct describing 
offenses, rather than being the first recourse, were seen as only necessary in the case 
that higher moral principles failed to solve a problem. Thus for the majority of issues 
in China the local family head, judge, official, or other father figure would be required 
to determine the proper solution according to adherence to, in order of importance, 
"heavenly principles (tianli), the way (dao), morality (de), ritual propriety ("•)，custom 
(xixu), community compacts (xiangyue), and family rules (jia cheng)" (Alford 1995: 
10). Only if these did not provide the needed guidance would the arbiter refer to legal 
codes. 15 
Reliance on such higher morality may also have meant that TP, by its nature, 
was downgraded in its importance. Alford describes for instance how the hierarchical 
relationships that were essential to Chinese ideas of propriety influenced the relative 
severity of crimes. He gives the example that displaying impiety toward one's senior 
was significantly more serious of an offense than murdering a stranger due to the 
breakdown in this hierarchy it entailed (Alford 1995:10). IP infringement, because its 
basis is intangible, can occur at great distances meaning that not only may the 
infringer not have a relationship with the owner, but they most likely have never met. 
Furthermore, as the British, for instance, were not Chinese and refused to submit to 
the Emperor, they would not have fit into the hierarchical system which governs 
propriety at all. How severe could violating the "rights" of a person who denies even 
the highest of these relationships (that between subject and Emperor) be? 
15 This is not to say thai officials or arbiters made decisions purely based on such virtuous principles. 
As in other societies, decisions often favored the richer, better connected, or more powerful side. 
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Although the relevance of some of these higher moral concepts and their 
content certainly varied immensely throughout Chinese history, through the 
republican and communist periods as well there have been similar views of the formal 
law needing to be subsumed under larger morality. In the communist period up until 
quite recently for instance, the law was to be applied by police and judges 
analogously. This meant that authorities were meant to prosecute an immoral act, like 
adultery, which was not specifically proscribed by law as though the offender had 
committed an analogous offense such as rape (Bakken 2005b: 2). For IP laws, this has 
meant that judges and officials tended to decide cases of infringement without regard 
to official rules, laws, and the presence or absence of proper registration of the IP 
(Alford 丨 995:52). 
Besides legal codes, Alford discusses the paramount importance of the past in 
the Confucian worldview, a second important cultural factor in Chinese views on 
intellectual property. As he sees it, this worldview saw the peak of humanity's 
understanding of the world as having occurred in an idealized time of great emperors 
long past. Scholar's role in the present, including Confucius himself, was not to create 
new knowledge, but merely to recover and transmit this knowledge (Alford 1995:25). 
The study of the past was to serve as the way that individuals could achieve moral 
development and the past itself functioned as the standard by which current 
relationships and actions in society were to be evaluated {ibid.: 19). 
In an essay written as a counterpoint to this particular assertion by Alford, 
Ivanhoe (2005) shifts the focus from a unified Confucian tradition (as he sees 
represented in Alford's writing) to one which sees multiple schools of thought. At 
least one of these schools saw the Confucian classics less as a guide to moral 
enlightenment (a revered piece of the past) and more as "a major impediment to 
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spiritual and social-well-being" (2005:128). Ivanhoe further brings in the importance 
of Daoist and Buddhist conceptions of knowledge which were available as alternates 
to Confucian n o r m s . R a t h e r than citing the importance of a reverence for the past 
which structures, guides, or limits present day creation as one reason for the non-
development of IP in China,丨 7 Ivanhoe points to a dominant (although not 
uncontested) view of knowledge and people's relationship to it as embodied in the 
Dao，i8 or the way. According to this view, "any idea or cultural creation that is true, 
good, or beautiful can never belong to an individual [because such things] are 
reflections of the Dao, which runs through and unites everything" {ibid.: 133). 
Refusing to share knowledge by claiming it as one's own, by this perspective is 
considered a moral failing which, in turn would prevent that person from truly 
understanding the knowledge and the Dao that it reflects. 
While Alford and Ivanhoe disagree on the particulars of this point, I do not 
believe that Ivanhoe is able to completely discount the role of the importance of the 
past, he rather recasts it to be embodied in the Dao. Interestingly, as he presents his 
case against the importance of the past, Ivanhoe cites an example of Chinese scholars 
looking back to a golden age in the past. Liu Xin, a writer from the Han Dynasty 
explains how the numerous philosophical schools throughout Chinese history arose 
with the decline of the Zhou Dynasty. Before the fall of the Zhou, there was said to 
16 At the level of daily practice in the form of morality, sayings, and popular religion, these three 
traditions were generally fused together such that it is difficult to say were one's influence ends and the 
others' begins. 
17 Ivanhoe's (2005) other reason for this non-development was the fact that China's imperial court 
attempted to regulate the internal circulation of goods while European monarchs were concerned more 
with external trade. European monarchs then regulated goods under a view of trade as a zero-sum-
game (mercantilism) in which they competed for monopolies on trade and a leg up via new inventions. 
In China, on the other hand, internal structures also meant that the majority of inventors (literate 
scholars) were also officials of the governmenl or attached in some way to the bureaucracy, there was 
little room for any of them to claim an invention as their own personal property. 
The "Dao" is a pinyin romanization of the character 道 and is often written in English popular 
literature as "Tao." 
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exist an "ideal form of government" where everyone worked, wrote, and invented 
anonymously as a part of their duties and as a product of and expression of the Dao. 
Thus while Ivanhoe chooses to emphasize Daoist rather than Confucian ideas 
and the sharing of knowledge rather than an emphasis on the past, his and Alford's 
views seem to differ only slightly. Ivanhoe objects less to the importance of the past 
and more to the oppressively authoritarian influence of the past (in the form of the 
Classics, for instance) as presented in Alford's (1995) work, favoring instead a view 
of sharing, discussion, and disputation. In any case, the emperors and courts of each 
dynasty (and at least the rebels who successfully brought them down) were well 
aware of the immense importance of their control over history (and thus the meaning 
of the past) which, carefully edited, could validate or invalidate, legitimize or 
delegitimize their pursuit of and grip on power (Alford 1995:21). 
On the creative side, this reliance on the past and influence of the Dao has 
meant an emphasis on drawing from the forms and content of a "shared intellectual 
vocabulary" (Alford 1995: 26). In poetry and prose authors frequently copied whole 
lines of other famous works as a shorthand to encapsulate or comment on the entire 
themes and meanings in that previous work. These allusions needed no citation as the 
majority of the readers would have also been intimately familiar with the original 
from which it came. How could someone then mistake it for the author's own 
writing? This type of copying amounted to allusions to others that connoted a sense of 
respect by the current author of the quoted author's work. Similarly, historians wrote 
their histories by copying sections and quotes wholesale from other works and 
arranging them in a particular order to make their point. The mere arrangement and 
copying of other writer's words was the primary method accepted to make one's own 
point. While the style also allowed for the author's own analysis of the original texts, 
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of which there could be reams, to go in a separate part of the work, this re-mixing of 
old works itself could qualify as a new work.丨 9 Paintings also borrowed elements, 
themes, and styles liberally in conversation with past masters {ibid.:21-2S). 
It then is this shared vocabulary brought about by the reverence of the past 
(Alford 1995) and the philosophy of the Dao (Ivanhoe 2005) that caused creators to 
see their work more as a product of the common heritage of all people rather than 
individual creation. Copying, far from being seen as offensive or acceptable for 
training only in the absence of other methods, was an essential portion of production 
without which the production would be worthless. Alford further explains that for 
these intellectuals, the pursuit of commerce or money was supposed to be beneath 
them. Seeing others copy one's work, even for earning money, was then largely seen 
as a reaffirmation of the quality of the work itself (Alford 1995:28-29). 
Given these broad cultural ideals concerning copying, control, and the law, it 
is a bit surprising that China has Western style IP laws at all. China's method of 
resolving the contradiction between these cultural ideas and international political 
pressure, has been to "[proclaim] rights without being constrained by 
comprehensively providing for their realization" (Alford 1995:94). Thus although the 
formal laws are (ambivalently) on the books—the Copyright Law was enacted 1990 
and revised in 2001—they are selectively enforced both by the national and local 
governments based on political pressures and a range of different objectives which 
may have very little to do with private property or innovation. Censorship, like IP 
rights, especially in a place with a saying like "the heavens are powerful, but the 
In this way, it seems that Chinese dynastic historians and commentators might be a good source for 
current advocates of the creative commons approach to copyright to pull on. These modern day 
activists seek to promote the public domain as a way of increasing the available works that can be "re-
mixed" by subsequent creators in their own new works. See e.g. http://ccmixter.org/, 
http://creativecommons.org/, or http://www.free-culture.cc/remixes/ for more information. 
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emperor (heaven's embodiment) is far also never seems to have been fully 
implemented. As with the Qing dynasty government, the CCP also must pick and 
choose which types of infractions it will allow and which it will make a public effort 
to crackdown on. The disc market in China is a great example of how this situation 
plays out. Although the dissemination of copyrighted or censored materials continues 
despite attempts at controlling it, as I will elaborate on in Chapter 4, government 
pressure and goals have affected the types of discs that are sold. 
Methodology and Xi'an's Disc Market 
I chose to conduct research into Chinese conceptions of IP in Xi'an primarily because 
of my previous experience in the city and prior contacts with store owners and others 
who could help me to find people to interview. Given the sensitivity of doing research 
on a topic which, though it was practiced in the open, was illegal, having previous 
contacts among disc sellers was essential. I spent six months living in Xi'an teaching 
English in 2001 and had maintained contact with many of my friends from that time 
through visits back to the city in the summer of 2002 and during a pre-fieldwork trip 
in the summer of 2004. Thus several of my initial informants, including those at 
Chenggong, were people I already knew prior to returning to Xi'an for this research 
for three months from May to August 2005. 
From an analytical standpoint, Xi'an was chosen for this study not because it 
has a reputation for inordinate amounts of daoban discs, but rather because in China's 
context of 90 percent piracy rates it is quite normal. As the primary purpose of this 
research was to examine cultural conceptions of intellectual property, I chose also to 
focus on the point of sale, the consumers, and retailers of daoban. Due to the difficulty 
20 Tiangao huangdiyuan (天；^皇帝Si) literally means, "Heaven is high, the emperor is far." 
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of knowing which discs were zhengban and which were daoban, I made use of Wang 
Ge's knowledge and the discs from a large state-owned Xinhua music store as my 
benchmark for zhengban.之‘My methodology focused largely on participant 
observation at Chenggong combined with frequent visits to other shops around the 
city and informal, in-depth interviews (taped) with about 25 informants.^^ While my 
informants where chosen based on contacts in the city and thus do not represent a 
random sample, the themes that I worked with involve less an individual and more a 
cultural level of data. As such, while the results T present here certainly do not 
represent everyone in China, I do believe that they are a fair representation of how 
many people in China perceive these particular issues. 
My interviews in the city were also supplemented with a stint of volunteer 
English teaching in a county seat outside of Xi'an. Shi Ge, at whose English school I 
taught, showed me around the town's disc stores and helped to introduce me to people 
I could interview for my research. Especially for these interviews with more rural 
informants, my assistant, a local male college student who spoke and understood 
Shaanxi dialect, helped to clarify my questions and aided me in understanding their 
responses. I also arranged two focus group interviews of college students (one male, 
one female).23 For these group interviews, I prepared a list of questions and kept track 
of who spoke when, but the actual questioning was done instead by my assistant as he 
Xinhua is the primary state-owned publishing company in China (they publish books, all 
international newspaper articles, many domestic news articles, music, and movies). Even so, some 
informants told me that even in Xinhua's music section, some discs may merely be good quality 
daoban. 
22 In choosing informants, I attempted to get a balance based on age, incomes, and gender. While the 
numbers are not as balanced as I would have liked, given three months to work with I believe the only 
area I am missing is young, but well-off informants. This type of people often go to clubs and bars at 
nights for entertainment and tend to wear more fashionable brand-name clothing. They are also a 
growing demographic in China (see, e.g. Jankowiak 1993; Yan 2003) and in Xi 'an (though slower 
perhaps than Shanghai) and future studies should also include their views, especially in relation to 
issues of real, fake, and paying extra for authenticity. 
231 had originally planned to do another two focus group interviews with wage earning adults, but had 
difficulty arranging schedules and finding a suitable location. Eventually, I ran out of time and had to 
give up on this plan. 
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was better able to follow the various strands of conversation without interrupting the 
flow. 
With a population of about 6 m i l l i o n ? Xi'an is the capital of inland Shaanxi 
province which has only just begun to develop itself economically at a rate much 
slower than large cities on the coast. The inner walled area, one of the older areas of 
the city surrounded by its Ming Dynasty wall, is home to around 400,000 residents 
and, especially towards its center or along its four main roads, multiple upscale 
department stores, clothing shops, and four or five star hotels. The southern district of 
the city is the main area for universities and is also home to several shopping districts. 
While historically the city was one of the centers of the Chinese empire, serving as the 
capital for the Tang, Qin, and Han Dynasties (in addition to several less well known 
ones), in the last centuries China's focus has shifted towards Beijing and the coast. 
After the Communist Revolution in 1949, Shaanxi province (and specifically 
the central city of Yan'an) attained a kind of honorific position as the province where 
the party, and Mao, grew to power. It housed major technological exchanges with the 
Soviet Union during the first decade of Communist rule prior to the break in relations 
between the two socialist powers. Xi'an was also one of the organizing points for 
Mao's ill-fated 1950s attempts to establish a "Third Front" (a line of defense to fall 
back on in case of another invasion from the sea) of manufacturing and military 
production centers housed in unpopulated areas deep in the mountains of central 
China (Lane 1998: 213-214). Then in the late 90’s Xi'an became known as the 
"Gateway to the West" and attracted development money from the central 
In addition to the Han majority, Xi 'an is also the home of a large number of Hui minority peoples as 
well as migrants from many areas to the West. Many of these minorities (including the Hui), are 
Muslims and the northwestern quarter of the city center is known as the Muslim Quarter, the residential 
area for many Hui people as well as the location of many of the cities mosques. For another 
anthropological account of Xi 'an focusing on issues of tradition and modernity among its Hui Muslim 
community see Gillette 2000. 
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government as a part of Beijing's "Open up the West Campaign" (Vermeer 2004). 
Beyond these sporadic and largely unsustained political attempts to develop the city, 
it remains more or less a provincial capital similar to those in other inland provinces. 
The only exception to this is the degree to which tourism to and from Emperor Qin 
Shihuang's tomb (the Terracotta warriors) has helped the city to attract large four and 
five star hotels. These tourists however, while contributing to the local economy, 
largely keep to tourist areas and do not have a large effect on the overall market for 
daoban discs. 
Xi'an, although serving to a degree as a distribution point for many products 
heading to the West of China, is not known as a production or manufacturing center 
for discs and thus views of daoban centered more on retail level buying and selling. 
Importantly, perhaps due to the absence of production centers and the relatively low 
wages in the city, it has not been a major site for crackdowns on daoban discs. In this 
way, the city is similar to other inland provincial capitals and the cultural conceptions 
of daoban of the people who live in and around Xi'an may better reflect those of the 
more rural or less developed majority of China than a study focusing on Shenzhen, 
Shanghai, or Beijing for instance. 
Chenggong Music and Movies is one of many similar "old style" stores selling 
daoban music and movies in Xi'an. These shops, like Chenggong, tend to cluster with 
two or three within a few blocks each other. Old style shops are streetfront, open air 
shops short on decorations. They have cement floors and usually have a rack of discs 
along the walls and two back to back down the middle. At the same time, these old 
style shops are not the only type of sellers of discs in Xi'an and, as I will detail in 
Chapter 3, the style of the shop has a lot to do with how consumers perceive the 
quality of their discs. On the one side of these old style stores are the various sorts of 
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vendors with more temporary locations ranging from rented space above electronics 
stores to itinerant venders selling from their coats, a box, or a blanket. Vendors in the 
electronics market are usually arranged in a wholesale type of atmosphere where they 
compete for customers, but also depend on each other's presence to attract customers 
looking for discs as well as for the degree of protection that numbers might offer. 
These markets however, are not permanent and when I was in the city in 2001 there 
was one such market which changed its location three or four times per year. 
On the other side of old style shops are the newer, more modern style shops. 
These new style shops tend to have better floor tiling, storefront glass display 
windows, larger square footage, and, overall, more expensive pricing. An example of 
this type is the chain store which moved in a block or two away from Chenggong a 
couple of years ago. The store has air-conditioning and a glass and wood fagade set 
just inside the pull down garage door so as not to give up its protection at nights. The 
owner spent a good deal of money, according to Wang Ge, coordinating the colors in 
the shop, tiling the floor, and making attractive racks for his products. While most 
customers I spoke to were not aware it was a chain shop, he has sought to connect his 
branches together through the name of the store and his color coded paint job. The 
difference between old style and new style shops has allowed the newer style ones to 
sell their discs at a slightly higher price and, as such, it has helped to spawn a wave of 
renovations in shops like Chenggong. 
The consumers of discs in Chenggong and the wider disc market in Xi'an can 
be roughly divided along age and gender lines as can be seen in Table 2. In general, 
younger informants were more interested in music and movies and students made up a 
large portion of Chenggong's visitors. Predictably, these consumption patterns also 
reflect the purchasing power of the groups: while DVDs may be the cheapest disc, 
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Age Range Gender Notes Buying Groups Format Notes 
, , _ - , Animated movie and 
Elemetjtary school Female’ male ^ parents Learning English titles: 
age and younger about equal ® D V D or V C D 
, , More female Single sex groups: 3 or „ „ „ 
Middle school age , ^ • , • r u Cassette Tapes b than male more girls, pairs of boys 
. . . , , , More female Single sex groups of 2 or Cassette Tapes and CDs; 
High school age , , more girls; boys came as , , , • r- “ 
b b than male M / p couples boys looking for software 
Mainly CDs, music VCDs, 
p . .. ^ , some cassette tapes; Men 
20-35 . y , , ‘ Singles and pairs looking for software; Some 
occasional male l…、；•n 
couples bought D V D 
movies 
n . .1 , o. 1 …/T^ Men: D V D movies; 
35-60** Primarily male. Sing es, occasional M /F Women: D V D , V C D 
some female couples . 
music 
** People who looked over 60 rarely visited the store. Those who did either accompanied a younger family member who wanted 
to buy or just seemed half-lost half-curious. I saw only one older gentleman enter alone to buy a Henan opera VCD. School ages 
are used because kids of these age groups invariably were those who attended school, they often arrived and left in uniforms. I 
chose not to use "college age" as a category as it is difficult to tell those in college from those already working and both consume 
such products. 
Table 2: Consumers and Consumption at Chenggong^^ 
their players are the most expensive and cassette players may be the only player many 
students can afford. Middle school and high school students almost exclusively 
bought cassette tapes and had this rack largely to themselves. Both boys and girls 
bought music tapes and they generally did their shopping as groups of three and more, 
choosing what to buy and then often sharing that purchase among themselves over the 
next few weeks. I saw very few college-aged men coming to Chenggong and, upon 
interviewing some I realized that they much preferred to listen or watch movies and 
music for free over the Internet. Many of them liked to play computer games and thus 
were often already in Internet cafes. College-aged women continued to buy music 
from shops like Chenggong although many of my own informants told me that they 
This table is a summary of my observations, impressions, and informal counting of customers at 
Chenggong, although I believe that the general trends described in the text also fit with most other 
stores I visited. Some stores, however, also sold software and so attracted more male customers in the 
younger age groups. 
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bought much less than they used to for the same reason.^^ This gender imbalance 
continued through adult age groups as well with women (or married couples) in these 
groups frequenting Chenggong much more often than men. Where younger men went 
to Internet cafes and thus not to Chenggong, middle-aged men were the primary 
consumers of Chenggong's DVDs. Also where younger students consumed in groups, 
older men invariably came shopping by themselves and told me that they generally 
watched the movies by themselves as well.^^ While some shops served relatively 
more DVD customers and others more upscale clients, like one which fully 
categorized its titles by director, actor, and genre, the age and gender demographics of 
categories were fairly constant from shop to shop. 
Chapter Breakdown 
This first chapter has provided a basic introduction to TP, Chenggong, and to 
the larger Chinese context. Chapter 2 will build on this to present essential 
background on the theoretical underpinnings of the study of the expansion of notions 
26 Female students actually go to Internet cafes a lot less than their male counterparts. Many cafes are 
seen as dirty, smoky, masculine places where only "bad gir l" types would go. This is beginning to 
change however as cafes begin to clean themselves up and offer more chatting services which appeal to 
both sexes. When I was in Xi 'an in 2001，Internet cafes were popular places for high school and middle 
schoolers to hang out as well primarily for playing Counterstrike, an intranet team shooting game of 
terrorists and counter terrorists, but in 2005 recent government regulations were actually being 
enforced to prevent this recreation for those under 18 (meaning at least that people who were obviously 
too young were turned away). 
Perhaps as a reaction to these demographics, some music and movie businesses have sought to 
partner with software shops or to begin selling software themselves. One such hybrid shop that I visited 
frequently, had more younger male customers than Chenggong. While it sold software most customers 
preferred only to browse not to buy. The majority of the "software" sales, and its profits, were actually 
from online gaming refill cards (like for World of Warcraft). The music and movies boss claimed that 
the merger allowed them to draw in new customers as well as a steady stream of rent. The idea was that 
these men buying refil l cards would also browse through their music and movies (and thus eventually 
increase sales). The verdict is still out however, whether or not this alliance actually achieved any 
increase in the sales as the software store had only recently moved in. This hybrid store trend reflects 
the only major difference in demographics of consumption that I noticed between Chenggong and other 
shops, including those that most informants claimed sold zhengban only. 
27 This trend of consuming DVDs, however, is also likely to change in the future as more middle-aged 
men have some computer skills and the economic ability to buy a computer and the Internet. Several 
such informants told me they stopped buying DVDs and now only watch movies over the Internet. 
3 5 
of ownership of intangible property. It sketches out the various ways in which 
anthropology has touched on and interacted with the realm of IP, from aboriginal 
cultural rights, to farmer's right to save seeds, to disputes over access to critical 
human archeological/ancestral remains. The chapter takes this opportunity to 
delineate the politically constructed nature of IP by reviewing key works in the field 
and explaining how the current study contributes to this dialogue. Finally, at the end 
of the chapter I outline three key analytical concepts 一 metaphorical framing, which 
helps to determine how we look at and react to problems; the untidiness of 
implementation, which draws attention to multiple actors each with multiple 
intentions; and stages of piracy advocacy, which sets forth structural aspects of IP 
acceptance and rejection. 
Chapter 3 moves the focus back to Chenggong Music and Movies to present 
the concept of dual, overlapping, systems of right and wrong. Both a legal and moral 
conceptual system are alternately at work in my informants' perception of disc piracy. 
Furthermore, these are neither completely separate nor fully interacting systems. This 
chapter explores the disc industry as my informants, both shop owners and 
consumers, saw it. In placing Chenggong in the context of multiple distinct types of 
disc sellers, I seek to show that consumers view different categories of shops as more 
or less likely to have daoban. Importantly, along with this variety, consumers 
emphasized that disc selling is neither absolutely good nor absolutely bad. It must be 
seen relatively. Some kinds of shops, and more so, some kinds of bosses, are more 
moral than others. The industry as a whole is no more or less moral than any other. 
The overlapping moral and legal systems are intimately tied to the history of China's 
opening as well as to selective adherence to more "traditional" Chinese culture. 
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Throughout this chapter, I make use of the frame, similar to that of my informants, of 
daoban as a business. 
While Chapter 3 delves mainly into the moral system in exploring daoban as a 
business. Chapter 4 shifts the focus, and our metaphorical frame, to looking at daoban 
as an illegal activity. This is not the illegal activity that the music industry might 
claim; locals associate daoban with petty crime rather than terrorism, drugs, or the 
Mafia. Although associations with terrorism, drugs, or organized crime may come 
into play in the production and distribution of daoban, especially as the PRC gets 
more successful in cracking down on the practice, this is not the predominant view of 
local people. By showing which types of crime my informants do identify as 
conceptually similar to daoban, we can better understand the local enforcement 
situation. Specifically, this chapter will present links and ramifications of links 
between daoban and pornography, corruption, and unlicensed vendors. 
Chapter 5 then takes this focus on the context of daoban itself and inverts it to 
look at how daoban relates to intangible property, the very thing whose absence 
should define it. By focusing on consumption and relying on in-depth interviews, I 
seek to draw out cultural and social elements like gift-giving, the centrality of 
performance, and the nation to begin to define contextually both daoban and 
zhengban. This chapter importantly makes use of the moral and legal backgrounds 
provided in earlier chapters to show how daoban and zhengban relate to downloaded 
files, gift giving, and intangible property. The chapter concludes, however, by 
wondering to what extent all of these culturally specific elements of Chinese 
conceptions of intellectual property are really exclusively Chinese. 
How much of this can be seen as a part of structural stages of IP advocacy and 
how much can be ascribed to agency? What is the future for IP in China? How can a 
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study of IP in a city in China be relevant to the overall study of intangible property? 
Chapter 6, the conclusion to this thesis, returns to the original questions laid out in 
this introduction with the explicit help of both the literature and theories of Chapter 2 
and the ethnography and analysis of chapters 3, 4, and 5. By privileging informants' 
voices and analyzing what they have to say as well as what I saw people do, this 
anthropological approach to IP seeks to reorient anthropology toward the importance 
of studying the underpinnings of this new knowledge economy. While copyrights, 
patents, and trademarks each work very differently, and their application in different 
sectors or on different types of property produces significantly variable results, the 
system as a whole continues to expand based on political rather than economic 
impetuses. As a result, like property in land, ownership and the distribution of 
ownership of knowledge continues to have a potent impact on the continuance of 
inequalities worldwide. This study seeks to further our understanding of the social 
norms which may or may not legitimize these new forms of ownership and new 
structures of power. 
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Literature Review: 2 An Anthropological Approach to IP 
Throughout my fieldwork, in both casual conversations and more formal interview 
settings, my informants and I questioned the boundaries of Intellectual Property as 
well as the scope of my own research into it. This of course is one of the aspects of 
ethnographic research, the questions that you wish to answer and the answers that you 
are given (or, often the questions that are posed to you in return) may proceed in quite 
different directions. The people who speak with you do so voluntarily and, as such, 
they speak with you because they have something to say as well. 
As an anthropologist, I was interested in how local people viewed and 
interacted with intellectual property in the form of the products that they, or others 
they had seen, consume. Yet we also ended up discussing the return of historical relics 
from international museums back to China, government action to sweep vendors from 
the streets, the pros and cons of renting shop space from private vs. state owners, what 
right the United States had to land on and experiment dangerously with a passing 
comet, and why I didn't have to pay China for the right to use the paper (a Chinese 
invention) in my notebook. Our range of topics then touched on multiple kinds of 
property from intellectual to cultural to physical. They included suggestions of the 
diversity of ways people see and contest the ownership of property and, as such, they 
reflect the range of combinations of ownership and use rights existing in China today. 
Who are the owners of this property or that and what rights do they have over what 
they own? In what ways are tangible and intangible property similar and in what ways 
are they different? 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the discussions that have 
already taken place in the realm of property and intellectual property as well as to 
position my own study in such a way as to make a contribution to this discussion. The 
chapter will begin by laying out some of the assumptions anthropologists make in 
regards to property and some of the ways and reasons they are researching property 
today. This current research will lead us from tangible property into some of the 
intricacies and complexities presented by intangible property through a look at the 
work of Marilyn Strathern. The implications of increased partitioning of the world of 
intangible ideas occurring in an already unequal global system has driven many 
anthropologists to consider expanding the idea of intellectual (private) property to 
cover cultural property of indigenous and disadvantaged groups. In this vein many 
anthropologists have joined (in their own way) with activists to help promote the 
rights of indigenous groups. While I recognize that the political effectiveness of a 
rhetoric of cultural property may indeed aid indigenous or disadvantaged groups to 
obtain some measure of control over their intellectual "assets," I tend to side more 
with Michael Brown (1998，2003) who points to the dangers of essentializing culture 
and of forgetting that indigenous groups also have divisions of interest within them. 
Moving away from this interaction with universalist human rights discourse, I 
next outline economic and legal perspectives which see IP as a policy. While 
economic articles on this subject do have a diversity of perspectives toward the degree 
of IP protection countries should adopt, their focus on IP is similar to their focus on 
private property — something necessary for propelling growth in the capitalist 
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system. Critiques of this economic approach have stressed the notions of power and 
politics over economic justifications for the system of IP. This has provided a deeper 
understanding of how intellectual property rights are constructed by and for the 
benefit of specific groups. 
The final section of this chapter will then address the specific case of China 
taking into account the ideas of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) on metaphorical framing, 
of Lawrence Lessig (2004) on stages of copyright advocacy, and of Norman Long 
(1992, 2001) on the untidiness of policy implementation. This introduction to the 
academic ideas that I will be pulling on and building off of throughout this thesis 
should set the stage for later chapters which will present analyses that, in turn, have 
been constructed on the voiced ideas and behavior of my informants and friends in the 
field. 
The Anthropology of Property 
While many people get in the habit of looking at property as a relationship 
between a person and an object, for example me and my computer, anthropologists 
(and lawyers for that matter) tend to stress that property is a matter of rights and 
relationships. Anthropology explains property as a bundle or "network of social 
relations that governs the conduct of people with respect to the use and disposition of 
things" (Hoebel 1966: 424 quoted in Harm 1998: 4). By this definition, then, property 
rights are only exercisable in regard to other people. Therefore, in the absence of other 
people (or simply of any people) there then can be no property as there is no 
differentiation of rights. Taken a step further, property can be seen as a form of 
communication, “connecting] even as it divides," because it requires explicit 
indication to other people of one's entitlement to resources (Demian 2004: 62). This 
also implies, perhaps obviously, that property rights entail both people with and 
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people without (or without certain) rights to a particular object. Harm, emphasizing 
this power element, thus seeks to specify the focus of anthropological treatments of 
these bundles of rights by framing property as the "distribution of social entitlements" 
(Hann 1998:7). 
Anthropological views of property, and of private property in particular, 
depend largely on and react to the ideas and justifications of it provided by important 
philosophical thinkers of the West such as Locke, Rousseau, and Marx. Echoes of 
each of these theorists' ideas run throughout this chapter and throughout much current 
anthropological work. Locke's work on property focused on finding a justification for 
individuals to hold property in private in the face of what he accepted as God's gift of 
the world to humanity to be held in common. He proposes that by investing one's 
labor into natural resources, one can convert such common property into something 
which could be owned individually (O'Brien 1996: 58-59). At first, as he saw it, such 
private enclosures mattered little because no one person could enclose enough of the 
earth's seeming unlimited abundance to detract value from the remainder, the 
commons. In fact, enclosures contributed to society because, by investing their labor 
in the land, the land would be induced to give more produce than it would naturally 
and thus its usefulness would increase. Key, then, to Locke's perspective was this 
moral idea of maximizing usefulness. Wastefulness, on the other hand, he considered 
to be immoral. Thus a person or group who enclosed so much (in the way of land or 
resources) that the remaining property left in the commons was diminished, a person 
who took more fruits from nature than he could consume, or the mere existence of 
huge tracts of relatively valueless land (valueless because it was held in common and 
was still in its "natural state") which had not yet been worked into private property all 
constituted forms of waste and thus of immorality (Locke 1996). 
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Rousseau built on Locke's ideas of the importance of labor in transforming the 
commons to private property, but with an added emphasis on inequality. In his eyes, 
humanity in a time before private property was conflict free and socially cooperative 
while civilized society was a brutal world of accumulation and war. The combination 
of individual people's inherent differences of ability with a legal right to accumulate 
private property meant that the skillful increasingly became wealthy while the others 
became poor, simply by not keeping up. While he sees property indeed resulting from 
mixing labor with common resources, he views this justification as weak and 
unworkable were it not that the wealthy had also created government, societal, and 
legal institutions which would protect their new-found advantages (Rousseau 1996). 
Marx can, in some ways, be seen as following both Locke and Rousseau. As 
with Locke, he too stresses the role of labor and importance of use. As with Rousseau, 
he places the inequalities resulting from private property in the foreground. Yet, at the 
same time, Marx is not seeking to justify private property, but rather to describe how 
such property works. Thus when focusing on labor, Marx emphasizes how capitalism 
transferred the rights of ownership of property or commodities from those who 
labored to produce them to those who supplied the capital or means of production. He 
also goes into detail on the value of commodities and the degree to which they rely 
not on the amount of labor that went into producing them, nor on the usefulness (use-
value) of the commodity, but rather on what other people are willing to trade 
(exchange-value) for it (Marx 1996).28 
Money is also an important link through all three of these philosophers. Locke, for instance, saw 
money as the commonly agreed upon method of preventing waste by allowing people to transform, 
through exchange, perishable goods for an imperishable object. Rousseau, on the other hand, saw 
money as an evil which facilitated the movement of resources thereby increasing the accumulation of 
them by some people more than others. For Marx, money was a key element of the fetishization of 
commodities, this process by which the role of labor is disguised and replaced by value derived purely 
through exchange. 
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Working off of this theoretical background, anthropologists have focused on 
land for much of their research into property due to the tremendous influence systems 
of land rights have had in structuring, or at least in understanding the structure of, 
economic, political, and social entitlements in our fields of study. In a larger sense, 
however, these anthropological ideas also have to do with the nature of ownership and 
commodification; thus with a wide range of objects. In keeping with this widening, 
Hann describes a recent shift in focus from Marxian production (both of agricultural 
and industrial kinds) to consumption 一 researching the values and identities 
expressed in property's symbols. Although giving credit to those who have shifted the 
focus into consumption and thus onto the consumer as well, he maintains that this is 
not an end in itself. By zeroing in on distribution, Hann uses these values to better 
understand inequalities and to refocus on relations of power (ibid.: 45). As I will 
explore later on, in the case of intellectual property these definitional pleas to keep in 
mind power and inequality provide reason to study IP both at the local as well as the 
global (or national) levels (Moore 2001). 
Taking this model of property as relationships and applying it to intangible 
property, we find that it plays out a bit differently than it does with tangible property. 
While anthropologists often look at changes in regimes of property, perhaps from 
socialist to post-socialist regimes, they have not had much experience in looking at 
the creation of property. Anthropological studies in post-socialist societies contribute 
much to our understanding of communal and private property and of the lack of 
wholesale "transitions" between them despite political rhetoric (see Hann 2002; 
Hohnen 2003; Verdery 1998; Walder and Oi 1999). By investigating the local 
situation, these anthropologists discover the variations occurring today and can gain a 
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better understanding of the political, economic, and social reasons why such expected 
change has or has not happened. 
In the realm of intangible property, this is directly applicable to investigations 
of the relationships of property between the holders of IP and the producers of the 
physical product (or copies of it) that will eventually be sold. Yet, while consumers 
are involved in the exchange of physical property during their monetary transactions, 
they are not involved in a transfer of intangible property. There is no interaction or 
communication between the holder of the TP and the actual consumer of the physical 
optical disc. Consumers may own the tangible disc, but merely buy the right to use, 
passively, its content. Rights of ownership of intangible property are rarely 
transferred,29 and the rights to copying remain with the producing company, not with 
the product. In this way, IP serves more as a raw material inputted into the physical 
property than as a part of the transaction itself. This is despite the work that holders of 
IP have done in convincing consumers that they should watch out for copyright issues 
when they consume. From within the market, however, this makes good sense as 
consumers must be convinced to buy a more expensive licensed version of the same 
product. 
With the growth of what has been "described [as] a fundamental shift of the 
overall economic system towards [...] intellectual capitalism" (Granstrand 1999: 13) 
even companies traditionally seen as heavy in raw materials like those in the oil 
industry have substantial commitments in BP {ibid.: 12). Thus in addition to Harm's 
emphasis on tangible property, new relations centering on "property in knowledge," 
the idea of controlling potential profit through the ownership of ideas (Strathern 1999: 
29 This holds especially beyond the initial (and frequent) transfer between authors with little bargaining 
power and their publishing or producing companies. In this case many wil l give up their rights of 
ownership in totality in return for the chance to publish it and a one time payout. This difference is 
clear when contrasted with the frequent transferals involved in daily transactions of tangible property. 
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162), quickly have opened the intangible up to commoditization — allowing it to be 
sold as part of the "information economy" and defining new relationships to be 
explored. Marilyn Strathern (1999), using ethnographic techniques and based in a 
Melanesia!! setting, explores what types of "things" can be owned. Alluding to this 
increase in categories of ownable "things," she challenges the perceived deep-seated 
distinction that Western philosophy makes between people and things. Her 1999 work 
begins by introducing the issues of ownership that have arisen as a result of new 
reproductive technologies. Strathern examines a case from Tennessee over whether 
frozen embryos constituted "people" or "property" and thus whether to a allow a 
woman to bring one of them to term against the wishes of her ex-husband. She sees 
current debates over such property rights, as well as over intellectual property rights, 
as blurring the traditional Euro-American distinction between person and property. At 
the same time however, she points out that this division, declaring that objects or 
things can be owned but people cannot, has never been as clear as we might make it 
out to be, especially given the latent concept of ownership in a parent-child 
relationship (ibid.: 139). Furthermore, her work points out the role that such analogies 
of parent and child have had in legitimating intellectual property^^ through the foil of 
the author (to which I will return in a later section of this chapter). 
Moving a step beyond this, she shows how the same analogy, applied in 
reverse could easily change our understanding of ownership in the parent and child 
relationship. If intellectual property can be owned because it is the child of its creator, 
then perhaps children, despite being people, also can be owned in some way. This 
then brings justification to the strong meaning of the "my" in my child, and further 
This analogy of parent and child also happens to fit with Locke's older justification for private 
property although that is not how it was phrased by him. The parents, through their labor, have created 
a new person which is, by its nature a part of themselves. Similarly, people, through their labor, can 
turn an object from its natural state into something that they own. 
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blurs the distinctions between people and things {ibid.\ 165). Indeed "[the world] is 
expanding in terms of new candidates for ownership" {ibid.: 23) pregnant with the 
potential to change our relationships with old kinds of property, other people, and 
intangibles like ideas, genes, songs, and stories. 
Human Rights Discourses 
Strathern's discussion of changing analogies and concepts of property in 
certain areas of social and legal norms leads directly into the primary arena wherein 
anthropologists engage with the subject of TP. Given the discipline's historical 
involvement with minority and indigenous populations as well as a more recent 
tendency to acknowledge the power inequalities that help to shape their world, it is no 
surprise that we find many anthropologists engaging in IP debates from the 
perspectives of farmers' rights and cultural property. In relation to the former, 
Stephen Brush (1992) carefully explores the benefits of various models of protection 
for the biodiversity that often surrounds indigenous people and whose benefits they 
know as a part of their cultural knowledge. Often this knowledge is not given credit as 
it is part and parcel with their cosmological outlook (which is incompatible with a 
scientific worldview). Vandana Shiva (2001) describes, in a more polemical piece, 
how bioprospecting companies from the West freely "pirate" indigenous resources, 
synthesize them, and claim patents. Companies may then force those same groups to 
buy the resulting medicines or seeds at a high price (sometimes with a contract to 
prevent the replanting of seeds) without any profit returning to the people or to the 
preservation of the resources relied upon. Brush and others (see Cleveland and 
Murray 1997 for this debate) then seek to use anthropological knowledge of 
indigenous property and cultural systems to redesign and extend Western concepts of 
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IP to protect communal property and allow farmers the right to replant their genetic 
heritage. 
As for the latter, the recognition that, through increasing claims by indigenous 
groups to museum specimens, anthropology had largely been complicit in the stealing 
of native people's cultures, has led to advocacy for protecting their cultural heritage 
through an extension of IP to cover "cultural property."^' Danell Posey (2002) argues 
that the commodification of indigenous people's sacred plants, medicines, dances, and 
music amounts not only to disrespect and profit stealing, but also to a violation of 
their human rights. Posey, as one argument in a work covering all sides of the issue by 
Barken and Bush (2002), also pushes for extensions and revisions to existing TP 
statutes that would give native people's the right to decide how and when their culture 
is appropriated. 
On the other side of the issue，Michael Brown (1998，2003) explains the 
dangers of establishing a codified, and therefore static, version of cultural rights due 
to the inherently dynamic nature of culture and of the people who belong to that 
culture. Brown introduces a range of complex examples illustrating the political 
disagreements that can arise within indigenous groups to illuminate the difficulty of 
one statute or set of statutes to deal fairly with all cases. Thus Brown points instead to 
the role of anthropology in advertising the issue and to the subsequent role of 
governments, museum curators, and indigenous groups to negotiate individual 
solutions that will satisfy both native people's demand for respect as well as the 
general population's (and social scientists') need for understanding (2003). 
Strathern points out an intriguing difference however, between IP and Cultural Property wherein 
cultural property is "authentic because it can be shown to have been handed on[’ or transmitted, while] 
intellectual property is claimable precisely because it has not" (1999: 169). 
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The concept of IP that such scholars, indigenous leaders, and, increasingly, the 
general population wield is one of natural right. According to this discourse, just as 
individuals can own a copyright, farmers have some sort of natural right to own their 
seeds and cultures have a natural right to control the use of and profit from their local 
knowledge, songs, images and sacred symbols. Anthropologists and others here, 
thus key into the idea of universal human rights and, while IP in fact causes numerous 
complications through contradicting other neighboring human rights like the right to 
health (Chapman 2002), it is enshrined in numerous international agreements. 
Furthermore, characteristic of human rights debates, the debate over IP has caused 
division between two "competing universalisms" (Englehart et al. 2003: x) of 
common property and culture on the one hand and private property and economy on 
the other (Irr 2003). 
The political necessity of framing each side of an argument as a universal has, 
as I summarized Brown above, led to an essentialized view of culture and a dangerous 
assumption of undifferentiated indigenous g r o u p s ” The primary problem with this 
treatment of the issue is that, by legitimating IP as a human right (or universal) to 
support their claims to protect minority peoples, anthropologists may be aiding in 
hastening the spread of ownership and specifically of copyright to cover more and 
more areas. The next sections will explore in more detail how we came to hold this 
conception of IP as a natural human right and advocate instead for focusing on it as a 
The relative success of this discourse can be seen in the propagation of laws in the United States (and 
elsewhere) like NAGPRA (the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act) in 1990 
which provide a process for the repatriation of cultural artifacts proven or suspected to be of Native 
American origins and the inclusion of intangible cultural heritage as a part of the United Nations' set of 
recognized cultural heritage among others (see, for instance, Nason 1997). 
33 Strathem replies to this critique by explaining that, given the "existing [ . . . ] social inequities [in the 
world...] , TPR is also a force to be harnessed f... - ] it is a political slogan of (international) power" 
(1999: 203). Thus while she recognizes the dangers of essentializing culture and further empowering 
subgroups of indigenous peoples over other subgroups, she sees this as a unique opportunity to begin to 
right a severe power imbalance. 
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policy instrument constructed for political reasons by particular individuals and 
groups. 
Economic Pragmatism? 
The idea of IP grew gradually out of philosophical and economic debates in 
Western Europe and thus economics, while not placing a large emphasis on its study, 
was one of the first disciplines (and the only for a long time) to look into its 
intricacies. In economics, IP is studied not as a human right, but as a policy method 
for correcting market failures. Knowledge in the form of inventions (patents) or 
creations (copyrights) requires substantial investment to produce but, once invented, 
compiled, written, or recorded, making further copies costs extremely little. In their 
introduction to a four-volume collection on the economics of IP, Towse and 
Holzhauer (2002) suggest that IP rights are designed to prevent underinvestment in 
knowledge creation (innovation) through the manufacture of scarcity — temporarily 
limiting knowledge distribution. This provides the incentive (monopoly profit) that is 
meant to induce creators to disclose information to the public rather than keeping it 
secret. Like private physical property, economists see IP as necessary to avoid a free-
rider effect and, despite intangible property's unique ability to be shared without 
diminishing the value of the original, to prevent the tragedy of the commons (overuse 
of resources held in common).�^ 
In spite of their emphasis on an utilitarian perspective rather than one of 
universal human rights, this approach to IP also relies on an important assumption. 
The assumption is that IP, as a system, has a positive effect on innovation rates that is 
better than its alternatives. Unfortunately, there have been few conclusive studies of 
34 An interesting exception to this is thai trademarks do seem to lose some value as they are 
reproduced. This then quickly ties into theories and discussions on branding. 
5 0 
its overall effect and there are now no satisfactory opportunities^^ to understand its 
effect vis-a-vis other systems of knowledge creation. One example suggesting 
negative potential is described by Lawrence Lessig (2004:67). The patent for FM 
radio was bought by RCA from one of its engineers in order to prevent its 
development by others. The difference in sound quality was so large between FM and 
the AM standard, that RCA worried that its enormous existing investment into 
covering the United States with an AM radio network would be almost immediately 
obsolete. By owning the patent, they could prevent both the original inventor and any 
other company from encroaching on their monopoly over radio and thus protect their 
investment in AM technology. Patents protected RCA's investment in innovation, but 
at the expense of overall technological innovation in neighboring fields. 
Increasingly, economic articles also discuss the potential of IP to have a 
deleterious effect on innovation (Heller and Eisenberg 1998): 
Almost the only points of consensus regarding the role of the IPR system in 
economic history are that its role is intrinsically difficult to assess and that 
there is no persuasive evidence that the IPR system has ever played a major 
role. [...] While there are plenty of accounts of cases where patents have 
played major as well as minor roles in promoting as well as delaying or 
distorting technical progress, there are few if any studies showing the impact 
of the patent system upon the stream of innovations and the opening up of new 
technological fields and industries on the aggregate (Granstrand 1999: 41). 
Similarly, studies of economic research by Penrose in 1951 and again by 
Mazzoleni and Nelson in 1998 find no economic justification to institute^^ national 
patent laws (Lerner 2002: 1)，the historical basis of all forms of IP. At the same time, 
Lai (1998) and Yang (1998)，working with theoretical economic models of a 
This is primarily due to its expansion and the methodological difficulty of comparing what is with 
what might have been. Similarly difficult would be comparing what is in a developed country (which 
have IP due to the processes described above) with what is in any country without an IP system (which 
necessarily would mean economically and technologically poorer countries due to our current world 
system). 
36 Most such authors conclude, due to our lack of knowledge, that it would be “irresponsible [ . . . ] to 
recommend abolishing i t" (Machlup 1958: 80 quoted in Granstrand 1999: 47). The problem with this 
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simplified world find very few circumstances under which developing countries 
would willingly embrace IP laws. Yet still, the world has already moved on its own to 
force developing countries to adopt them. Keith Maskus (2000) introduces this 
extension in practice as a technical change that is the result (with, he acknowledges as 
an aside, some pushing from the United States) of lowered costs, global economic 
integration, and the increasing importance of information products. This drive toward 
efficiency then encourages the standardization of diverse national legal codes^^ that 
will move the world toward "a global economic optimum" {ibid.: 12). Thus theory 
fails to find benefits for developing countries or for the system of TP in general. 
However, in practice, both policy makers and the general public often assume TP's 
expansion is not only merely technical, but also that "modernizing economies benefit 
from [innovation created through] IP protection" (Rapp and Rozek 1990: 101). 
Despite its pragmatism, many authors taking this economic approach fail to make a 
connection between theory and practice largely because they simply assume that 
economic encouragement of innovation was and is IP's raison d'etre. 
The Return of Power 
It is then at this juncture that political science and sociology have asserted that 
the difference between economic theory and its practice lies not in rational 
economics, but rather in rational political policy (Ostergard 2003: 2). Libecap 
attributes "the persistence of seemingly perverse property rights in the face of what 
would appear to be obvious alternatives" (1989: 3) to the relative political bargaining 
power of interest groups. Similarly in sociology, Christopher May (1998) stresses that 
perspective is that they envision the IP system as something already in place, a fete accompli, rather 
than as an ongoing and expanding process. 
The Trade Related aspects of IP. This is one of a battery of international agreements aimed at 
"harmonizing" national legal statutes. 
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the emergence or construction of intellectual property regimes has little to do with 
searching for an "optimum" but instead, has to do with power. 
Duncan Matthews (2002) then extends these arguments to the 
internationalization of IP through the TRIPs agreement. Matthews sees the force 
behind TRIPs as a coalition of multinational corporations who successfully pressured 
their governments to endorse IP legislation, but whose coalition, he says, is now 
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facing disintegration as members' interests begin to diverge. The case of China 
illustrates the pressure developed governments have brought to defend their 
industries' interests (see Mertha 2005^^). Most recently this has centered on China's 
entrance into the WTO and threats of Section 301 trading sanctions from the US 
(Neigel 2000; Ostergard 2003), but such concepts have been forced on successive 
Chinese governments since the end of the nineteenth century (Alford 1995: 33). 
These scholars have then succeeded in shifting the discussion of IP from its 
economic role in innovation to an acknowledgement of the integral part that politics 
and power have played in its institution. They confirm the historical and purposeful 
construction of this system at a societal level (thus without recourse to individuals). It 
is this constructed system that is now beginning to look natural due to repeated 
appeals to metaphorical framing (see next section) and human rights (including 
cultural property as discussed above). The role of specific groups within society (and 
with power) also should give us pause when we hear of new categories of ownership 
which someone argues are somehow "natural" rights. A case in point is Boyle's 
.飞片 For an alternative explanation of the evolution of the TRIPs agreement basing itself less on coalitions 
of companies and more on an international class of capitalist entrepreneurs see Richards (2004). 
Mertha (2005) provides a comprehensive account of modern pressure placed on China to conform to 
the United States' standards on IP. While he evaluates the use of Section 301, special negotiations, and 
joint agreements, he sees the most useful pressure not coming from government to government 
relations at all. Instead, Mertha points to the importance of horizontal pressure by foreign companies, 
industry groups, and (slowly) domestic pressure groups directly on local enforcement agencies. This is 
most successful, he notes, when such pressure groups are wil l ing to pick up the tab for enforcement 
actions as it provides income or at least budgetary release for cash strapped local enforcement agencies. 
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argument that patents may influence research and thus innovation in certain directions 
based on profitability or the relative ease of getting patents (1996: 13). This thereby 
could skew research from basic towards applied knowledge as well as perhaps 
orienting research on medicine toward diseases affecting people who can pay. Such a 
connection might explain, at least partially, the lack of research on diseases like 
malaria and tuberculosis which disproportionately affect poor populations as opposed 
to obesity and coronary disease which are diseases of the rich (Farmer 1999). 
Importantly, this recognition of construction also is the beginning of a movement of 
IP study toward Harm's idea of distribution of property that enables us to look at 
inequalities and relationships. 
Toward a Theory of IP 
Thus while the above work has provided an essential description of how 
systems of IP were created at national and then international levels, for an 
anthropological approach to IP we must also comprehend how these macro forces 
shape and are shaped by individuals, families, and groups at a micro level. This 
section will highlight three theoretical perspectives that will shape the presentation of 
my arguments in the subsequent chapters: metaphorical framing, stages of copyright 
advocacy, and local contextualization. Helping to lead the way toward the local level 
are scholars who have researched how it is that this constructed policy has spread and 
become natural. Siva Vaidhyanathan (2001) renarrates the role that the romantic 
image of the "author" and "creator" has played in allowing copyright terms to be 
established and extended. He discusses particularly the role of famous and beloved 
icons like Mark Twain and Mickey Mouse in establishing and, over the course of the 
twentieth century, continuously extending the protection offered by copyright. This 
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occurred despite the reality that only famous, well-established authors have enough 
bargaining power to keep from selling their rights to more secure publishers or 
corporations. The metaphor of the author creating ("giving birth" to her creation), as 
alluded to in the discussion of Strathern above, plays on our conception of the 
relationship between parent and child and thus strongly shapes the naturalness of all 
IP including support for patents, copyrights, and even trademarks. 
Metaphorical Framing 
The role of metaphors in shaping how we think about an issue as well as what 
things we can not conceive of is one described at length by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980). In effect, the words that we use help to define the frame through which we see 
that portion of the world. One intriguing example of this is when President Carter 
declared the 1970s energy crisis as the "moral equivalent of war" {ibid.: 156). This 
then allowed his administration, newspapers, and the general public to conceive of an 
"enemy," "battles," "targets," "call[s] for sacrifices," and many others {ibid.: 156). 
Metaphorical framing "forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that 
it highlights, ]ead[ing] us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true'' 
{ibid.: 157, emphasis in original). If we were to respond then to a question as to 
whether or not the President had "won a major battle," we would be required, 
regardless of our response, to work from within that metaphor. The "true" response to 
such a question then depends less on an objective evaluation and more on the 
boundaries of the metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson explain that while our minds cannot 
work in the absence of metaphor, we can change our metaphors {ibid.: 239). Seen in 
the light of an alternative metaphor, the answer and even the question might be 
completely different. 
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Building off of this, another aspect of metaphorical framing's power is that we 
often do not recognize that it is working. Cognitive metaphors are not generally things 
that we think up on our own (although literary metaphors often build on pre-existing 
cognitive metaphors) — they structure our thoughts, but do so at an unconscious 
level. Besides being unconscious, such metaphorical frames are systematic, pervasive, 
and culturally specific (Barcelona 2003). Intellectual property itself, for instance, 
relies on a metaphor which equates knowledge and ideas with property and 
ownership. As the above sections discuss, there is very little that is "natural" about the 
exclusive private ownership of an idea; it is the acceptance of this underlying 
metaphor (and others which complement it like that of the sacred author or inventor) 
that leads us to see it as "true." It is also a result of this metaphor that it was important 
for me to include reference to anthropological and philosophical work on property 
earlier in this chapter rather than a myriad of other works on other neighboring topics. 
This leads us to wonder why it is that some metaphors succeed and become 
natural (like the idea that "love is war," for instance) while others fail. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) do not explicitly address this question in their work, but do provide 
hints to their position, especially in sections where they discuss the issue of truth. The 
first, and perhaps most important point, is that in the absence of an alternative 
metaphor the existing metaphor will certainly succeed and we, most likely, will not 
realize that there are other possibilities. A second reason some metaphors succeed is 
that they are one of a group of conventional metaphors (or close derivatives of them), 
meaning that they have been in common use in a variety of situations among a 
particular cultural group for a long time. Third, metaphors often succeed because they 
are well articulated by people in power who are careful to stress only those aspects of 
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the total issue that the metaphor illuminates well (hiding those aspects where the 
correlation between reality and the metaphor breaks down). 
As with the wider issue of enculturation, there is, however, more here than 
simply a matter of ideology and cultural dupes. While ideology, political or other 
power, and the ability to repeat a message multiple times do play a strong role in the 
acceptance (or imposition) of a metaphor, other factors can provide a basis for the 
failure of even such well propagated frames. First, a new metaphor should not clash 
with other pre-existing conventional metaphors/" To succeed, it should not only not 
clash with other ones, but it should fit systematically with them. Thus the “Nation as 
a Person" metaphor is powerful not just because presidents advocate it, but also 
because it fits with the metaphor of an "International Community of Nations” as well 
as with metaphor of the "Nation as our Mother or Father" (Lakoff 2005)."^ ^ Second, to 
a certain extent, a new metaphor must also fit with our own personal understanding of 
the world and our own personal interests: "We understand a statement as being true in 
a given situation when our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of 
the situation closely enough for our purposes" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 179). 
Part of intellectual "property's" success has been the absence of any ready 
alternative metaphor for us to change to (even the creative commons and copyleft 
movements which stridently oppose copyright still do so working from within the idea 
如 An example of a time where such a clash of metaphors causes problems and alerts us to the 
" inconsistencies of our metaphorical frames is when we are asked to turn the air conditioning down. 
Here we are confronted with two opposing metaphors connected to down: Colder is Down, but Lower 
Electricity is also Down. In English at least, we often must ask a second question to find out i f the 
person is too hot or too cold (and thus i f the dial should be turned "higher" or "lower"). The reason 
that neither metaphor loses its legitimacy is because both are used pervasively in other situations. I f 
one was a new metaphor that we were attempting to use, however, it would clash with the other 
existing conventional metaphor and would fail. 
41 To get an idea of this systematicity of metaphors try to trade the "Nation as a Person" metaphor for 
Benedict Anderson's "Nation as an Imagined Community" and see how it clashes with the other two. 
I f we see a nation as an imagined community it is difficult to see it also as a member of another 
community, or as a parent. This does not however mean that publicizing "Nation as an Imagined 
Community" would negate these other three opposing metaphors. Most likely it would itself fail 
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of property).42 One possible alternative can be found in Ivanhoe's (2005) description 
of Chinese philosophy's stress on knowledge as a part of the Dao. Looking at the 
issue as intellectual knowledge rather than property allows an interesting shift from 
stressing ownership to stressing use and sharing. It also moves us away from talking 
about ideas as countable nouns and instead as an uncountable noun, a part of a larger 
whole much like water is a part of the ocean. Owning a particular idea, using this 
metaphorical frame, would be as strange as saying you own "one" water. Taken as a 
part of the Dao, the issue of innovation, a prime justification for stronger (and, more 
recently, for weaker) TP laws, also becomes irrelevant. 
Boyle argues convincingly that the metaphorical frame of the author causes us 
to be blind to or downplay the significant role that previous incremental building of 
knowledge (in the public domain) contributed to the final discovery (1996: 207). 
Seeing IP as a human right—which itself, hidden behind its claims to universality, is a 
relatively young concept—then also helps to hide both IP's constructed policy aspects 
and its relative youth (having occurred on a wide scale in Europe only in the 1 
century with the Statute of Anne in England). Viewing the trade in daoban goods as 
"piracy" allows us to connect the practice to criminals thirsting for easy profit at the 
expense of others and to people beyond the control of the state. It prevents us from 
seeing such "pirates" as family business owners who might pay taxes, be backed up 
by contacts within the local government, and might just as easily have opened a 
"knock-off shoe store, a restaurant, or a flower shop in the same location. It also 
because the others are more firmly entrenched as a part of our conventional set of frames for 
understand how the world works (and how "nations" interact). 
42 Lakoff (2002) attributes the failure of failure of Liberal politics and the success of Conservative 
politics in the United States to a similar problem. Conservatives are able to articulate a comprehensive 
metaphorical frame with fits with each of their disparate positions. While Liberals, he claims, do have 
their own alternative comprehensive way of framing such issues they are not aware of it. Instead of 
proposing an alternative, they instead react to and thus within the Conservative metaphorical frame. 
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helps us to avoid the idea that "pirates" actually also follow the rules of supply and 
demand in the market. 
In this research I aimed to follow the progress within China of campaigns by 
multinationals, the United States, Europe, Hong Kong, and Japan to equate the 
dualism of "real" and "fake" with that of "licensed" and "pirated." A recent South 
China Morning Post article (Chan 2005: CI) using this frame describes raids on 
businesses dealing in 5.5 million HKD'^ ^ worth of "fake jewelry." The raid was 
conducted because of infringements on copyrights rather than their selling physically 
fake jewels. Most people would agree, when this is pointed out, that the difference 
between truly fake diamonds, perhaps made of glass, and real diamonds arranged in a 
design that was not properly paid for, is quite consequential. In the first case the 
tangible object is fake. In the second, the product's intangible aspect (its design) was 
unlicensed. Legally the two are very different, but increasingly we are being taught to 
use this metaphor of fake to describe "pirated" goods. The goal obviously is to 
provide a framing metaphor that allows for "natural" acceptance of increases to 
criminal penalties and prosecutions of piracy by making us see an unlicensed product 
in the same way as a defective one. 
Stages of IP Advocacy 
Building on the above research into the construction of the copyright system, 
Lawrence Lessig (2004) identifies a pattern of development in industries and nations 
beginning as pirates and ending as radical IP proponents. Countries including the 
United States were in favor of weak IP rights (or piracy) early in their development 
and then steadily turned into strong advocates not only of existing copyrights, but also 
of their expansion into new arenas as they themselves developed IP that needed 
43 Approximately 760 thousand US dollars in 2005. 
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protecting from competitors. Industries like Hollywood began by running from what 
they saw as innovation-stifling patent protection on the East coast (due to Edison's 
patent on the film projector) and now, in the form of the MPAA (Motion Picture 
Association of America) are a potent force on the side of making copyrights 
permanent. Patents and copyrights, he explains, noting the cases of FM radio and 
peer-to-peer file sharing, have allowed many larger or older corporations and 
industries to use IP as a method of blocking innovation by preventing startups from 
entering their corner of the market (Lessig 2004: 67,19). 
Lessig's aim is neither to support piracy nor an end to IP, but rather for a 
severe weakening of its role in favor of a strengthening of the public domain. 
Although he focuses almost entirely on the United States, the same general arguments 
can be made for stages of advocacy and the role the public domain worldwide. His 
interest in IP has led him to outline a theory that addresses, albeit at a more abstract 
level, Hann's entreaties to look at the distribution of social entitlements. One issue 
with his theoretical approach to "life stages" however, is that, as he has worked 
primarily within the United States, it does not account for any role played by culture 
or norms. Given their importance in guiding moral behavior, beyond ideas of legal 
and illegal, changing social and cultural norms are essential in this process of stages 
he describes. In focusing on China, one of the primary sites of piracy in the world 
today, and in turn focusing on an example within it where pirated goods are consumed 
as a normal part of everyday life, this study investigates the role that social and 
cultural norms have in affecting these stages at the local level. 
Thus I situate my study firmly in the realms of legal and economic 
anthropology.44 I am not interested only in the formal laws of a state, but also in the 
That is to say, I situate my study " f i rmly" straddling the intersections of politics, culture, and 
economics. 
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cultural conceptions and resulting norms regulating behavior beyond those laws. 
Especially in the case of laws that were forced upon a country from outside, at an 
everyday level, it is these norms that guide consumers' behavior. They have the 
potential to offer the laws legitimacy, without which, rules can not be adequately 
enforced (Mansell et al. 1995: 29). Culture can be consciously mobilized to oppose 
implementation as "local worlds are impinged on by global happenings. It [then] does 
not go without saying that because something is the law, locally or internationally, it 
is obeyed" (Moore 2005: 3). 
Local Contextualization 
While it may now seem a truism in anthropology to point out the need to 
situate behavior, beliefs, or processes in their local context, given the importance of 
metaphorical framing in the case of IP, this is all the more important. The third 
theoretical perspective that I plan to borrow in structuring my argument is that of 
"untidy development" drawn from the work of Norman Long (1992, 2001). In dealing 
with development efforts at a local level, Long notes that the idea of planned 
intervention as a "plan for action" that is then followed through with projects whose 
results are written up neatly is largely a myth. Instead, intervention should be seen "as 
an ongoing transformational process in which different actor interests and struggles 
are located" (Long 1992: 9). 
Thus he points to the fact that interventions involve multiple groups on 
multiple levels each with their own goals and methods for achieving them. 
Contextualizing development intervention means recognizing that, in the lives of 
people at a local level (including residents, anthropologists, NGO workers, and 
government officers), the phenomenon being studied is merely one among many other 
issues. As such, views and reactions towards it are intimately shaped by its untidy 
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context. In this way, he also provides a manner to combine the "global" and the 
"local" by seeing "that local practices include macro representations and are shaped 
by distant time-space arenas, but that these macro phenomenon are only intelligible in 
situated contexts. That is, they are grounded in the meanings accorded to them 
through the ongoing life-experiences and dilemmas of men and women" {ibid.: 6-7, 
emphasis added). 
By situating an analysis of campaigns against daoban and the business of 
selling daoban discs into the contexts that people in Xi'an situate them, we can begin 
to understand how the macro discourses of TP are and are not included in local 
practices. This contextualization will allow us to see how different metaphorical 
frames are used strategically by actors. Acknowledging the embeddedness of the 
global within the local and the untidiness of it all also provides insight into the roles 
that local (and even different groups within the local) and national government play. 
Importantly, Long provides a theoretical perspective on how cultural conceptions of 
daoban could have an effect on the seemingly inevitable stages in IP advocacy as 
described above by Lessig. 
China: Global Pressure and Local Response 
Starting in the first decade of the century, China was forced to adopt its 
own equivalent of foreign IP laws to offer protection to foreign national's intangible 
property. Beginning from this point then, following Lessig (2004), China might have 
started on its own road toward advocacy for IP protection based on the strength of its 
own stockpile of intangible assets. China however, as I described in Chapter 1，also 
has had a significant history of innovation occurring in the remarkable absence of any 
parallel to the West's IP system (Alford 1995). Given the degree of pressure placed 
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on it by various industries and nations, efforts often spearheaded by the United States 
and Section 301，as well as its own national government's stated aim of catching up 
with the West by turning itself into an information-based economy, what is happening 
in China? Why is its piracy rate still so high? How do Chinese consumers conceive of 
intangible property and how might this affect China's future movement toward IP 
advocacy? What can China tell us about the expansion process whereby new 
categories of intangible "things" can be owned"^^ or of the process by which that 
ownership is seen as "natural?" 
Turning then to China, Alford (1995) explains that while multiple dynasties 
had regulations on publishing, these were intended solely as means to secure imperial 
power, never resembling Western notions of TP for innovation. He notes that merely 
claiming ownership or prohibiting others from copying works does not amount to an 
automatic precursor to copyright or patent ideas. In China, these rights were meant to 
restrict the distribution of information as a form of censorship {ibid.: 16-17). It thus 
was neither a method of ensuring profit nor of encouraging innovation. In addition, 
Alford describes how copying was seen as a reaffirmation of "the quality of the work 
copied and [of] its creator's degree of understanding and civility. [...] True scholars 
wrote for edification and moral renewal rather than for profit" (Alford 1995: 29). 
45 A 2005 article in the International Herald Tribune by James Kanter explains that copyright for 
broadcast programs (television, radio, web) is owned by the writers, actors, and producing companies 
(depending on their own arrangements). The broadcaster of the program has no copyright in its 
broadcast. The article cites Fritz Attaway, general counsel of the MPAA, as saying that broadcasters 
deserve "a right to prohibit unauthorized use of their signals, in addition to the existing rights of 
authors and copyright owners." This would add an ownership right that would rest with broadcasters 
over one particular instance of the playing (broadcasting) of a particular program which they could 
enforce against "pirates" who tape or digitally copy it and transfer it on the Internet (thereby, the theory 
goes, undermining the viewership of the original broadcast which might not yet have occurred). For 
this discussion of expansion however, the last few lines of the article are most intriguing: 
Ben Ivins, of the National Association of Broadcasters in the United States, [ . . . ] noted that, so 
far, global copyright authorities had not even considered intangibles like Internet traffic as 
intellectual property, where ownership begins and ends or how much it is worth. Deciding 
these matters could take years and may not even be possible, Ivins suggested. "Does an 
Internet signal eventually turn into ether, into something so ephemeral that nobody can own?" 
he said. "The argument has become almost theological." 
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Furthermore, claiming ownership over a work should not be assumed to be 
claiming the same over its IP. It could perhaps more easily be related simply to the 
work itself — the physical property created. Weller (1998) remarks that while 
individual artists' works were valuable for collection, especially the eccentric (thus 
famous) ones, even subsequent owners of the painting would apply their own seals (or 
occasionally poems) to it. The physical paintings were thus the focus: 
"commemorat[ing] both their individual creators and their specific histories of 
ownership, recorded permanently on the paper itself {ibid.: 81). 
In discussing rampant piracy, Alford importantly describes the Chinese 
government's understanding that, as with Lessig,s copyright-poor countries and 
industries, they needed access to the knowledge of the West. Alford seems to agree 
then, from his section on Taiwan, that one necessity for promoting IP protection is the 
growth of a nation's own companies and industries who would be in favor of such 
protection. Yet, this may not be enough. He also stresses that, simply promulgating a 
new law does not mean starting a new way of life. There must be a social acceptance 
of this law and an internalization of it for it to actually change people's behavior. In 
this sense, he points to the necessity of a "rights consciousness." This cultural 
conception, beyond simply the law, political forces, or economics, is one, according 
to him, in which a society accepts both IP rights and the right of individuals to assert 
them "even with respect to those in positions of authority" (Alford 1995:117). 
r -
Moving now from a historical description to the present, Wang and Zhu 
(2003) offer an intriguing alternative perspective to piracy studies. They provide a 
look at distribution — a "middle part to an otherwise dichotomized attention" {ibid.: 
100) on the global points of production or advocacy for IP and the local points of 
consumption. Their work also establishes another context to help us to understand the 
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growth of the market for pirated discs. In this study they focus on distribution 
networks exploring and complicating our understanding of the connections between 
national and international policy and the trade in pirate films. Perhaps the most 
intriguing finding concerns how the pirate market (software) has stimulated the 
domestic production of VCD players (hardware) that are more forgiving when playing 
pirated (or badly burned) films. In effect, the pirate trade has led to a boom in VCD 
players in China (especially for those more forgiving to badly burned copies), despite 
their having been quickly eclipsed in much of the rest of the world by the DVD 
standard (ibid.: 108). 
These two studies on TP in China provide insight into the global pressure 
exerted on China, some general cultural background, as well as one of the contexts— 
distribution—into which we should fit the phenomenon of piracy. Yet, still we are 
lacking information on how these global discourses play out in the cultural 
conceptions of local people. The range of conversation topics with which I began this 
chapter are meant to illustrate how, in Xi'an, IP did not make up its own category in 
my informants' minds. Rather it is an integral part of many other themes and contexts 
that are played out in informant's conversations and behavior. 
The chapters that follow will attempt to situate the global and national 
pressure to adopt IP within local contexts as a way to begin to explain the role that 
agency does have within given structural restraints (Long 1992). People consciously 
rv-
and unconsciously contest these new categories of ownership by selectively drawing 
on "tradition" and on the way they envision their parents having done things. 
Grounded in ethnographic data, I aim to detail different forms of daily property 
relations in China beginning with the next chapter by looking at the metaphorical 
framing of daoban as a business. Chinese cultural conceptions and metaphorical 
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framing of IP provide an opportunity to fill in an essential gap left in our knowledge 
of local level norms, and thus in our knowledge of distributions of entitlements in 
China. With such an understanding we can then address many more questions about 
why China has such a high rate of piracy, how Alford's "rights consciousness" is 
being shaped, and how new categories of ownership in intangible property grow, 
spread, are resisted and adopted worldwide. 
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3 Daoban as a Moral Business 
Reading newspaper articles on "piracy," it is easy to get an impression of daoban as 
some sort of global shadow industry working to copy and distribute pirated products. 
While this is the image promoted by the copyright industries to support their quest for 
harsher penalties for copying, it also is, in some ways, the opposite of the consortium 
of companies (described in Matthews 2002) that sought to impose the TRIPs 
agreement. For the copyright industries this type of framing helps us to conceive of a 
"them" that "we" good consumers and legislators are fighting against. For researchers 
also, however, a similar frame helps to understand the networks and sophistication of 
this parallel business structure which allow "pirates" to acquire, copy, and distribute 
new movies around the world within days of their official opening. Yet, by framing 
daoban in this way, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain, we have allowed other 
elements to be obscured. 
This chapter seeks to actively change lenses to reveal other elements of the 
issue. The analysis will make use of an alternative metaphorical frame in the form of 
daoban as a small business. Besides presenting ethnographic elements that aid in 
understanding the context and perception of daoban, this chapter also introduces the 
idea that informants are working within and selectively using two separate, but 
interacting notions of right and wrong. The first, presented here, is one of moral and 
immoral. The second, concerning legal and illegal, though referred to in this chapter 
in the section on stealing, will be dealt with more thoroughly in Chapter 4. By 
framing daoban as a business and investigating its context, this also thus allows an 
exploration of the moral connotations of the practice. While on a basic level, this 
framework will be uncontroversial, on another level, it may be difficult to view the 
sale of "pirated" goods in such a "legitimate" manner. Importantly however, this is 
one of the ways that Chinese people do see it and therefore it is essential to 
understand. 
The Commoditization of IP 
The key to this framework lies in the fact that discs are not themselves 
intangible property, but rather quite tangible products. This is not to say that music, 
movies, and software discs do not have an intangible element of intellectual property 
within them, but rather to emphasize that this intangible aspect has been 
commoditized. Furthermore, people interact with the physical discs, this 
commoditized version of the intangible song or story, rather than with its intangible 
version. 
The relatively recent and ongoing (albeit forced) creation of intellectual 
property in China thus is occurring alongside processes of commoditization. By 
commoditization, I mean two things. First, commoditization is the process by which 
something which was freely shared becomes ownable and sellable. Here it refers to 
the processes by which our concepts of ownership are changing. What previously 
could not have been said to be owned (such as songs, stories, minority dances, seed 
germplasm, and modified DNA), now not only can be owned, but also have been 
commoditized 一 they can be bought, sold, licensed, and stolen. 
In the second meaning of commoditization, I mean to highlight the process by 
which intangible property is associated with a physical product. Rights to knowledge 
can, of course, be traded without being encased in a physical commodity — as when 
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rights to produce a CD are transferred from a musician to his producing company. 
However, most people interact with intangible property in the form of medicine, a 
CD, or a book which they buy or sdl.46 Within a newspaper or textbook article on IP 
a writer might guide her readers toward an abstract legal notion of intellectual 
property. Yet when interaction with IP occurs on a practical level, such guidelines are 
left behind and discs are interpreted as a part of specific local categories of 
commodities which may have little to do with IP. Disc stores, while not sites for the 
production of knowledge, are sites wherein both consumers and retailers are 
confronted with the commoditized version of IP at a day to day level. As such they 
are good places to explore these local categories of commodities and business. 
Price is all that Matters! 
When I spoke with people in Xi'an about my research, I quickly found that 
they were not at all interested in intellectual property and felt that there was nothing I 
could learn about it by talking to them. If I really wanted to understand this problem, 
then I should be doing research at the national level, speaking with government 
officials from the United States and China. These political experts would surely be 
better able to enlighten me on such an issue of state relations than they could. Beyond 
this nation to nation aspect (to which I will return in Chapter 5), most informants 
thought the topic was boring because it was so easily answered. Informants both in 
the city and the county seat explained when I asked why people buy daoban that the 
46 Commoditization also explains how people can agree with an overall discourse of IP rights while at 
the same time challenging them in the case of a specific product, as with downloading in the United 
States. While the discourse of IP tends to attempt an appeal to universality, thai "creation" or 
"authorship" be protected or rewarded, the reality is that the effect and appeal of TP protection differs 
depending on the specific kind of product and that product's local contexts. Thus while software and 
stories are equally authored, the effect that copyright protection spanning 70 years (after the death of its 
creator) would have on their respective industries is quite different indeed. 
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answer is the price. When I asked about the difference between zhengban and daoban 
the answer also was price. I asked about how to tell which was which, and again the 
answer was to look at the price. This section then explores the importance of 
consumers linking price with quality as a central component of understanding how 
intangible aspects of daoban are downplayed and how daoban is viewed locally as a 
business. 
On the level of the country, daoban is a problem because of China's 
relationship with the United States. But the common people (laobaixing) don't 
bother with it. It's like Wang Ge said, 99 in 100 people will buy the cheaper 
one and the others will look at that one person and laugh, not understanding. 
Even the Governor and the Mayor buy daoban. They buy it because it's 
cheaper. Of course they get someone else to go and do the buying for them, 
but they don't buy the 100 yuan one, they buy the one for 6 [Jing Ge, the 
manager of company Chenggong rents space from, 50s, male]. 
A common saying that many informants cited explained that "sorting by price, 
properly sorts the goods" {yifen jiaqian, yifen huo). Higher priced goods are 
zhengban and lower priced ones are daoban. This saying relies on a common idea that 
the quality and price of goods should correlate. Of course, my informants were well 
aware that business people might try to cheat their customers with goods whose price 
and quality did not match, but, in the long run, they felt those business people would 
not succeed in retaining customers and they would disappear. The goal for consumers 
then is to balance the quality of the product with the price. It is as simple as that. 
My informants continued to explain that, since many people in China are poor, 
they buy discs at low cost, giving up on higher quality, so as to save more money to 
spend on food. Most thought that, once T learned this, there was nothing further that 
needed research. To them, and perhaps to consumers of most products in China, this 
was a question of neoclassical economics — poor quality discs are sold because there 
is a demand for them and there is a demand for them because there are so many poor 
people in Xi'an. They saw selling daoban as a business like any other and daoban 
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itself as a product like any other. Each individual balances his budget with spending 
on the things that he wants and needs. 
Pricing Practices within Stores 
Chenggong, as is the case with most stores, set their prices by format rather 
than by popularity or any other method" At the beginning of the summer at 
Chenggong, the per disc price (in yuan) of selections were five for VCDs, six for 
DVDs, three fifty for tapes, and ten for CDs. Some other stores also had separate 
prices, one or two yuan higher, for those they claimed were HDCD or DVD-9 format 
as well. Thus while Chenggong had two or three different versions of the Incredibles 
DVD, the original English as well as one each dubbed in French and German, all were 
priced the same. Similarly, Jay Chou's latest album, one of the most popular of the 
summer, was priced the same as his older albums and the same as a Brittany Spears 
compilation CD. Pricing also did not change based on where the original movie was 
produced (Hollywood, Bollywood, Hong Kong, Japan, or Korea) or based on its 
intended audience (animated kids movies and those oriented towards adults were all 
the same). Thus pricing was not based on the content of the discs, but rather on the 
disc itself: that is, as this relates to the above discussion, if price is linked to quality, it 
is linked to the quality of the physical disc, not to the "quality" of the songs or films 
on the disc. 
A second related aspect of pricing in disc stores, was that the price differed 
based on the number of discs included in each package rather than on a per movie 
basis. Thus while all movies require at least two VCDs, most can be burned onto a 
single DVD. This meant that in 2005 a movie in VCD format actually was more 
expensive than the same one in DVD format. This situation was a reversal of that in 
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2001 where the price of a movie on DVD was higher. In the intervening years, the 
disc price for DVDs has dropped such that in most stores the DVD is now cheaper. In 
Xi'an then, most new movies came out in DVD format, while VCDs were primarily 
sold as music and karaoke titles. In the county seat there were significantly fewer 
DVDs and the primary format for both movies and karaoke titles was VCD.48 
For Chenggong, this pricing strategy made good business sense. To them, all 
discs are more or less equal as they have an arrangement with their wholesalers to 
allow them to exchange unpopular discs for other newer ones as necessary. This 
arrangement is similar to that which occurs between publishers or wholesalers and 
many book shops. The price per item purchased is higher, but the store gets a 
guarantee that they will not be stuck with the product if it does not sell. The 
wholesaler then can try to shift the exchanged disc onto another shop instead. 
The third and final aspect of pricing was the tendency of most stores to round 
prices off to the nearest yuan. If buying a large number of discs, one might also be 
able to get the total price rounded off a few more yuan as a bulk discount. In contrast 
to this general tendency, however, were many of the newer style stores which my 
informants thought sold zhengban discs. These stores, including a Xinhua music store, 
priced some of their selections to the tenth of a yuan. They also had variable pricing 
for CDs (although mainly stuck to a single flat price for VCDs). In Xinhua, it was 
explained to me by a college-aged female employee, that this was because the store 
had to buy titles from multiple different distributors and thus the stocking price was 
In an interesting side note, one of the biggest faults that critics of Apple computer's iPod online 
stores in the music (and now the movie industry) industry have is just this: songs are sold at a flat rate 
rather than marked up or down based on popularity or differences in licensing fees. 
While in the West we would tend to assume that DVDs are better than VCDs, in China this is not 
always the case. Many daoban DVDs actually do not have access to any added features or a menu 
function. Furthermore, my informants explained many more D V D players had difficulty reading 
daoban discs than VCD players did (for more on the daoban-hardware relationship, see e.g. Wang 
2003; Wang and Zhu 2003). Personally, I prefer VCDs because you can have both English and Chinese 
subtitles simultaneously rather than having to choose one or the other (as for most DVDs). 
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different for each title. When I pointed out that stores could just as easily change their 
markup in order to make the customer prices relatively equal if they wanted to, she 
said she felt that having different prices and marking them out to the tenth of a yuan 
both contributed to an overall image of a store as more modern. 
While none of my other informants specifically mentioned precision in pricing 
as a way to tell the difference between zhengban and daoban, most did emphasize the 
"modern" look of a shop and several saw bargaining as a more traditional way of 
buying. Furthermore, the price precision practice appears to have caught on in several 
other shops more similar in size to Chenggong. The cash registers, price labeling, and 
receipts that often accompany this practice also add to this look, especially as 
compared to the more "traditional" practice of limited bargaining and cash in hand 
transactions in shops like Chenggong. By marking prices to the tenth, the employee 
explained to me, it gives an impression that prices are determined based on set costs 
incurred by the store rather than an attempt to squeeze as much profit as possible out 
of each transaction. More precise prices then can appear to be the result of a formula 
that decides the absolute lowest price and thus seem both more modern and somehow 
less arbitrarily determined. 
Pricing Determinants 
When discussing prices with consumers, two different ideas of price seemed to 
exist at the same time. The first fit in nicely with the Xinhua employee's explanation 
of precision pricing. Here the price of a product is seen as the sum of its inputs with a 
bit of a markup to secure profits for the owner to live off of. The price of discs in any 
shop then will vary based on the shop's decorations, the rent that the shop must pay 
(and thus by location in the city), the cost of transporting the discs to the shop, and the 
price at which the shop stocked them. Daoban, by this input-oriented view is cheaper 
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than zhengban because owners do not need to pay for the rights to produce it. At the 
same time, it should not be that much cheaper because it still has other overhead costs 
like taxes (though less, because they do not give receipts unless requested) and the 
cost of bribing government officials. 
The second idea of price was that it should be linked to the living standard of 
the buyer. As an outsider and a westerner (who therefore was perceived to be rich), I 
came across this idea of price based on the buyer's situation numerous times. At one 
point, T tried to buy a bottle of water at an underground vendor and the vendor chose 
to quote me a higher price than the usual going rate. When I explained to her in 
Chinese that I live here and usually buy it for one yuan, the vendor apologized, 
explained she thought I was a tourist, complimented my Chinese, and sold it for one. I 
have spoken to numerous Westerners who spent extended periods in China and most 
also found this practice—prevalent in everything from admission prices to tourist sites 
to hotel prices and everyday shopping—to be frustrating. As far as we were 
concerned, the price should be based on the product, not based on who we were. 
To my Chinese friends in Xi'an, however, we believed this because we were 
forgetting that the person sells goods only to make a living. As such, the price should 
be based on ensuring their livelihood and, if I could afford to pay more (and did not 
know better), then they had the right to ask it of me. At the same time of course, if my 
Chinese informants happened to be the ones getting the higher price, they would 
bargain as well as they could to get the price down. Xiao Ma explained this by 
comparing a watermelon sold to someone in the countryside to one sold to someone in 
the city: people in the city are better off so they should pay more and the price should 
be higher. By this person-centered view, there is less a universal price and more a 
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price based on "what it is worth to the consumer." Making outsiders pay more is less 
a matter of cheating, and more a form of correct business practice. 
Relating this back to daoban discs, many people brought up the discrepancy 
between the price of zhengban discs and the income {shouru) of the average Chinese 
person: 
The reason that there is so much daoban, is because there are a lot of people 
around here [pointing with his finger] who make a monthly salary of 300-500 
yuan. After paying for housing and food, they have to buy all these little things 
with the rest. They are not going to buy a zhengban CD for 30 or 60 yuan 
when they can buy the same thing here for 10 [Wang Ge, 40，male]. 
The shouru and the policy must match. The United States has a higher 
standard of living, maybe 20 something times higher, so they can afford to 
have a policy that forces the prices of discs to be very high, 6 vs. 180 yuan. Of 
course here they will buy the 6 yuan [Kong Ge, male customer, 50s]. 
Underlying both of these quotations is the idea that everyone has a right to buy 
music and media products. While speaking to people about prices and income issues, 
these types of responses prompted me to ask specifically if people thought that such 
entertainment was a want (xiangyao) or a need (xuyao). One typical retort American 
companies, as well as many individual Americans, make against poor people buying 
"pirated" discs is that, if they are that poor, then they should not be wasting any 
money on such luxuries at all. They should be saving the money to see them through 
to buying the things that they need like food, water, housing, and clothing. My 
informants in Xi'an, however, instead saw discs as more of a need than a want. They 
also often disputed the question, and the dichotomy underlying it, that I had asked in 
..the first place. These two terms do not carry the same opposing connotations in 
Chinese as they do in English. Most people, even if they chose to call it a want, spoke 
of a necessity to have it at the times they wanted it. As a telecommunications worker 
explained to me, music and movies are a kind of food that, though it does not satisfy 
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the stomach (and satisfying the stomach must be achieved first), it does satisfy the 
jingshen (精神)，a higher level need of the spirit for entertainment. 
Music not only helps to relax you and "keep the world from going dark," but 
also is linked to modernizing people's thoughts (rang women sixiang wang qian zou). 
Both music and movies are seen as a window into a world (the West, Beijing, etc.) of 
modern lifestyles which they cannot yet afford. While people cannot buy what they 
see advertised on TV, they can buy movies. Thus through these movies they are 
taking part in China's return to the international stage as a respected member of the 
community of nations. There is a certain drive, not too dissimilar from that in the 
West, to keep up with everyone else in knowledge, possessions, and modernity. In 
Xi'an, there seemed also to be a sense that poorer people had a right (or duty) to be 
able to keep up and modernize themselves and that the advancement of society as a 
whole depended on their modernization. While this does not entail a sense of equality, 
meaning that rich people are willing to give up their status for the poor, it does 
contribute to the idea that access to things modern, and to China's quest to become 
modern, should be available in various forms to all people. 
The idea of differential pricing and keeping up with others then, at the level of 
the market, meant a view of an ideal market as one where the same or similar 
products should be available at a wide range of prices and qualities. Such a situation 
would mean that everyone could consume the good, albeit at a different level of 
quality. Indeed in the clothing markets around Xi'an my informants saw this type of a 
system at work. Some stores sell name brand clothes at very high prices, others sell 
unauthorized copies of these clothes at much cheaper prices, and still others sell fake 
versions which may resemble the originals but are made with lower quality materials 
at very low prices: 
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People whose income is high buy brand name and don't think about it. Fake 
clothes, name brands, all are brands. The difference is in the comparison 
between price and quality. There are lots of different prices and qualities of 
fake goods. Some are at 100，50, and even 20 yuan but the quality differs. If 
you are poor, you don't really care about the best quality one because the 
difference isn't worth the price [Local university professor, 50s, male]. 
While poor people may indeed not care about quality, and those with a bit more to 
spend will search for good deals, the market is accessible for everyone. 
To a certain extent also, the perceived quality or value of a purchase is itself 
determined by the price or brand name rather than by its physical quality. Thus often 
the idea that quality helps to set the price is reversed. As an example, Shi Ge, an 
English teacher in his 30s, bought a present at a large shopping mall for his wife on 
the day he took me to meet his friend in the wholesale clothing business. After I spoke 
with his friend for a while, Shi Ge took out the dress to ask him what he would have 
paid for it. As the wholesaler looked it over, he explained that his wholesale clothes 
are bought for the same price by different retailers who then put the product in their 
stores and sell it for what they like. If it happens to go to a nicer chain store, the price 
will be quite high. If it goes to a smaller store, it would sell for much lower. His 
clothes might sell for anywhere from 20 to 50 yuan in different retailers. The goods 
are the same, but since the store is different, the price is too. He concluded that he 
would only pay 50 yuan for the dress, but that since Shi Ge had bought it in such a 
nice store it might have cost up to 200 yuan. Although Shi Ge was a bit embarrassed 
to admit he had paid 300 yuan for something his friend claimed was only worth 50, on 
the way home, he also was clearly proud of his chance to prove his ability to pay so 
much for a gift to his wife. Moreover, as most consumers are not experts in how to 
determine the actual quality of clothing, retailers at higher end stores can count on 
their prices affecting consumer's evaluation of the quality. 
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For discs also, since people very rarely buy the same title from two different 
stores, they use the price as a shortcut to evaluate the quality, assuming that market 
forces (meaning the equally partially informed decisions of other consumers) would 
force prices to stay in line with quality. As with clothing, people see in discs a need 
for a range of products on a scale of price and quality that allows everyone to 
consume, just at different levels. While this idea of a market is actually present in the 
clothing sector, as the professor's quote above suggests, it was repeated to me by 
multiple informants in a tone that suggested this was how they thought the market, 
including the disc market, "should" be. People with high incomes can choose to buy 
one of the better quality products, or more of the low quality ones. People with little 
money however, can still take part by buying something similar of lower quality and 
at a cheap price. 
Moving Beyond Price and Quality 
One of the problems with this focus by consumers on a correlation between 
price and quality is that, from the business side of the equation, this correlation can be 
used as a way to make more profit. While my informants imagined that they could 
separate good quality discs from bad quality ones by price, and this may be roughly 
true between stores, within Chenggong there was no separation of good and bad 
quality versions of discs. Wang Jie told me that though their tapes all sold for the 
same price, when she ran the cassette business, she purposefully mixed in different 
qualities of the same title: 
We used to sell many more tapes when I was in charge of it. Xiao Zhang now 
sells only 300-500 yuan a day instead of the 800 yuan we used to make. This 
is because some customers have switched to CDs, but mainly because our 
quality has gone down. I used to buy 30 out of 100 cassettes at 3.8 yuan, the 
really good quality ones, and sell all 100 of them at 3.5 yuan each. The next 
time I would alternate which titles I bought the good quality ones in. This way 
even though we lost some money on those higher quality ones, it was easier to 
retain customers because they would sometimes get those really good quality 
7 8 
ones. Xiao Zhang only buys the low quality ones now so I think people have 
stopped coming here. If he mixed them, then people would still continue to get 
a good one every once in a while and so decide to come back. 
Thus store owners can play with the percentages of good and bad quality discs 
and tapes while still selling them all for the same price. Wang Jie knew that customers 
see the price and quality as linked, so she felt that if they occasionally get a really 
good quality one at a low price then they might overlook the worse quality ones. 
Knowledge about which particular discs to buy then did not come from the price. It 
came instead through establishing a relationship with the owner and asking for advice 
on which to buy or from continually exchanging titles until finding a satisfactory one. 
In another example, stores use this correlation and a higher price to suggest 
that their discs are of better quality than they actually are. On a main street just north 
of the Bell Tower there is a construction area that has been around for four or five 
years now. The building that was planned to be built there has never materialized over 
the hole they dug for it, leaving a row of semi-permanent stall stores lining the space 
between the sidewalk and the construction site. All of the stores (not just the media 
shops) constantly seem to be running sales. Every few weeks they announce that they 
will soon be destroyed (chai) and so are having a 20 percent off sale. Interestingly, 
while their "original" prices are a few yuan higher than other more permanent looking 
stores nearby, their "sale" prices are almost the same. The higher "original" price 
(carefully marked and dramatically crossed out) which supposedly had only been 
lowered due uncontrollable circumstances (the inevitable demolition), gives 
customers a sense that they are getting a good bargain — relatively higher quality 
discs for a lower price. Of course, most of their customers are outsiders as locals 
know the situation and do their shopping a good ways away where things are cheaper. 
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Outsiders do not know that the sale is not actually saving them money, and the price 
gives them a sense that the quality is good. 
A third and final example of this use of the quality-price correlation occurred 
in a disc shop near my favorite noodle place. I saw a middle-aged woman and a 20-
something-year-old man buying CDs in the shop. Talking to the man and the 
salespeople I learned that he is an aspiring DJ and that he had just been hired to play 
in two different clubs. He was stocking up on titles to use and, because of the volume 
of sales and him being a "good" customer, he claimed to me that he got a good price. 
During the process of the bargaining, the salespeople said several times that certain 
selections he had made were "zhengban" and so higher priced.49 When he tried to 
work the price down, instead of offering a bulk discount, they offered to switch out a 
few of his "zhengban" ones for burned CDs that were not in jewel cases. In the end, 
he declined to switch them, content that the discs he bought were better quality 
because the price was higher. The final price that he got, which averaged out to 
around ten yuan per title, was not all that low. Outside the store however, he claimed 
to me that it was a significant discount because some of them were better quality 
discs. By making use of these concepts of "zhengban" and quality, the store was able 
to convince him that he actually wanted the higher priced item and, in the end, he was 
convinced that he got a good deal. 
While the idea that price was the answer to all of my questions certainly did 
have some explanatory power, it also has clear drawbacks. Of course people buy 
things because they are cheaper. At the same time however, as with Shi Ge's gift to 
his wife, people sometimes buy things precisely because they are more expensive. 
49 From my own comparisons, the prices, and Wang Ge's comments I would guess that none of the 
discs he was buying actually were licensed. The store claimed they were zhengban so as to emphasize 
the discs quality. Most however were compilation discs which often are compiled in China without 
authorization based on which songs have been popular in the Chinese market. 
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The dress may be the same as one bought in a smaller shop, but because his was 
bought in a nicer shop and for a higher price, it is actually better. 
Price and quality are definitely linked, but there is more to it than this. 
Attributing everything to price as the only thing that matters, ignores the fact that 
consumers themselves, through their cumulative buying decisions, actually help to set 
what the prices are. Also, as the examples above show, owners are well aware of this 
connection between price and quality and often exploit it. Thus while some may 
blatantly sell low quality discs at higher prices, even normal store owners play with 
the percentages of good and bad quality products. By claiming a disc is zhengban the 
owner can also claim that its quality is better and thus convince the consumer to pay a 
bit more for it.^ ^ Quality does not necessarily determine the price. Furthermore, since 
the range of prices is said to be determined by a range of quality, as an answer to the 
difference between zhengban and daoban concentrating on price explains even less: 
these two terms are not supposed to be concerned with questions of quality, but rather 
with those of licensing. 
Beyond issues with the relationship between price, quality and licensing, there 
is also no objective formula outside of the context and culture that can determine what 
a product should cost. How is it that people in China see the "agreed upon" price for a 
DVD as six yuan rather than the 150 yuan (19 USD) which is common in the United 
States? The price people are willing to pay (exchange value) often has little to do with 
the actual costs associated with making the good or the benefits of using the good (use 
value). On its own, saying that a person's monthly income does not allow them to buy 
zhengban discs makes little sense; they could easily save up enough to buy one disc 
each year. My informants, however, did not see discs as this type of product and thus 
I wi l l explain more about my informants' methods of telling the difference between zhengban and 
daoban or between good and bad quality discs later in this chapter. 
81 
such a high price did not seem right. To them, a disc's proper price was supposed to 
be low. People should not have to wait a year to buy a movie or music album. Neither 
the price nor the quality alone can help us to understand this type of question. 
Thus there are other, less easily quantifiable aspects beyond the price like 
prestige and morality which also factor into why people see one version rather than 
another as worth buying. In Xi'an, the idea of pricing based on the person buying 
entails some degree of exactly this kind of less quantifiable aspect. Another example, 
has been the rise of fair trade coffee and cut flower products in the West. Individual 
consumers do not buy such higher priced products based on quality alone (many 
actually complain about bad quality to play up the "sacrifice" they are making for 
their morals), but also on a moral imperative to do something to ensure that workers 
producing the goods are paid livable wages (or at least based on the prestige that 
claiming such high morals can bestow upon them), ' Furthermore, there are other 
things, like stolen property, which are of high quality and low prices that few of my 
informants were willing to buy: morality also then plays a role. The remainder of this 
chapter then seeks to delve further into, build off, and if possible get beyond and 
behind, this idea of price and quality. 
Consumer Fraud and Fakes: The Breakdown of Price and Quality 
Throughout my discussions with informants and retailers over the relationship 
between price and quality, they consistently brought up the issue fake goods. While IP 
was noticeably absent from people's conversations, the topic of fake goods was 
constantly present. Based on this and the above characterization of the difference 
51 The connection between morality and market decisions in free vs. fair trade products (the Kenyan cut 
flower trade) was brought up by Catherine Dolan in a paper she gave for the Society for Economic 
Anthropology's 2006 Annua丨 Meeting. 
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between zhengban and daoban as a matter of price, and quality, I began to look into 
how daoban might be connected to the locally relevant issue of fake goods. 
Chinese newspapers as well as local and national television stations often had 
reports on government efforts to stem the current flood of fake goods in the market, 
new examples of especially egregious fakes, and interviews with various academic 
and official experts explaining how to spot a fake and what to do about it. One 
example of a particularly widely spread story from 2004 involved fake baby milk 
powder which poor parents bought and fed to their babies. Thirteen children died of 
malnutrition after a few months drinking it and over 200 were seriously injured 
(Yardley 2004). Other stories my friends told me involved farmers injecting 
chemicals in their fruits to make them look and sell better. A middle-aged professor at 
a local college told me only half joking that 
Before, we used to look carefully for insects on our greens. Then it was 
because we didn't want them. But, now we look even more carefully because if 
they can eat it and survive, then it is probably safe for us to eat too. The more 
bugs the better. 
The problem of telling the difference between real and fake things then is a 
frequent subject of conversation and, towards the end of my fieldwork I was called 
upon as an "expert" on American companies and products. Several friends of friends 
approached me for advise on whether a particular product they had purchased (one 
asked about baby milk powder) was real or not. Having little more information than 
they did as far as whether what was inside the package was real or fake, I could only 
check online to make sure that the company's product actually was sold in China 
under that particular brand name. 
In the West, it has become quite common to connect a product that lacks the 
necessary licensing to the label of "fake" or "counterfeit." In a way, however, this 
elides a clear difference between something which is physically fake and something 
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which is an exact copy that merely lacks authorization. The article I mentioned in 
Chapter 2 on fake diamonds (Chan 2005) is a case in point. Physically the jewelry 
was real, but the designs and arrangements were not properly licensed from their 
respective brand name jewelers. IP-rich companies have a lot to gain from equating in 
our minds the notion that unlicensed copies are the same as physically fake products. 
Considering "pirated" goods as "fake," brings in negative connotations of inferiority 
which aim to combat the increasing quality of these copies. Something which lacks 
that essential intangible component may soon be seen as just as defective as 
something lacking an essential tangible component. 
At the same time, while this may be where the West (and even Hong Kong) is 
headed, this is not necessarily the case in Mainland China. In Xi'an, this relationship 
between daoban and fakes was somewhat more tenuous. Where people did connect 
the two, it actually served to put daoban in a relatively positive light. A 25 year old 
female real estate agent referred to this relationship between daoban and fakes in the 
course of her justification of the practice: 
Fake medicine and pills are not the same thing as fake CDs. Zhengban and 
daoban discs are both the same inside. Not like foods and medicines. Those 
are dangerous. 
Importantly however, many of my informants disagreed that daoban could 
qualify as a fake at all. A member of a local amateur rock band felt that whether or 
not something could be used (as it was supposed to be used) was the key to knowing 
if it was real or fake: 
Let's still take this medicine thing as an example, real products originally 
could be used to treat illnesses, but fake products cannot necessarily treat 
them, it cannot necessarily make you well. But a daoban CD, just like the 
others, can be listened to. Even the resulting listening quality is about the same 
as with zhengban. While with DVDs you can usually figure out by listening to 
the sound quality, the difference is actually not big. So no, I guess doaban 
doesn't count as fake. 
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A retired female secretary pulled many of the disparate opinions on the issue 
together by explaining to me that there are two different kinds of fakes. One is both 
fake and inferior while the other is merely fake. As opposed to dangerous kinds of 
fakes like the milk powder or chemicals in vegetables, there are also 
some products which are false, but not inferior. This second is to say that 
while some products falsely claim to be other people's brands, as far as the 
process of making them goes, they are very similar to the original product. I 
secretly use your trademark so I don't need to pay to register my own 
trademark. I don't need to go to the government to pay taxes. Though I brought 
your packaging over here, I make a good product and I can enter the market to 
sell it. This kind of product is false but not inferior and we can accept this. If I 
eat this thing no harm will come to me. 
Here she brings us back to the issue of IP while also making clear that her 
concern is not over IP violations but over inferior goods. If a product is copied, but 
copied well, then it may be fake but it is neither inferior nor morally reprehensible. 
An analogously perceived product in the United States might be something like 
generic medicines; they are more or less the same as the original, but are sold at a 
lower price and considered a bargain. If it cannot be properly used then it is deceptive 
and immoral. The issue to her and many in China then is only being able to pick out 
the dangerous fakes. In short what she is concerned with is the notion of consumer 
fraud, not of IP. 
In the case of consumer fraud we see a breakdown of the notion that price can 
separate products by quality. An inferior good, even if priced as cheaply as possible, 
still does not do what it is supposed to do. Furthermore, inferior goods are not limited 
to the realm of fakes as a Muslim informant was quick to point out. He explained that 
a popular halal snack which was made by a company in Shanghai was recently 
rumored to have put pork ingredients in its products to cut costs. On the other hand, in 
the case of simply fake goods, there is no violation of the relationship between price 
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and quality. The lower price takes into account the fact that it may be made of cheaper 
materials and overall the quality is still said to match the price. 
This discussion is quite similar to the one occurring in Vietnam, according to 
Elizabeth Vann (2006). Vietnamese has four different terms used to differentiate 
between types of goods: branded goods or models {kieu), mimics of the model goods 
{hang nhai), fakes {hang gia), and real goods (Jiang that). The first two describe a 
brand and its local imitator whose quality is assumed to be somewhat less than the 
model, but who strives to be true to the standard the model sets. The last two 
differentiate between things that can be used (a commodity) and those that cannot (a 
non-commodity). Vann explains that, as with my informants, Vietnamese consumers 
differentiate between real and fake, but not in a way which takes any notice of 
intellectual property. As she puts it, IP's "reliance on a notion of 'authenticity' that 
emphasizes ideas of 'originality' and 'uniqueness' does not reflect Vietnamese 
concerns about product quality or legitimacy" (Vann 2006: 294). 
While many in the West point to the fact that trademark regulations and later 
other forms of IP emerged out of a concern for fraud, assuming that this will 
necessarily be the case (and thus that consumer fraud issues are a pre-cursor to IP 
consciousness) is forgetting how history works. From the present looking to the past it 
is easy to assume that earlier situations led to later ones. We can construct a single 
stranded line of causality leading up to our present view of IP and then look for 
elements along that strand present in other groups. Yet, when looked at from a 
historical point in the past, our future is but one of many possible ones. In this way, 
though unlicensed discs have been incorporated into an idea of fake, their 
categorization has to do only with consumer fraud. Here, the situation is quite similar 
to dynastic China where the imperial government only sought to enforce trademarks 
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or monopolies in the course of maintaining order and preventing fraud, not out of 
respect for intangible property (Alford 1995:32-34; see also Chapter 1). For Chinese 
people, in effect, "fake" and "inferior" are two separate but related local categories of 
products and IP does not really figure into the mix. On an abstract legal level people 
see daoban as defined by IP, but in its commoditized form the local categories of 
products of which it is only marginally a part is that of fake but not inferior goods. 
Daoban may be fake, but as such it is considered to be an important part of 
establishing a range of similar products at different prices in the market. When 
compared to fake and inferior goods, daoban is clearly placed on the side of morality. 
Competition and the Disc Business 
During the time that I spent outside of Xi'an in a local county seat, I met the 
owner of a household appliances shop who also had racks of CDs and VCDs for sale. 
The middle-aged man began with a business of repairing radios and other electrical 
devices in his rural hometown just prior to the reform period. As he moved to the 
county seat and as other appliances came to be popularly owned, he expanded out to 
repair televisions, electric fans, washing machines, and nearly anything else. When he 
registered as a getihu (a private small business) in 1982 he was the only machine 
repair shop around and could therefore set the price. He explained that, back then, 
success depended on into the bigger cities as early as possible. If you got to the 
county seat early you could build capital and might be able to break into Xi'an city. If 
you made it in to the bigger markets early enough, then you had made it. Now 
however, the market is more difficult and he has to be content with keeping his retail 
shop in the county seat. While he felt that people do not look down on him now for 
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his retail job, he made a point to say that he envied those government workers among 
his classmates who, with their connections, were really able to move up fast. 
In another interview with a middle-aged man who sells clothing at a wholesale 
market known for fakes, I was told a history of success that had moved him, albeit 
slower now, in the direction of his goal — to sell brand name or zhengban clothes. 
When he started out, he had a chance to go to Guangzhou to import clothes with a 
friend. Because he got into the business early, selling those first few loads of products 
in Xi'an was relatively easy. Later, when the market became somewhat less "chaotic" 
and he learned that women's clothing fashions changed too quickly, he switched to 
specialize in men's dress shirts. He consequently was able to expand and invite his 
brother to take a line of clothing as well. His customers are mainly store owners from 
around Xi'an, Shaanxi, and even provinces like Ningxia and Gansu to the west. To 
him, moving into brand name clothing (which might first be copies) and then into 
zhengban all are steps up. They offer the opportunity to make more profit per item 
and only owners with significant starting capital can get in. 
These two stories of early business reflect themes that also run throughout the 
larger reform period and specifically through the business of selling daoban. Both 
men were describing, through their stories the life cycle of the market in a place 
where, at the beginning of the reform period, products were limited, raw materials 
were especially scarce, and those who could open stores could take whatever profits 
they wanted for most anything. Hohnen (2003) describes a similar situation in 
Lithuania when the borders first opened and traders could begin to bring products in 
from Poland. Later, as competition increased and the availability of products 
expanded, the big profits were only available to those who knew what was in high 
demand, especially scarce, or significantly more expensive in Lithuania than in 
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Poland. This narrowing continued and traders began to make longer journeys by plane 
to markets in China, Turkey and the Middle East in search of such profits. By this 
time however, entry was limited to those with capital and only those who had gotten 
in early (and succeeded) had the knowledge and resources to make the trading runs. 
Bringing this back to China, Shi Ge, laughing at the inability of some street 
vendors to get him to buy their fake medicines, told me of a similar golden age for 
business: 
It was easy to make money from 1997 to 2001 here because the economy was 
too chaotic. You could sell anything and people would buy it. Now it is much 
harder. This means that there are less fake things around. 
While these stories are not about daoban music or movies, there is a general 
idea that the same thing holds — moving forward in the business meant expanding 
into higher profit products and locations. Chenggong began selling only cassette tapes 
they copied themselves as one of the only such shops around. Partially as a result of 
this early entry, they have expanded their offerings, Wang Ge's brother now owns his 
own shop, and Wang Jie has had enough capital to try her luck in other business 
ventures. At the same time, the changing nature of the disc market was brought home 
to them when a chain shop moved in a few blocks away. 
If you do it wrong now, you lose money. It isn't like your monthly salary 
which is steady each month. If I think of another job, I'll quickly get out of 
this one. It's just that I haven't thought it all the way through yet. Business is 
getting harder [Wang Ge, Chenggong owner, 40，male]. 
The chain shop moving in nearby has meant that Chenggong's prices must be 
similar if not a bit lower than theirs in order to stay in business. Wang Jie, being a 
Christian, was concerned with portraying the competition in a good light. While she 
does not shy away from the fact that daoban is illegal, and therefore bad, she also 
continually reminded me of its business aspects and the relativity of morality in 
practice. Here she adopts the metaphor of business competition as a running race 
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where competition pushes one to do better. Before, she felt they were doing a good 
job, but had no comparison to be certain. Now, both she and her customers have an 
easy comparison of price, selection, and quality that she is confident, at least when 
speaking to me, will bring more loyalty in her customers. In the end though, this 
competition has clearly made their lives more difficult. It has meant that, being a 
family enterprise and so not having to pay overtime wages, the shop now stays open 
two or three hours longer than it did in 2001. It would be a shame, Wang Ge and 
Wang Jie told me, if a customer wanted a disc from Chenggong late at night only to 
find it closed and their competitors open. 
Wang Ge and Jing Ge (Chenggong's landlord) on the other hand see the other 
store's choice of rental space as a deliberate attack and have so responded in kind. I 
arrived at the store one day to see a big hand painted sign on the tree advertising 
DVDs for five yuan a piece (down from Chenggong's usual price that summer of six). 
The wholesaler had given Wang Ge a lower price for their new discs and he decided 
to take advantage by immediately passing the savings along to his customers. The 
new selling price would still give them a tiny profit on the old discs while attracting 
customers from the chain shop looking to save that extra yuan. Also, they felt that the 
chain shop relied more heavily than they did on DVD sales for its profit. The pinch on 
profits was then a direct attack on their competitor. It also shows the importance of 
relationships with both consumers and wholesalers in an increasingly tight market of 
competition. 
I was first interested in this other shop because of its starkly contrasting 
appearance with Chenggong and the constant references Wang Jie and Wang Ge 
made to small remodeling jobs they were to undertake. The chain branch shop rented 
its current space about two years ago. It has air-conditioning and a glass and wood 
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facade set just inside the pull down garage door so as not to give up its protection at 
night. The owner spent a good deal of money coordinating the colors in the shop, 
tiling the floor, and making attractive racks for his products. In this way he has sought 
to connect his branches together through the name of the store and the color coding, 
although most people I spoke to were not aware that this was a chain. His store thus 
fits in more with the newer "named" stores than it does with the older types of stores 
like Chenggong. Interestingly, several informants who lived nearby sited the look of 
the chain store (as well as its relative newness on the scene) as making it more 
zhengban despite the fact that Wang Ge claimed they bought their discs from the 
same wholesaler. 
While Chenggong's owners did not specifically connect the store's appearance 
to its reputation for having or not having zhengban, they did do remodeling on a much 
more frequent basis than they did before the chain store moved in. Another media 
shop boss who sold primarily movies made this connection between competition and 
remodeling explicit: 
[Why did you redo the inside of your shop?] 
You think about it. With the market competition so fierce, if you want to 
compete, and you don't change yourself a bit, then you'll be eliminated by 
disuse. Therefore we thought we'd fix it up a bit, do it up a bit better, make 
ourselves more comfortable in the process [Daoban shopkeeper, 30s, female]. 
As with the clothing and repair shop bosses that I began this section with, 
daoban business owners have had to deal with the changing landscape of the disc 
market. With increased competition they too have sought to expand their products and 
figure out ways to protect their profits. Thus while they might not actually sell 
zhengban, at least they could aim to be able to sell at zhengban prices. Making their 
shop look more modern meant making the customers more at ease over the quality. It 
also meant, as I will discuss below, appearing more "zhengban." Store owners, 
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whether they could express it or not, had a good idea of how to position themselves. 
But what does it mean to look more "zhengban?" How do customers tell the 
difference between zhengban and daoban and, given the emphasis on quality over 
licensing, does this difference mean anything to them? 
Is it Zhengban or Daoban? 
Zhengban is generally associated with the city and more urban areas. 
Numerous informants explained to me that in their rural home villages, no one had 
even seen a zhengban disc. Several told me that daoban in these more marginal areas 
is also of lower quality than the daoban in Xi'an. 
I would guess about 90% in Xi'an are zhengban,^^ In the countryside around 
Wuhan, Hubei province [her birth village], I have never seen zhengban. People 
there don't worry if it is zhengban or not, only about getting clothes and 
eating. In a big city the police can catch people, in the countryside it is not that 
they can't, its just that they won't. Tapes here are sold for 15 yuan, but there 
they can be bought for 5 or 4. The quality there is only "OK" though [Xinhua 
music section worker, 20, female]. 
The ability of a place to have zhengban is then said to be correlated (which 
causes which, in my informants minds, was unclear) to economic standards of living 
as well as the population's "cultural" level. When Chinese use the term "culture" 
{wenhua) they allude less to an anthropological understanding of culture and more to 
an idea of high culture or cultivation — something that can be built up through 
education. This building up of culture also can occur simply by being surrounded by 
more modern things and thus people who have resided in the city are thought to be 
somewhat more cultured than those who have not. Thus I also found that most people 
While this guess is extremely high, one clue to the confusion in the market as to zhengban and 
daoban was that my informants' guesses varied quite widely. The average was around 40 or 50 percent 
zhengban, several claimed 10 to 20 percent and others claimed 60 percent. No one really knew. As 1 
mentioned in Chapter 1,1 also had few objective ways to get a better estimate and as a result relied on 
Wang Ge for information and Xinhua as a model. The RIAA (Rosen 2003) estimates that 90 percent of 
all discs in China are daoban and my sense is that the actual figure in Xi 'an is not all that different. 
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thought areas inside the city wall, both a more ancient cultured area as well as an area 
replete with fashion and department stores, were more likely than those outside it to 
have zhengban. While this way of thinking might suggest that people try to buy, or 
claim to buy, zhengban in order to raise their social status and though in the county 
seat the claim was present, in the city it was not. Instead, there was a sense that people 
who bought zhengban must have something wrong with them for wasting so much 
money. In the city as well as the county seat, the idea was to get the best quality for 
however much money you could afford to spend. 
One of the main sources for information on how to determine whether 
something is zhengban or daoban,^^ as with fakes, are lists of differences published in 
local or national newspapers and on television. Informants invariably first mentioned 
the price of the product and the quality of the recording as the main ways to tell if it 
was zhengban. Xiao Ma, for instance, had no difficulty establishing that all the discs 
in a store near a tourist area were doaban, except for one. The store had a traditional 
Chinese music CD selling for 78 yuan and though the packaging and picture were 
more or less the same as the others in the store, it stumped him. While the prices for 
all of the CDs were rather high, this one was way too high and forced him to stop and 
think about it. In the end, his only answer was that it was hard to say. While this type 
of price hike is quite exceptional and probably only exists because the store is in an 
area frequented by foreign tour groups, it does illustrate the predominance of price (as 
well as the problems with this predominance) over the other methods of determining 
the difference. As a 23 year-old male worker at a barbecue meat stand pointed out, 
53 Whi le the majority o f my informants referred to zhengban and daoban as opposites, this is not always 
the case. As I wi l l discuss further in Chapter 5，other terms like shuihuo, products that are imported 
from outside without paying the necessary taxes, dakong discs, discs or cassettes that have been 
destroyed (generally by the producing company or a contractor) to remove them from the market, and 
cases which fall between zhengban and daoban complicate the issue. 
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"daoban is so developed in China because its quality is good, better than others, and it 
is cheap." This then is what most people expect, that daoban is cheap (but perhaps 
good quality), and when one is good quality and high price many will hesitate to call 
it daoban. 
Beyond the price, a lawyer pointed to the security sticker as the best way to 
tell the difference saying that most people who did not buy zhengban did so because 
they were careless. Unfortunately, as I took a few informants around from shop to 
shop, we found that all CDs, VCDs, and cassettes had these stickers and any 
differences in brightness were difficult to discern. Other informants came up with a 
whole list of things to look at including the packaging, the thinness or smoothness of 
the plastic wrapping, the vividness of the colors, the quality of the pictures, and 
English mistakes on the packaging. A high school-aged informant (to whom I was 
referred to by his mother as the in-house expert on discs) explained that in addition to 
the security sticker, quality, and price, you could even count how many copyright 
warnings appeared before the main feature to prove a disc was licensed. Yet, in the 
end, they admitted that they largely had no idea which was which. 
I also had a very difficult time of this. Even starting off with the advantage of 
knowing for certain which discs were daoban and zhengban in Wang Ge's store, I 
found few satisfactory methods of explanation.54 The producers of daoban discs (other 
than DVDs where they sometimes proclaim the name of their company) are fairly 
good nowadays at copying the covers, colors, and security stickers on the packaging. 
Especially since 2001，the packaging in many stores has gotten much more 
54 Out of all of these theories, the most useful one I found was from a software store owner who 
claimed that the way to tell zhengban software was to try to register it online via the registration form 
provided in the box. While I can easily imagine a situation of a daoban company setting up their own 
registering website, this method of checking did seem the most promising (granted it only works after 
you have purchased the product) although it was only used for software at the time. 
9 4 
sophisticated. Thus while packaging did differ from store to store, as I knew the discs 
in the better packaged stores were daoban as well, I found this to be more indicative 
of higher prices rather than of a split between zhengban and daoban. In many cases, 
the dirtiest VCDs were actually the zhengban selections, simply because no one 
seemed to want to buy them. They sat there gathering dust and scratches to their 
plastic. Of course, provided with a zhengban copy of the same title and the time to 
compare them or with more definite information on the precise wording on the 
original version from the company, this issue would easily be solved. The problem is 
that neither I, nor any other consumers had access to that kind of special information. 
This was an area where I had hoped to depend on local knowledge. T quickly 
found out that most people did not rely on identifying individual selections but rather 
they bought based on the store itself. One female university student explained that 
"small stores cannot have zhengban, you need a big store to do that." Similarly, a 
telecommunications worker highlighted the importance of the type of store. 
In China, we have some specialty stores that only sell computer games, or you 
can go to a big shopping center to buy zhengban. I just know when I go in to a 
place that most are zhengban, but I don't have the ability to say if every single 
one in there is zhengban. But to protect their store's name they must be able to 
check that all are real. For daoban there are often vendors selling on blankets 
on the ground or in a small electronics store [Telecommunications company 
worker, 29, male]. 
The method that most people mentioned had a lot to do with the location of 
the building in the city, the category of store it is, and its decorations. Walking around 
town with informants it was clear that newer stores with glass fronts or housed within 
department stores were much more likely to be cited as zhengban. Most older stores 
on smaller roads with concrete floors and older display styles and all itinerant and 
wholesale vendors were seen as having daoban. Several people mentioned that the 
best way to ensure that you buy zhengban is by going to a specialty store or chain 
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store. They would then have the expertise to know what to buy for their store and that 
way you know you are buying good quality. Furthermore, people reasoned that these, 
because of their large profile would not get away with selling daoban for very long. 
Also, no one mentioned, even if I brought it up, the idea of going to a local shop with 
which one had a connection and relying on them to get you good quality products. 
This was similarly not a method my informants used to ensure they bought real rather 
than fake products; they felt that relational or particularistic ties were not useful in 
either situation. 
This preference in store types, as well as that of importance of newer stores, 
strongly connects the notion of zhengban with being more modern and more 
sophisticated. Zhengban stores would need to emphasize cleanliness, decorations with 
matching color schemes, and backing by prominent companies. This idea also, like 
the quality and price idea, seemed less to divide stores into two categories, and more 
to divide them along a scale. Better quality discs (and higher prices) were to be found 
in better looking or more modern looking stores. Informants had little problem 
agreeing on the top and bottom ends of this spectrum. The bottom end (vendor's 
stalls) certainly sold bad quality daoban, the high end were zhengban. Yet partially 
because of the confusion in the middle, I began to suspect that what my informants 
were searching for and what I was defining as "zhengban," based on IP, were not 
quite the same thing. 
Doubting the Difference 
There are several complicating factors that lead me to doubt that the difference 
my informants described was that between licensed and unlicensed discs. The first is 
that while it is generally assumed that zhengban means better quality, the difference is 
not thought to be a simple dichotomy as daoban has many grade levels. The worst of 
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daoban are not even found in the city. Furthermore, the best of daoban might even be 
better than zhengban of the same title, especially when the daoban is copied from a 
foreign version and the mainland licensee does a shoddy job in its licensed 
production. 
[Can daoban ever be better than zhengban?] 
There was a recent news article about a zhengban producer in China who has a 
lot of popular artists. It was found that they were using bad quality discs and, 
because they had many popular singers, they could set the prices high. Their 
lyrics listed inside were often wrong too. They didn't care. The recording 
quality was just bad and the fans got angry about it [Xinhua music section 
worker, 20, female]. 
A second complication, then is that many people question the zhengban status 
of large named stores as well. Several informants claimed to have heard or read 
somewhere that daoban CDs were being sold in the music stores housed within the 
department stores in the city. Wang Ge insisted that they stock their store from places 
that he occasionally buys his discs from. Thus these people doubt that, even for a 
higher price, you can be certain to get a zhengban CD. Given what many see to be a 
small difference between the two in quality and the confusion in the market, most 
prefer to buy the cheaper one. 
While observing at several stores in the city, I often heard people ask the 
owner if the product they were considering buying was daoban or zhengban. 
Invariably the owner said it was zhengban. The customer would turn it over in her 
hand a while longer and then buy it. I asked Wang Ge what he thought of this and he 
said he didn't know why people asked this question. He did not see how there could 
be another answer. The very next day, I noticed that Wang Ge also insisted "wo shi 
zhengban,” or literally “I am zhengban" when asked this question. Consumers I spoke 
to said they would never ask this question because they all knew they were looking at 
daoban, but some speculated that those who did ask were just seeking confirmation of 
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the quality. With a “guarantee’’ that it was zhengban, the person felt better about the 
price asked and knew that, if there was a problem, they could return it for a different 
one.55 
In the end, if you add up the methods that consumers use and owners then 
adopt along with the ambiguity of even the large stores and the role of the 
government, it is very difficult to tell which is which. A fitting saying related to me 
was that "there are often a thousand good horses, but people like Bo Le (a horse 
expert) are in short supply" {Qianlima changyou, er Bole buduo 
千里馬常有，而{白樂不多).Thus there are often many good quality discs, the 
problem is that they are mixed in with the bad ones. The number of people who can 
actually differentiate them successfully are in short supply. An official in Kunming 
involved in intellectual property enforcement agreed, warning Andrew Mertha (2005: 
186) that daoban's quality is now so high and legitimate discs' often so "shoddy" that 
even he had difficulty distinguishing between them. While my informants had many 
possible methods for finding zhengban, they generally bought daoban. Furthermore in 
a focus group of college women, though at times they brought up exceptions where 
the quality of zhengban was poor, when they spoke of finding "zhengban" they spoke 
of it mainly in terms of guaranteeing quality. 
“ T h e r e was generally a policy which allowed customers to return unplayable daoban discs. This, of 
course, only worked i f the customer could prove they bought the disc at that particular shop by way of 
a (rare) receipt, by being a frequent customer, or by bringing the title back soon after having bought it. 
While I saw many titles returned, I saw only a handful of people try to return discs and not succeed. 
One woman tried to return a movie for a new title claiming that it did not play in her D V D player. She 
was refused, however, because apparently, over the past week or so, she would buy one, exchange it, 
then exchange it again all for new titles. The store offered her a different version of the same movie, 
but she refused. At Chenggong, Wang Ge refused to exchange a teenager's CD which he claimed 
wouldn't play in his CD player. Instead of exchanging the disc, Wang Ge cleaned the laser reader in 
the player and the CD then played alright. Besides these types of examples, and provided you could 
make yourself remembered, there was a general unspoken guarantee of exchangeability: while no 
questions were generally asked, the policy seemed to cover unplayable discs rather than simply bad 
quality ones. 
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If you are looking for a range of quality, the methods described work fairly 
well — better looking stores and higher price did generally mean better quality. If, 
however, you are trying to use them to find licensed rather than daoban discs, the high 
end of the market yields nothing but confusion. Whether as a result of this or as one of 
its causes, I would maintain that most people care very little about zhengban or 
daoban in terms of licensing preferring to use those words as a way to describe 
quality. The best quality ones are zhengban and the rest are just varying qualities of 
daoban discs. Most of my informants (richer and poorer) bought from cheaper shops 
where they could assume that the discs were relatively decent quality daoban, only 
occasionally shopping around for much higher quality ones. As a commoditized 
version of IP the local categorization of the market has little to do with intellectual 
property, and more to do with the physical attributes of quality and its related idea of 
consumer fraud. 
Relative Morality: Guilt and Stealing 
Throughout these descriptions of differentiating zhengban and daoban, a sense 
of morality depending on its relationship to locally more important themes of 
consumer fraud and business seemed to trump the legal notion of daoban as an illegal 
activity. Though people clearly recognized that daoban was illegal (an aspect I will 
explore in Chapter 4), when the conversation dwelled on the daily life level, a moral 
sphere of right and wrong dominated. While doing something illegal might arouse 
feelings of guilt, when the moral system supports it, there is little need even for 
justifications. My informants invariably told me that they bought only daoban discs 
and did so without guilt. The manager of the state owned company that Chenggong 
rents space from explained that 
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99 in 100 people will buy the cheaper one and the others will look at that one 
person and laugh, not understanding. Even the Governor and the Mayor 
(shengzhang and shizhang) buy daoban discs. They buy it because it's 
cheaper. Of course, they get someone else to go and do the buying for them, 
but they don't buy the 100 yuan one, they buy the one for 6. 
To my informants it was ridiculous to expect a person with their income to 
spend the price of a licensed disc just to watch a single movie. The important thing for 
them was not collecting, instead it was just to keep up with the latest trends or their 
favorite artists. They might make the effort to buy licensed as a gift to a peer, but in 
general wouldn't pay more because they saw it as a short term buy. 
Just as the "piracy" discourse in the West would like to instill a sense of guilt, 
it also often focuses on equating copying with stealing. When I asked my informants 
at a practical level if daoban was stealing many said no. As a 19 year old female 
informant put it, the key is money, “You pay for it. You give the person money and 
they give you the disc. How could this be stealing?" 
The only stealing people saw was the first time that someone made a copy, at 
the manufacturing stage. In this stage the disc was copied without any exchange of 
money. Beyond this stage the disc was paid for each time it changed hands. By 
focusing on the physical disc, the commoditized version of IP, only the manufacturing 
stage counts as stealing, the rest were simply people making a living like anyone else. 
On the other hand, when our conversation moved to more abstract topics, 
some informants spoke about daoban differently. A 30 year old male programmer 
working for a mobile phone company formally concluded daoban was stealing, but 
had significant reservations as to whether it was immoral: 
From the law's perspective, I 'm stealing your benefits. [...] But its like 
cheating on a test. Everyone says it's bad, but in the test most will have done it 
or will do it because it is a rational choice. Whether it is moral or immoral is 
not important. No, I usually have no guilty feelings about buying daoban. You 
would have to be a very cultured person to mind morality {daode), it is too 
1 0 0 
difficult to use a sense of guilt to regulate people's behavior, this is why we 
need the law. 
Daoban, at this formal level, is a kind of stealing. Yet, my informant takes great pains 
to point out that it is a rational act and thus cannot be immoral. While such an act 
equally cannot be moral, as "morality" belongs only to much higher level acts, it is 
justified by social norms and he does not feel guilty. Interestingly, most of my 
informants used the same phrase when asked what was stolen, "the fruits of someone 
else's labor," (laodong chengguo 勞重力成果).This phrasing, similar to newspaper's 
language shows that the legal sphere does exert a degree of influence. Yet again, 
when brought back to the daily life level，buying daoban, like cheating on a test in 
China, is a rational act and thus neither moral nor immoral. 
A retired female secretary explained to me that 
Daoban does count as stealing. [...But] it is not the same kind as stealing 
something like mobile phones. People don't think that daoban and thievery are 
the same. I just think daoban is cheap, I buy it, take it home, and I can use it. 
Right? Phones though you clearly, clearly know where they came from: stolen 
from someone else's bag. Daoban is from inside a factory, produced in large 
quantities, it goes through a regular store, goes through the market to get to my 
hands. This is not the same as a thief picking something out of someone else's 
pocket and then selling it to me. [...] Daoban can be regarded as a 
"commodity," not as "stolen goods". 
To consumers, speaking from a practical perspective, stealing physical 
property is thievery. Buying and selling daoban however, goes through regular market 
channels like other businesses do. 
The Ambivalent Position of Chinese Retail Business 
Thus while daoban is clearly recognized as illegal, it is not seen as violating 
social norms, practice, or morals. As far as daily decisions go, it is the moral sphere of 
right and wrong that is important. The legal sphere has little or no impact. 
Furthermore, I was told on many occasions that morality should be seen not as 
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absolute, but as relative. Daoban is neither absolutely moral nor absolutely immoral. 
As discussed above, when it is compared to other "fake," or copied, products it is 
actually a relatively moral example. Unlike fake versions of medicines and foods, 
daoban does no harm to people. Moreover, daoban also has good qualities, as the 
female owner of another daoban store told me (and consumers often enough 
repeated): 
American companies don't only think that selling daoban is bad, they also 
need our market — 1.3 billion people. Daoban is not cheating, not immoral, it 
is relative [spoken with force and emotion]. Everything has its benefits, and 
there are always some things that are not so good, daoban is in the middle. It's 
understandable. Some daoban is also beautiful, it is not just zheng [正，straight, 
correct] things that are beautiful. US companies are only looking at money, not 
at how this is promoting your [United States' or Western] culture. Daoban is 
not always fake, if there is a need, then it is filling that need. It is just a 
business. If we sold zhengban, then no one would buy it and people would not 
know about US culture. It helps their thinking move forward [Daoban 
shopkeeper, 35, female]. 
To many, the stuff of daoban movies and music was seen as an accessible 
piece of the modern that poorer people could consume on par with rich people in 
developed countries and in cities along China's coast.^^ 
What most people stressed is that any ambiguous position it occupied was less 
due to the products sold and more due to how individual businesses are run.^^ Some 
bosses sell bad quality daoban at cheap prices. Others sell bad quality daoban 
56 In his article on video piracy in Nigeria, Brian Larkin (2004) stresses a similar aspect of piracy. He 
describes how pirate video networks build a parallel but decentralized infrastructure that, while 
..threatening the small profits indigenous movie makers gain from their copyrights, provides those same 
producers (and many times more consumers) with access to the world of modern consumer culture. 
Instead of being marginalized by official networks, they have mediated access to Indian, Pakistani, 
Hollywood and many other films via this so-called shadow economy. In Nigeria too, then, piracy 
occupies an ambiguous position in that it is illegal and yet largely seen as being positive. Like 
Chenggong, Nigerian retailers often offer both pirated and licensed discs. A major difference, 
however, is that in Nigeria the shops tend not to pay taxes and are largely unmonitored while in Xi 'an 
this second economy blends more closely into the first. 
57 This assertion seems to fit well with the case of Vietnamese consumers as well: “The dangers that 
shoppers associate with mimic goods stem not from their manufacture, but from their sale; that is, 
when sellers misrepresent them as famous brand name goods" (Vann 2006: 291). 
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pretending it is good quality. These individuals may be immoral, but the business of 
selling discs as a whole is not seen as less moral than others. 
Moreover, retail business in general, is seen as a morally ambiguous 
enterprise. Shopkeepers are constantly accused of cheating, especially of cheating 
outsiders, both by charging too high a price and by passing off low quality goods as 
high. As Xiao Ma explained, 
Every kind of business definitely has cheating in it. China has a saying to 
describe this, wushang bujian 〒女干).581 can explain it like this: Business 
people are driven by economic benefits. My goal is only to make money. 
Therefore I may use shadowy methods to make that money, including 
cheating. I produce some things using fake raw materials, but the from the 
outside they look like the real one. In business, for instance, even when we're 
negotiating on a contract there is also deception. Absolutely there can be. 
There isn't one industry which could say that there isn't deception. 
This ambivalence is not a result of Chinese being unaccustomed to market 
exchange, as common people in China have been involved in markets for centuries 
(Cohen 2005:4). Rather, it builds off both recent politics and selectively chosen more 
"traditional" Chinese cultural ideas. Thus it is partially resulting from suspicions of 
private businesses that emerged at the beginning of China's opening up. Referring 
back briefly to the stories of the appliance repair shop and the men's clothing seller, 
we can also see some elements of this ambivalence. It is clear from both accounts 
that, in the beginning of the reopening some people got ahead faster than others. 
Moreover, they did not do so purely on the basis of doing a good job supplying 
consumers with what they needed. It depended a lot on where you started from and 
connections within the government. Furthermore, the mass quantities of fakes that are 
consistently decried now (and perhaps were also decried back then) also seemed to be 
a source of capital for successful business people to build off of as Shi Ge hints. The 
58 Literally, this means "no business does not deceive." 
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golden opportunity for business occurred precisely because of the chaos of that early 
market and the ease of passing off fakes, gaining capital, and moving up. 
As Ole Bruun (1993) has pointed out, at that time, businesses were opened by 
people of lower social status and, due to raw material shortages, nearly all businesses 
had to skirt illegality just to do business at all. Where earlier there was only one route 
to success, through the party/work unit, there now emerged a group of richer people 
who, despite their riches, had not outgrown their low social standing. As a result of 
this double ladder, of wealth and prestige, some attempted to trade success on one 
ladder for entry onto the other. Business people began to try to enter government 
(often through volunteer work) and government workers began to dabble in business 
(Bruun 1993). As the repairman suggested, many government officials used their 
connections to "get rich first." The large profits some made were and are still seen as 
resulting less from hard work, and more from cheating or connections in the 
government. 
Furthermore, people accept that the clear nature of business is to make a 
profit, not to serve its customers. As with Xiao Ma above, my informants agreed that 
a boss' goal drove their actions and that bosses therefore would use any and all means 
to be certain to achieve that goal; just as customers would try to do the same to get a 
lower price. While several informants told me they would never shop at a family 
member's shop for fear that they would be forced to buy something close to what they 
want at a higher price (rather than exactly what they wanted at a bargained price), 
customers also commonly tried to pull on commonalties like ethnicity, laojia (or 
ancestral home), or schooling ties to bargain prices down. There is then a 
simultaneous need to get "closer" to the boss as well as maintain some distance in the 
course of bargaining. 
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When I asked a former general store owner about deception^^ and cheating in 
business he replied that it is simply the nature of business: 
This term you need to understand a bit more. Deception is a neutral term. It 
does not completely carry a derogatory sense. Inside it, it has some 
complimentary connotations, good meanings, it does not always have a bad 
meaning. Granted most of the time it is a bad term though. 
You just asked from a business point of view, so you mean "cheating" 
on the price, don't you? But sometimes it is just striving for profit. In business 
(and so for business behavior), you must have profit or else it won't work. This 
kind of deception, you just can say it is because of your goal. Back when I had 
the store, let's say I want to sell you some clothes. I stock them at 10 yuan a 
piece. But, I mark them with a 20 yuan tag because I want to sell at a high 
price in order to make a little money. We bargain and I tell you I bought it for 
15, or maybe even I say 16. In the end we agree on 18. I make 8 yuan on the 
sale because you don't know the base price and T want to make a profit, get a 
few more dollars. From a linguistic perspective this is deception, but from a 
behavioral perspective, I did nothing wrong. Business is meant to look out for 
the bottom line. If you don't say anything at all, then you don't sell it. It is 
necessary. Even if there was deception by action as well as by language, if it 
was for your goal then so be it, the more your profit, the more you are correct. 
It is derogatory deception only based on the literal sense of the word, but from 
a behavioral perspective it isn't because the goal is correct. If the goal is wrong 
only then is this kind of deception really not good, [former general store 
owner, 45, male] 
In the county seat I visited, there additionally seemed to exist a belief that 
competition should be fair: that each business had its own right to work, and that no 
one should strive to put the other out of business. On the way back from helping with 
some English classes, Shi Ge and I passed a store that had been attacked by a gang of 
people. Shi Ge told me the store was opened as a branch of one in Xi'an. The owner 
put up signs (big black characters on bright yellow paper) telling of the police's 
inaction and offering a reward for information on who did it. Two days later the 
posters were gone. When we saw the posters, Shi Ge sighed and said "it is too bad. 
The law is not complete (jianquan 健•全)yet, so these things happen and no one will 
"Deception" here is translated from the Chinese qipian (欺騙）which could mean anything from 
general deception or unfaithfulness to specifics of lying or cheating. In general, I have chosen to 
translate this and other similar terms such as pianren (騙人的)and qizha (欺詐)based on their context 
into the English term that seems to fit best with my informants' meaning. 
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find the people who did it. It's not fair, it's unfair competition." At this point I agreed 
completely with my friend. I thought that such a violent response and the alleged 
refusal of the police to investigate was clearly unfair. But then, a split second later, 
Shi Ge came to his conclusion, "their prices were too low, so they probably made 
their neighbors unhappy." To him, the unfair competition was not the violence, but 
the prices of the shop itself which were too low and were seen as forcing local stores 
out of business. He insinuated that the law should have some way to protect 
businesses from such unfair competition. 
This story from the county seat echoes, to an extent, something that several 
urbanites explained to me. They felt that everyone had a right to earn their own rice 
and that it should not make any difference to me how someone else makes theirs. That 
is their business alone. Wang Ge, in explaining a comment made by one of my other 
informants, underlined this idea by saying that even purse snatchers, to some extent, 
should have a right to make their living. He felt, and other informants later agreed, 
that as long as it does not affect you personally, then you should not interfere. 
At a more "traditional" level, merchants were part of the lowest class rank 
under scholar-officials, farmers, and craftsmen in dynastic China due to Confucian 
hierarchy as well as reputations for cheating. The ''wushang bujian” saying, coming 
from dynastic times and also used in Taiwan, is one example of a more traditional 
aspect to this view of business. While this traditional aspect can explain why there are 
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similarities in views of retail business in Taiwan and Mainland China despite their 
drastically different recent histories, it also presents some questions for the large field 
of China studies. Several scholars of Chinese civilizations have mentioned this 
distrust of retail business (see for example Bruun 1993 for the early reform period on 
the mainland; Oxfeld 1993: 227 for a minority view among overseas Chinese in India; 
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and especially Olsen 1972: 291-293 for martial law Taiwan). Yet the majority of 
anthropological work on business tends to stress not deception, but rather xinyong, 
trust or reputation, and guanxi, relationships (see for instance DeGlopper 1972; Sillin 
1972). In these accounts, businesses and other individual actors are held to rather 
important codes of morality and relationships that help to secure their ties to 
customers as well as raw materials and credit. Thus it seems that in the same 
"culture," business can be seen as a morally ambivalent entity wherein cheating and 
deception are normal, even essential practices; and also as a system wherein actors 
must follow social norms and honor relationships in order to be successful at all. 
Part of the answer to this contradiction lies in the fact that xinyong and 
deception are two sides of the same coin. The systems of particularistic ties and of 
trust that anthropologists describe can be seen as ways in which these business people 
avoid being cheated. The presence of the possibility of deception is central to the 
process of building and maintaining particularistic business relationships.^^ While it 
then makes sense to see an emphasis on ties of trust because of a background of 
deception in business relationships, there also seems to be something more to it. My 
consumer friends, coming from the same culture, refused to make use of these types 
of particularistic ties even in the presence of what they saw as rampant cheating. 
I believe that an additional part of the answer to these contradicting views of 
Chinese business lies in the type of business each are speaking of and in 
anthropology's reliance on participant observation. Due to our reliance on participant 
observation, anthropologists tend to situate themselves entirely within a business and 
thereby focus on relationships within it and between it and its suppliers. Much of this 
work has been done with factories or production oriented businesses whose suppliers 
60 Thank you to Joseph Bosco for bringing up the importance of this relationship between xinyong and 
deception. 
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and buyers tend to be long term and more or less fixed (Silin 1972; DeGlopper 1972). 
Retailers on the other hand must have relatively long term relationships with 
suppliers, but may have a completely different relationship with customers. 
Tania Murray Li suggested this in her review of Hamilton's 1998 work on 
guanxi and Nagata's 1979 work on urban Malay entrepreneurs, "The Chinese in 
[Nagata's] study are, presumably, impervious to the demands [and local social 
customs] of their Malay customers but fully embedded in guanxi relations with fellow 
Chinese who provide their capital" (Li 1998: 159). While Nagata attributes this to 
ethnic differences, Li tentatively attributes it instead to a difference in structural 
relationships based on guanxi. As retailers relating to their customers, business people 
can cheat. While relating to those with whom they are embedded in long term guanxi 
relationships, they must follow established moral codes. Thus perhaps, were we to 
look downstream at some of the studies emphasizing xinyong and guanxi we would 
also see the idea of retail business’s ambivalence reappearing. In essence, the same 
people can pull selectively on different aspects of "traditional" Chinese culture to 
justify their behavior: on "w us hang bujian" for ambivalent retail business and on 
xinyong and guanxi to praise inter-business relations. Further study especially 
investigating the changing aspects of such conceptions of business and morality in a 
wider Chinese field of study would go a long way to solving this dilemma. 
Retail business being perceived as morally ambivalent does not however, 
mean that people do not want to open their own businesses. Throughout the Chinese 
field of study, examples of private retail business or family factories abound. While 
my informants still saw business as an ambivalent entity, many of my younger 
informants wanted to go into private business (as opposed to the relative few at the 
beginning of the reform period [see, e.g. Bruun 1993]), and many of my older ones 
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already were engaged in it. Business was neither absolutely moral nor absolutely 
immoral, but had aspects indicating a relative position slightly on the immoral side. It 
is then in this context that we can see selling daoban as a relatively moral business. 
Conclusion: Passive Contestation and the Moral Sphere 
Following the insights of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) about how our mind 
works through problems and understands the world through a framework of 
metaphors which both expand and limit our ability to make sense of it, this chapter 
presented daoban as a moral business. Within this metaphor, both the aspect of 
business and morality are important. First, the idea of daoban as a retail business helps 
to both locate the practice at a local level as well as complicating the idea of some sort 
of overarching "pirate" network. Of course the network approach is also true to a 
certain extent. However, I believe that its undertones, speaking of a shadowy second 
economy, gloss over the fact that stores like Chenggong operate on main streets, pay 
as much tax as other types of small businesses (meaning they at least must pay the 
monthly shop license fees), and are largely seen as legitimate. Furthermore, as 
compared to businesses dealing in fake and inferior goods, consumer fraud, and 
considering the overall ambivalence of Chinese retail business, the daoban industry is 
relatively moral. 
By focusing on local buying and selling this framework also allows us to 
concentrate on IP in its commoditized form and this is how most people in China 
interact with it, in the form of the music, movies, or other products they buy. Further 
emphasizing the "legitimacy" of the practice, my informants often chose to frame 
their responses to my questions in terms of neoclassical economics of supply and 
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demand.^' The quality should determine the price and thus, in the long run, price is a 
good indicator of zhengban and daoban. Unfortunately, this way of looking at the 
issue also glosses over a lot of the issue — bosses too make use of this idea to secure 
their profits and it is a much better indicator of quality than it is of licensing. 
Given that up to an estimated 90% of all copyrighted materials sold in China 
are pirated (Rosen 2003), it is fair to say that the IP regime is contested. This 
contestation is not, however, a form of active resistance to zhengban discs. My 
informants often claimed they bought daoban because it is cheaper and if they had 
more money they would buy licensed discs. Yet, most richer informants also only 
bought daoban. Further, no one justified the practice based on resistance to 
Hollywood or "big business" profits as is often the case in the United States or Hong 
Kong.62 Resistance instead took the form of people ignoring IP's categorization of 
discs in favor of other ways to categorize them based on quality, price, or the style of 
the shop they are in. Thus instead of searching for discs based on zhengban and 
daoban meaning licensed and pirated, they searched based on a scale of quality with 
"zhengban" meaning best quality and daoban ranging down to barely consumable. 
This is then where the second aspect of the metaphor comes in. Supporting 
this type of passive resistance, are two separate, but overlapping systems of right and 
wrong which informants selectively call upon — the moral sphere and the legal 
sphere. The moral sphere, shaped by practice and selectively called upon traditions, 
guides daily life practice and dominates the view of daoban. Here, moral and immoral 
are taken not as binary opposites, but rather as a scale of relatively more and relatively 
…Mertha (2005: 19) also found this characterization (and partial justification given the positive valence 
given to the modern market in China today) to be a common response in his interviews with Chinese 
officials involved in the enforcement of intellectual property. 
1 wi l l go into the various justifications and reasons for daoban in more detail towards the end of 
Chapter 4. 
1 1 0 
less moral. The legal sphere, which is the focus of the next chapter, is defined by the 
government and textbooks and appears when the conversation moves to more abstract 
theoretical levels. 
Thus the perspective presented in this chapter is meant to relay the primary 
way by which my informants viewed daoban. At the same time, by looking at the 
practice as a moral business, this chapter has also, of course, hidden some things. The 
next chapter will seek again to change our frame in order to investigate more 
thoroughly the legal sphere and the local ramifications of government and police 
campaigns. 
I l l 
/ | Daoban as an Illegal Commodity 
One of the most glaring aspects of daoban in China is the fact that it is illegal. Every 
once in a while, especially in the evenings when we had a chance to sit down and 
relax together over some beer, Wang Ge would abruptly steer the conversation back 
to my project. Specifically, he wanted another opportunity to impress upon me the 
seriousness of their (and my own) situation: I must always bear in mind that they 
might be put in danger by anything that I write. They do not think that their store hurts 
people, certainly not their customers, but they know that it is illegal. Wang Ge knew 
that, if someone decided to shut them down it, would happen very quickly and there 
would be nothing to be done about it. He and Wang Jie reminded me periodically not 
to mention the real shop name and certainly not to ever mention their names in what I 
write. 
Though they were extremely helpful throughout the summer of my research, I 
also felt the pressure that my presence could potentially place on them. Being a white 
foreigner, my mere presence attracted stares. The possible connections people might 
draw from my sitting there (that I might be involved, or even some sort of behind-the-
scenes boss) were driven home by conversations over the arrest and trial of two 
Americans in Shanghai just before I arrived in Xi'an for running a piracy ring (see 
Bodeen 2005). Thus among the other bosses and local residents nearby, I was simply 
a friend of Wang Ge doing research on business (it was not widely known that my 
interests were specifically in daoban). Though they offered several times to introduce 
me to some of their frequent customers for me to "ask my questions to," I declined 
preferring to speak with consumers who did not know where my main research site 
was. It was in this way that I began to shift my focus toward interviewing over 
participant observation after the second month. I maintained contact with Wang Ge 
and his family, but appeared less often at the store itself. 
At the same time, however, this illegal aspect, though periodically in the 
background, was not ever present. Actually, especially for consumers, the dominant 
characterization was that described in Chapter 3 of daoban as a relatively moral 
business. Thus while its illegality is one of its most obvious elements, it is also one of 
its most confusing ones. Its contradictions and complications are difficult to get a 
handle on. For instance, for all of this talk about being careful, Chenggong was a 
brick and mortar shop on a regular street surrounded by other shops and patrolled 
each day by policemen. Moreover it was not exceptional in this either. Many other 
shops were located on primary thoroughfares taking up retail space in central 
shopping districts. In the corner of Chenggong, by the ceiling and the sound speakers, 
Wang Ge had two certificates framed that proved his store was licensed to use their 
particular location and that they were furthermore licensed to sell music and movies. 
Every month he must pay some 500 yuan to renew each of those licenses to stay 
"legal." 
This brief account of my own field work situation and Chenggong's entangled 
legal situation are meant as an introduction to the legal sphere of the daoban disc 
market. Where the last chapter focused on the relative morality of buying and selling 
daoban in the context of consumer fraud and the overall ambivalent morality of retail 
business, this chapter shifts the focus to frame daoban as an illegal activity. While the 
moral sphere is characterized by a scale from moral to immoral, my informants were 
1 1 3 
quite clear that the legal sphere has only a dichotomy of either legal or illegal. At the 
same time however, this clear distinction is blurred again once it is taken down to the 
vagaries of everyday life. The legal-illegal dichotomy is blurred by association with 
the moral sphere, perceptions of the government (who sets, enforces, and can change 
the law), and levels of illegality. 
To begin to set up this framework from which to view daoban, we first might 
ask precisely what kind of illegal activity we are talking about here. Some in the 
music and movie industries (I will go into this in more detail later in the chapter) 
would like to equate it with preventing productive work, stealing, organized crime, 
and even terrorism. Given the views I began to explore in Chapter 3, however, it is 
not seen in this way in China. So if it is not that kind of illegal activity, then what 
kind is it? 
Petty Economic Crime 
To give some more of the context of daoban's illegality, my informants一 
choosing to build primarily on daoban's "copying" element—most frequently replied 
that daoban is like plagiarism, cheating on a test, or copying a painting. While 
people's view of which ones of these were better or worse than others varied widely 
(with the exception of the copied painting which was seen by most as the least 
offensive), they agreed that they fit in a similar category of taking advantage by 
copying. In talking about these four types of copying and attempting to parse out their 
relative positions, informants generally called on differences in skill required for the 
copying, the amount of the original which was copied, the goal of the copying, and 
the involvement of money or profits in the action. 
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Cheating, Plagiarism, and Painting 
Copying (chao) someone else on a test was commonly seen as a minor offense 
because it is done only within a school setting. My informants, especially students, 
also highlighted the fact that, just as everyone buys daoban, everyone cheats on tests 
at some point in time. The goal, they said, was also important as cheating on a test 
was more about individual advantage (not monetary profit) within a setting of 
pressure to do well and a feeling of not being able to keep up. Of course, as with other 
places, cheating on smaller tests or quizzes was much more tolerated than on larger 
tests and cheating on score-based tests (like the GRE) was more acceptable than on 
rank based tests like those in individual classes. As most foreign teachers teaching in 
China find out, cheating is very prevalent in Chinese schools. Many older informants, 
both with and without college education, commented that I was working much harder 
(and perhaps implying too hard) than Chinese students did on their Master's theses. 
Several, including a few professors, told me that some 90 percent of this research in 
China was copied or at least not based on actual research. These professors explained, 
and my student informants agreed, that the college degree is seen as a path to the goal 
of getting a good job. It does not matter then how you get the degree as long as you 
get the goal you strove for in the end. A former grocery store owner explained this 
instead as a matter of cultural difference, that Chinese people were simply better at 
copying than at creating. A college educated telecommunications worker placed the 
blame instead on an educational system which focuses on copying and memorizing 
rather than "working individually to come up with the answer on your own as in the 
West." 
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Whatever the reason? the prevalence of cheating does, to a degree, make it 
more accepted. Yet, there are also some other aspects to the practice which echo with 
attitudes toward daoban. There is a degree to which cheating is seen as "clever" 
{congming). This notion of cleverness describes someone who is worldly, understands 
the system, and can take advantage of it. At some level it thus also encompasses and 
describes people who find ways to cheat successfully because, to a certain extent, they 
then achieve the same goal that everyone else was also after, just sooner. Here, this 
concept of cheating as "clever" business fits nicely into other categorizations of 
development in China. Cities along the coast, especially Guangzhou were seen by my 
informants invariably as more developed than Xi'an and rural areas in Shaanxi were 
invariable less developed than Xi'an. 
Interestingly, this economic scale was overlaid with cultural ideas of 
shrewdness and benevolence (shanliang). Several informants told me stories about 
how rural people (especially those from two mountains from the main roads) would 
give a stranger their last bowl of rice. My informants described this as benevolence, 
but they also clearly saw it as a sign of naivete. Rural people were simultaneously 
more naive in business and also more hospitable {reqing) and willing to help others 
than those in Xi'an. The same scale was said to hold for Xi'an people as compared to 
those in Guangzhou, but here it truly was a good thing. In this comparison, the more 
benevolent people were those telling me the story. One of my informants pulled on 
this to explain why people in Xi'an dislike people from the South (and particularly 
Guangzhou). As with cleverness, being shrewd (or not being naive) carries both a 
positive valence, economic success, and a negative one, coldness and calculativity. 
63 Further empirical research focusing on cheating or copying in China (single sited or cross-culturally) 
would provide a lot more on this and add a lot to understanding other aspects of Chinese attitudes, such 
as many of my informants' insistence that "Chinese are not good at creating, but we excel at copying." 
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Cheating, then, while being denounced overall, is largely accepted in its more 
minor forms as cleverness (newspaper articles denouncing the practice often highlight 
the new ingenious methods students now use).64 As it takes on national or cultural 
elements, cheating can become almost a sense of pride as when Chinese students (and 
special preparations schools), including mainlanders, Hong Kongers, and Taiwanese, 
were able to beat the computerized GRE test. Students made use of the "people 
mountain, people sea" {renshan renhai) technique of overcoming odds through pure 
numbers. By sending many students in to the test at the beginning of the month and 
having each student memorize one or two questions, the preparation centers or 
Internet discussion boards were able to piece back together the large pools of possible 
test questions for that month. They could then figure out the answers and give the lists 
of questions and answers to their paying students to memorize. The trick was figured 
out because of the large increase in scores coming from Chinese (and Korean) 
locations at the end of the months.^"'' This cheating could definitely be categorized as 
clever even while it is also characterized as wrong，Cheating is for individual 
advancement (not for profit), was not at the direct expense of others (the test was 
scored, not ranked), and was on a test on which most Chinese already felt they were at 
a structural disadvantage due to English being their second language. 
64 For more on Chinese attitudes toward cheating and practices of cheating see also Mooney 2005; 
China.org.cn 2002; and China Daily 2004. 
65 See also Walfish 2001; Pan 2001 ； and numerous discussion boards online on the issue. See Pendall-
Jones 2003 especially for the fact that cheating is also very much prevalent in the United States. The 
issue has sparked a large backlash of Chinese claims that ETS unfeirly punished all Chinese for the 
actions of some and from many who say that the increases are a result of Chinese students willingness 
to spend much more time memorizing sample questions than Americans and others. While it is unfair 
to say thai Chinese are all or the only cheaters, the issues discussed here do relate to how Chinese 
people, specifically, see and justify the practice. 
66 L i Heng (2002) said for instance, "Wi th a huge population fighting for still limited education 
resources, China is inevitably a big county in terms of examination. It is not students' fault i f they are 
"good at" passing exams, for they have undergone too much training in this regard. The problems 
found in computerized GRE examination only expose shortcomings of the test itself, which has a far 
too small question tank." 
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Daoban, like cheating, is seen as an individual action that does little or no 
harm to anyone else. However, unlike cheating, it is done for material or monetary 
gains and thus it is seen as more offensive. At the same time though, the fact that 
daoban is a business and businesses are meant to pursue profits goes a long way 
toward limiting the offensiveness of the practice making it less cheating and more a 
matter of cleverness. The intermingling of the ideas of cleverness, cheating, the 
modern, and shrewdness all have many parallels with business and with daoban in 
particular. Also similar to daoban, cheating is something that Chinese students 
willingly admit is rampant in China; it is also something which they are embarrassed 
enough about to deny on the grounds that people everywhere cheat were someone of 
another national or cultural background to suggest it in the wrong way. Both cheating 
and daoban then have both structural aspects, which make them similar to cheating 
and piracy elsewhere, as well as cultural reasons and justifications, which make their 
manifestations specific to China. 
Plagiarism (piaoqie) has similarly gotten much more attention in China as the 
spotlight focuses on professors and graduate students who, pressed to publish or 
looking for shortcuts, publish articles or dissertations where large portions of the 
material is plagiarized (Zhu 2006). My informants differentiated among degrees of 
plagiarism figuring that the more one copies of someone else's work (and thus the less 
of one's own work), the worse the offence. Overall however, plagiarism was seen as 
significantly more immoral than daoban.^^ While students copying on tests was 
67 While my informants spoke of plagiarism as worse {gen liuai) I interpreted this as a moral statement 
rather than a statement of legality. At the seem time, with recent revelations in newspapers in the 
mainland of plagiarism by high ranking researchers (as well as cases similar to the Korean scientist 
who was accused of faking his cloning research results), the government has increasingly become 
involved in policing this immorality as well. Raymond L i reported in a South China Morning Post 
article that there is a plan to create a blacklist of academics who have plagiarized to shame them (Li 
2006). Other articles like Cindy Sui's for Agence France Presse suggest that the government may 
pursue criminal fraud charges in some cases (Sui 2006) thereby also moving some plagiarism into the 
realm of illegality. 
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considered a minor offense, plagiarism of research constituted a major breach. Thus 
while copying for business purposes or for individual goals of schooling were largely 
tolerated and while plagiarism is also similarly a professor or graduate student cutting 
a corner for their own benefit, the fact that it is an academic doing it entails a larger 
betrayal. Academics, from Confucian ideals as well as the more recent elevation of 
science as necessary for modernity, are to be held to a higher standard. Though their 
work truly is analogous to business in many ways where they must produce 
something (articles in journals) to maintain their positions and prestige (their 
profits),68 the justification of copying to achieve one's goals without hurting others 
does not hold up (scientific fraud also hurts China's image) and is largely denied as 
applicable to their situation. Interestingly, those informants who felt that daoban, 
because it copied the entirety of a work, was a worse offense than if it had only copied 
some of the original saw it more as analogous to plagiarism. Those who saw it as 
more faithful to the original (for the same reason) saw it as analogous to copying 
paintings instead. 
Finally then, the last act that my informants compared daoban to was that of 
copying (linmo) paintings, by far the least offensive of the bunch. This category was 
especially interesting to me as one example of "copying" which stretches back much 
further in history than daoban and thus could shed light一Alford (1995:27-29) deals 
with this subject briefly—on "traditional" views of the practice. I was quickly 
disappointed however, as most informants asserted that its connection with daoban 
was peripheral at best. Copying paintings, much like copying the Classics and their 
various commentaries, was a way to learn the art itself. Yet, more than that, it was 
This analogy becomes quite clear in the justifications given by professors who have been found to 
plagiarize as they emphasize the pressures of publishing large numbers of articles placed on them by 
their university system in order to maintain their jobs (Zhu 2006). 
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necessary to a career as a painter and good copying required skill. Some copiers, I 
was told, even became famous not for their own work but for their ability to copy 
other famous artists. This skill level was one of the major differences between daoban 
and copying paintings. While both strive to reproduce the original exactly, daoban 
requires no skill in singing or acting (only a machine) and so there was very little of 
your own that you invested in the copying. 
Painting in China, like poetry and prose, relies to a large extent on keeping 
within and conversing with ancient texts which were thought to be closer to 
perfection. Copying a painting, like adding someone else's line of poetry into one's 
own, was a way of referring back to the original with respect. Here, several 
informants, especially the members of a local band, saw a direct parallel in that they 
performed (copied) only the artists that they most admired. They also felt that, though 
daoban affected those artist negatively, its distribution throughout China was a boon 
as it allowed more people to listen to and appreciate their talent. 
The last major difference between copying paintings and daoban revolves 
around the issue of profits. First, as an informant pointed out to me, copies of 
paintings and the originals were sold in completely different markets. The original 
was sold (or gifted) most likely to the imperial family or scholar officials. The copies 
could be sold in the streets and, in turn, reflect well on the painter's prestige. As 
opposed to daoban, no one lost out in such a situation，” Second, the same issue of 
prestige and Confucian hierarchy that popped up in views of plagiarism enters into 
This idea of separate markets does, in fact, relate also to daoban. I f the American music industry had 
no desire to sell its music in China, then Chinese copying their music and selling it themselves would 
have no impact whatsoever on the American industry's "potential profits." Through the promises made 
by globalization, the industry increasingly expects to selling their products in markets around the 
world. It is only with this expectation that selling copies to Chinese p e o p l e o r to Americans who 
travel to China, buy discs, and take them home—that daoban becomes a problem (rather than free 
advertising for the "real" thing, for instance) for American companies. 
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this as well. Unlike daoban, even if the painter (who would also have been a member 
of the literati or scholar-officials) lost money, he would not claim the loss as he was 
supposed to be above such trivial matters of profits or even "potential profits." For 
daoban—and this is why it is only peripherally related to copying paintings—the 
original and the copy are both motivated primarily by business and profits. 
Daoban then is generally seen as illegal in the context of other kinds of 
copying. Where it is clearly less offensive than plagiarism, it is also clearly worse 
than copying a painting. How much more or less offensive and its relative position as 
compared to cheating varied considerably from informant to informant. The primary 
factors involved daoban being intimately tied up with business’s goal of profits, its 
generally perceived lack of a large negative effect on others, its lack of any 
requirements of skill to perform the copying, and the fact that it copies the entirety of 
the original. Interestingly, few people pointed out that daoban, in stark contrast to 
cheating on tests and plagiarizing, does not claim anything in the disc as its own: it 
sells precisely because it is attributed to the original artists and it is those original 
artists singing their songs on the disc. While this, to me at least, makes the act almost 
the opposite of plagiarism, the majority of my informants instead focused on copying 
of the physical disc itself and the goal of the copying. 
For daoban, the goal clearly is money. While many felt that this made it worse 
than cheating on a test which had no profit motive (also here copying a painting for 
sale was clearly seen as worse than copying it for studying, preservation, or simple 
admiration), others felt that here daoban was not so bad because it is a business and 
everyone already knows that business' primary goal is profits. It is this view of 
business linked with profits that I believe fuels much of the current backlash against 
plagiarism in academia in China. Where copying for profits is more or less accepted 
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for business people, academics are not supposed to be out for profit and their copying 
of others for their own benefit is seen as a much larger offense. It is then because of 
the importance of the economic aspects and daoban's perceived minor impact that it is 
more related locally with selling without a license, selling fake but not inferior 
products, or some common business offense like evading a portion of taxes. 
Petty Economic Illegality 
On a hot May afternoon, working in the shade of some trees near a bus stop, 
were a group of seven or eight newspaper and drink vendors who were mostly in their 
40s or 50s with two who looked to be in their mid-60s. The vendors were split evenly 
among men and women and all looked relatively poor.?" I mention them as a group 
not because they worked or stood together (quite the opposite as they actually 
competed to some degree for customers), but rather because they were the only people 
who stood still. Everyone else either walked right by on their way elsewhere, stopped 
temporarily to wait for a bus, or paused to rest for a bit in the shade before shortly 
venturing back into the summer heat. 
They were also a group because, at times of mutual threat, they did cooperate. 
When one saw the police coming, they would pick up their goods and quickly walk 
away to hide somewhere or blend into the crowd. Others would then follow, whether 
they had seen the threat or not. If one vendor was away at the time (using the 
bathroom or going for more stock) others often would grab their cooler for them as 
they left the area. Most of these turned out to be false alarms however, and were 
laughed off later. Interestingly, the vendors were not worried about regular police 
7" While most of such vendors certainly are poor as the job is a marginal one at best, it is worth 
pointing out that "dressing poor" itself was a quite common strategy for people in the city. Many 
traders from the countryside who come to the city to restock their stores wi l l dress in farmers clothes 
for the occasion and bring their goods back using burlap grain or seed sacks. Such methods are 
especially useful when transporting valuable goods around the city to minimize attention drawn by 
both by police and thieves. 
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patrols and would move only a few feet to be on the other side of a tree when such 
cars passed. On the other hand, when an unmarked (but somehow to them distinctive) 
van drove up, they all immediately scattered much further knowing that this was real 
danger. Police from this branch would confiscate their goods while other uniformed 
police would not give them a second glance. While this cooperation meant the safety 
of someone's total investment and does indicate a degree of group solidarity, the 
vendors seemed to come and go as individuals and, by the next week all had moved 
on to new places in the city. 
In some ways, the situation that these vendors are in can be seen as the 
opposite of that of Chenggong. Where they are selling legal products in an 
unauthorized manner (without a license), Chenggong has a license to operate issued 
by the local government but sells illegal discs. Where Chenggong is rooted to one 
place, they are mobile and often move from place to place throughout the day. Where 
these vendors will simply take their wares and scatter when the police arrive, Wang 
Ge could not simply move Chenggong. He thus must have a different strategy to deal 
with such threats. Structurally then, the relative marginality of the vendors (plus the 
flipside, their mobility) and the relative fixedness of Chenggong mean that Wang Ge, 
like most small business bosses, must rely much more heavily on his connections. 
The day was relatively nice and they often joked around, laughing with one another. Symbolizing 
their competition however, they also played jokes as another way of passing the time. The most 
popular joke involved sneaking up behind someone, either carrying your own cooler or temporarily 
leaving it behind for stealth (which might then make you a victim as well), and taking a bottle from the 
victim's cooler. By quickly returning to your own place and hiding the stolen bottle among your own 
wares the joke was complete. Of course, the only person you had to fool was your victim; everyone 
else was the audience, watching and laughing as you were caught and chased to return the bottle. This 
game, while fun, also was not merely in jest: a successful joker would not return the bottle and the 
victim would have lost 3 yuan in income. This combination of cooperation and competition is in some 
ways similar to the theoretical argument made by Kipnis (2003) for a neo-Durkheimian understanding 
of how both organic and inorganic solidarities are at work in relationships. Kipnis argues that rather 
than having either organic or inorganic forms of solidarity, the two forms are often both enacted within 
many relationships. People must simultaneously express sameness while also holding to a degree of 
difference. These vendors can cooperate as equals in the face of a threat, but they also must remember 
not to rely to heavily on their fellow "equals," because they are also competitors. 
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At the same time however, there are also similarities. Both Chenggong and 
these drink or newspaper sellers sell real things rather than fake ones (although there 
were constant rumors that drink sellers would refill used bottles thus making them 
fake). Both also must watch out for law enforcement, paying careful attention to 
which sorts of police will bother them and which will leave them alone. While 
Chenggong does operate from a store that it has rented for almost a decade, many 
daoban sellersespecially in cities on the coast of China~work as vendors, selling 
out of coats, boxes, or blankets they spread out temporarily on the ground. Depending 
on their structural position in the larger market, daoban vendors, like these newspaper 
and drink vendors, also have a degree of both cooperation and competition between 
themselves and other nearby vendors. They may compete for customers, but they also 
work together to avoid detection thus minimizing losses from raids and to make their 
area well-known among their possible customers as a place to buy their discs. 
Furthermore, while there may be organized crime in their respective backgrounds, 
especially in their distribution networks, these are all generally viewed as individual 
workers and normal retailers (within their respective categories of sellers). Most 
importantly for this chapter, both fit into a general category of petty economic crime. 
Using this term, "petty economic crime," I aim to highlight two aspects of 
daoban's illegality. The first is that daoban is seen as a crime intimately connected 
with business and done specifically for economic gains. It is thus more an economic 
crime than a political crime (in China this could run the gamut from overly leftist to 
rightist to advocating for democracy or opposing the government on other kinds of 
human rights) or violent crime (such as murder or armed robbery). As such, it needs 
to be seen in the larger context of post-reform crime rates. China experienced in the 
1980s both a precipitous rise in crime rates as well as a marked change in the types of 
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crimes committed (or at least in those prosecuted)/^ There was a decrease in political 
crimes and a sharp increase in violent crimes and economic crimes. Increases in 
wealth and its unequal distribution (as well as definitions of crime themselves), have 
also meant that the majority of crimes are now overwhelmingly committed by the 
poor (Bakken 2005a; Liu, Zhang, and Messner 2001). In this sense, the tremendous 
rates of copying intellectual property in China need to be seen as one of many 
increases in economic crimes. 
At the same time, there is an important difference. In areas like stealing 
tangible property, the offenses were always there and have simply increased. For 
daoban however, while the practice was prevalent prior to the reform and opening, at 
that time it was not an offense at all. The crime itself, or its definition as a crime, is 
new since the PRC promulgated its new Copyright Law in 1990. In this case we can 
look at "piracy," in China as well as in the United States some 150 years ago, not as a 
result of immoral behavior, but rather as the result of changes in legal ideas of 
property that have designated formerly legal activities as criminal. This redefinition 
has occurred simultaneous to a global revaluation of assets — from an emphasis on 
tangible resources to one on knowledge and intellectual capital. 
The effect of this change in legal structure then means that activities which 
formerly were moral and legal may now be illegal without having become immoral. 
This creation of crime also underlines the role of society in shaping the kind of crime 
72 Despite a consensus about shifts in types of crime, there is a degree of argument over how useful 
statistics put out by the government really are. Authors in Liu, Zhang and Messner’s (2001) book tend 
to take the statistics more or less as is. Wi th one author arguing that drops in the crime rates, assuming 
that these are actual rates, were caused by yanda or "hard strike" campaigns (both to be mentioned later 
on). Bakken (2005) tends to treat them much more skeptically, looking at the changes more as changes 
in reporting practices than reflections of actual changes in the rate of crime. The differences in statistics 
created through political pressure surrounding such campaigns as well as the contract system in general 
have created a "systematically biased picture of crime" (Bakken 2005c: 66). Concentrating on a 
comparative view with somewhat corrected statistics, he also maintains that, though compared to 
China's own history there has been a dramatic rise in crime, compared to other countries in transition 
or otherwise, China's rate remains amazingly low. 
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that there is. In pre-reform China, crimes of political position or of an alleged counter-
revolutionaiy nature were predominant (and included much economic activity that is 
now legal) and petty economic crime either went unreported, was reported as political 
(or capitalist) in nature, or simply was not committed as much due to the relative 
equality of the society. 
As I related in Chapter 3 and in the comparisons above, many informants felt 
that daoban's kind of illegality, as long as it was related to the goal of business 
(profits), was largely to be expected from businesses in every sector of the economy. 
My informants most readily identified selling knock-off clothes and fake foods or 
medicines (this perhaps because of both the current prevalence and preoccupation 
with them as well as my own references to them in our interviews), both clearly also 
economic in nature, as the nearest other illegal activities/^ Within this category of 
economic crime however, daoban is seen as relatively moral and its relationship to 
"fakes" in China is more tangential (daoban is fake, but importantly it is not inferior) 
than it has become in the United States. 
The second aspect, building off of the first, is that daoban is seen as a 
relatively minor crime. As several informants pointed out, while selling daoban was 
against the law (weifa) it was not criminal ifanzui). While it is not seen to be as 
innocuous as copying paintings, it was also clearly not as offensive as some 
plagiarism. Further, as I described in Chapter 3, most saw the stealing (and thus, to 
“ 7 3 Although no one mentioned tax evasion, I see many parallels between this economic crime (also very 
common in China) and that of daoban, especially as it was described in the Greek context by Thomas 
Malaby (2003). Malaby describes tax evasion as something which nearly all businesses participate in to 
some extent or another. While it is certainly illegal, it appears to play out rather more like a game 
between the business owners and the tax officials. Similarly, daoban is seen as one way, in the disc 
business, that retailers try to cut corners on the supply side to conserve some degree of profit, while 
simultaneously maintaining low prices that attract customers and allow them to continue to compete in 
the market. Besides this disc specific method, disc store owners (both zhengban and daoban) probably 
also practice other corner cutting practices (like purposely not giving out receipts to avoid taxes) in 
common with other types of stores. Other practices Malaby describes, such as restaurant owner's 
constant attempts to encroach further onto the roads or sidewalks, also have parallels in China. 
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them, the criminal aspect) as occurring only at the manufacturing stage rather than in 
the everyday buying and selling of the discs. To this, a lawyer I spoke with added that 
transporting large quantities of discs might also be considered criminal. While there is 
then a clear difference between legal and illegal, there also are different gradations of 
illegality, much as there are in the United States and elsewhere (misdemeanors vs. 
felonies for example). Viewed then in the context of rising overall crime rates and its 
perceived position among other types of economic crime, retail daoban is seen only as 
a minor form of criminality related primarily to the ambivalence of business I 
discussed in Chapter 3.1 have chosen to describe it as "petty" rather than use a more 
legal term in order to stress that my focus has been on people's conceptions of the 
practice rather than its definition within Chinese or Western legal statutes. 
Illegality in China's Context: The Government Connection 
Pernille Hohnen (2003) explains in her work based in Lithuania how a market 
reopened and profited from relaxed regulations on post-socialist business and the 
differences in prices and supply of goods between Lithuania and its neighbors. She 
describes the life of these traders and the social stigma of the trading activity that they 
participated in. Her account centers this stigma on the market itself, the place that it is 
and that it was. Interestingly, her accounts of the immorality of newly legal practices 
in post-socialist Lithuania echo those of early scholars in post-reform China, like 
Bruun (1993). As I explained in the chapter on business, there was a common mistrust 
of people who went into business and though they might gain monetary benefits, their 
status ill society was measured largely on their ability to convert that monetary 
success into official government or party positions or relationships. There was also 
seen to be a movement from government and official positions of status toward 
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gaining a foothold over some of these new profits of business. Thus the radio 
repairman from Chapter 3 sighed as he described his classmates whose government 
positions had allowed their businesses to take off much faster (and thus go much 
further) than his own. 
Hohnen (2003) also focuses on the organized crime aspects of the market 
where certain criminal groups collected protection money and, later, stall "rent" from 
the vendors. In China, Mertha describes two similar cases recounted to him by local 
officials. In the first, a warehouse of CD production lines that eventually was seized 
(it took a campaign with high enough backing to enable the arrest) was owned by a 
high ranking military officer (2005: 156). In the second, there was an outdoor bazaar 
of daoban stalls whose owners paid rent to the local enforcement agency who owned 
the building (ibid.: 186). While I did not specifically look into this type of 
organization working behind the scenes (for perhaps obvious reasons), my informants 
constantly pointed to the role of local government in supporting or at least turning a 
blind eye to daoban in Xi'an, a role that seemed also to be integral to the power of 
Hohnen's racketeers. 
In stark contrast to local comparisons of daoban to petty illegal activities 
described above, international music and movie industries often make such illegal 
copying out as "piracy," a practice they now seek to intimately connect with 
organized crime and, more recently, with terrorists. According to an Industry Trust for 
IP Awareness Christmas 2004 campaign in the United Kingdom, "no one benefits 
[from piracy], except the organized crime networks and benefit cheats" (2004). The 
industry quotes Lynn Faulds-Wood who on an undercover investigation with the 
Federation Against Copyright Theft (FACT) 
...soon realized why [I had to wear protective clothing] when we approached 
some traders in a market who were selling pirate DVDs from a wallpaper-
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pasting table. When we challenged them, one pulled a knife while another left 
behind a hammer when he ran off. 
Subsequently, I have come across many other threatening and 
unscrupulous pirate traders and also, sadly, seen children as young as 12 being 
used to front street stalls whilst being drawn into the web of crime. As a 
consumer affairs journalist, scams are something I come across daily. By 
investigating pirated DVDs, I have stumbled across a far bigger story featuring 
underworld gangsters, traffickers in illegal immigrants and terrorists. There's 
no doubt about it, DVD piracy really is an X-rated scene. 
In a single account we thus move from a conversation about intellectual 
property to protective clothing, knives, hammers, unscrupulous pirates, child labor, 
underworld gangsters, traffickers, and terrorists! While these accusations may have 
some truth to them, any truth is severely undermined by the interest of the parties 
involved (the "Trust" is made up of nearly all music and movie companies in the UK). 
The rhetoric however does have an impact on how we frame "piracy." 
Organized crime however, does not generally take on a high profile role in 
China as a single entity in the way that the Mafia in Italy or the Triads in Hong Kong 
are often portrayed. Instead, it surfaces as various groups with degrees of government 
backing who can get things done and prevent things from getting done. Such groups 
may be based locally rather than being a part of a larger organization (Shieh 2005:70). 
In 2005 and early 2006, news stories coming out of China have multiplied describing 
the role of "thugs" who are allegedly hired by local government or larger business 
interests to put down protests and demonstrations. Organized crime then seems to be 
very locally oriented and tied up with issues of corruption. Similarly, retailing daoban 
is also local in nature, despite its obvious international origins and distribution 
channels, and requires backing (or beijing) with government bureaus to succeed. 
However, businesses that organized crime groups themselves run tend to be those 
which offer large profits (and risks) and, in China at least, the retail selling of daoban 
at daoban prices is not one of those. There are too many competitors operating openly 
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in the city for an organized crime type of direct involvement in the business to occur. 
Daoban as a business operating openly however might be particularly vulnerable to 
protection rackets and, although Wang Ge never mentioned anything about such 
things (at least not non-government protection), I would not rule this out. 
Backing (beijing) 
Historically however, daoban was not the kind of enterprise run by organized 
crime because it was more or less legitimate. Provided you did not break censorship 
laws, copying copyrighted products was legal in Communist China up until the 
passage of (and under large exception clauses after the passage of) the reform-era 
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China in 1990 (it was modified in 200 
Even now, retail daoban can be taxed locally (at least as much as any business which 
does not keep receipts and most small shops in Xi'an do not), can be made to pay 
licensing fees to rent shop space on the street, and can be moderately controlled. At 
the same time however, while retail seems not to be directly connected to organized 
crime, the creation and distribution of the DVDs and VCDs may indeed be another 
story. As the state cracks down on such factories, the danger of doing it will rise and 
those with more government connections and skill in circumventing the law will (or 
may already have) found it in their interest to participate. As a local professor 
explained to me, the law, or at least 
the enforcement of the law (zhifa) can change very fast. We get the feeling that 
these people who do daoban are people who have money. You must have the 
right beijing. They are people who know how to do things. [Do you mean the 
factory people or those who run the stores?] The manufacturers. The others, 
buying and selling, I think I can really empathize with them. They have a need 
for discs but no money for zhengban. 
74 For the English translation of the 1990 version of Copyright Law refer to 
http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/kj/wjfg/t43948.htm and for that of the 2001 revised version see 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/lawslO.htm (both sites were last accessed on May 9，2006). 
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This professor, himself a copyright holder whose rights had been violated by 
people producing a daoban version of his book, explains how the people who produce 
daoban are seen as being figures with money and backing. "Backing," or beijing in 
Chinese, is a concept that echoes a broad idea of a person's background and is closely 
related to the Chinese idea of guanxi or social relationships. One's beijing includes 
both educational and relational capital individuals accumulate as well as who one's 
family and friends are. It is in many ways similar to the broader idea of social capital, 
but is restricted to a more narrowly utilitarian sense. Backing is then not solely about 
the education or family upbringing that a person brings to the table, but rather it is 
about access to the sets of relationships (which may indeed have arisen through 
family connections or education) with other people who might be useful in a 
particular pursuit. While the words the professor chose could be interpreted as good, 
bad, or neutral, in the context of his earlier stories, I believe this quotation to be 
implying a somewhat shadowy side. When I asked Wang Ge about the concept of 
backing in business, he replied with a short comment about Chinese politics. 
"Because the old politicians in China never go away, if you don't have beijing, then 
you cannot do politics." 
In business as in politics this backing is necessary. As Wang Ge implied, if 
you do not maintain (not to mention establish in the first place) connections with the 
old politicians, the king makers, then you cannot succeed in politics. For business, 
because the enforcement, or execution, of the law is always changing, connections are 
essential to know which way the wind blows before it knocks you over. Only such 
people with useful and reliable connections could successfully navigate the abrupt and 
somewhat arbitrary changes in enforcement and legal norms. The law itself might 
change, but even when it remains the same, how and when the local government and 
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law enforcement agents choose to enforce it is always changing. Therefore, for a 
person to be successful in any business, they must have a good handle on these 
changes and ways to protect themselves. Were raiding of daoban to become more 
frequent here, as it has in other parts of the country, these connections would be that 
much more important. While he specifically means that the manufacturers of daoban 
products must have this kind of political backing, to a smaller extent those who sell 
daoban also must have these connections. So too is this also an expression of the 
uncertainties that could be involved in any business and were involved in all business 
early in the reform period. 
As an illustration of the government's role and of backing in the daoban 
business side I want to briefly recount two stories which occurred in the summer of 
2005. While Xiao Zhang continued to rent space to sell cassette tapes out of Wang 
Ge's store, his wife had recently opened a new store in another part of town. Xiao 
Zhang's plan was to begin to move his cassette business from Chenggong to that store 
as business there began to pick up, eventually leaving Chenggong to Wang Ge and 
Wang Jie. In the first month or so business was quite good, he claimed they sold some 
1000 yuan (gross) of discs each night. Then one night, "the government told me I 
could not sell there anymore. The government said it's against the law (weifa), but if I 
move to 'X' district, then it is zhengban." Xiao Zhang spent the next week or so 
moving his stock to the new location by moped as three wheel carts were in short 
supply and he was worried about the attention renting a truck would bring to him. 
After moving everything, the new shop made only 70 yuan the first night. 
Unfortunately, everyone agreed there was not much he could do as he was locked into 
a rental agreement at the new place. Other shops who had been better established in 
the old location had no problems and stayed on. 
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While he may have had some connections to avoid having his stock seized^^ 
the government could use his selling daoban tapes as a reason to force him to move to 
a different area which, they claimed, would allow him to be considered "zhengban." 
Interestingly, "zhengban" here seems to be taking on more of a meaning of "legal" 
rather than "licensed copy." Daoban is illegal, so if your shop is considered legally 
licensed (as most brick and mortar daoban shops are), then it counts as “zhengban’” 
no matter what type of discs you sell. This entails a movement, similar to the one I 
will describe later in the section on pornography, away from the idea of intangible 
property as a focus of the definition of zhengban and daoban to one based on the local 
context and different aspects of legality. 
The second illustration of backing and the government's role concerned the 
mysterious disappearance of all DVDs from Chenggong for a week or so during 
August. I arrived one morning to find that, though the business was open as usual, all 
of the DVDs had been removed and their places were taken up with extra copies of 
VCDs and CDs that were already displayed elsewhere. Xiao Zhang informed me 
simply that the government had told them to get rid of them and, with a bit of 
sarcasm, added that "we always listen to the police." Later I approached Wang Ge and 
he explained that it was only a temporary thing and that, before too long they would 
be able to sell them again. All of the normal DVDs had been "sold" (though I guess 
this meant taken back to the distributor or given to his brother's shop) and the boxed 
sets were stashed in a drawer. When customers came in asking for DVDs, they simply 
said they did not have any. Occasionally, Wang Ge would also add that they should 
check back in a few days. 
乃 It is also possible that the raiding officers had some sympathy for him - going back to Chapter 3，he 
was only trying to make a living. 
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During the period the discs were gone, a lawyer stopped by to talk with an 
annoyed Wang Ge. The lawyer was a relative of a friend and Wang Ge, perhaps 
wanting an excuse not to speak with him, insisted that I ask him my questions as he 
was an "expert." After the discs returned in the next couple of days, Wang Ge wanted 
to know if I had gotten any good information from the lawyer. He said that lawyers in 
China are not like those in the United States. They cannot get you off the hook if you 
do something against the law. But, he explained, some are useful because they know 
the judge and can negotiate (sort of like a "plea bargain") a bribe, a smaller fine, or a 
lighter sentence^^ He was not willing to talk any more about the incident. I am thus 
left uncertain if this conversation implied that Chenggong had been fined or had been 
in danger of being fined, but I suspect that a warning of a raid which then did not 
occur was involved. Wang Ge's annoyance could have been a result of many things 
from having to get rid of the DVDs, to not liking all lawyers, or to this particular 
lawyer having had something to do with the disappearance of the DVDs. I also do not 
know why only DVDs disappeared when most VCDs, tapes, and CDs also were 
daoban. Looking at other shops in the city it appears that only those in Chenggong's 
general area had done away with their DVDs. Furthermore, all of them had DVDs 
back again the next week running business as normal. 
Such a view of lawyers and of their connections in the government which both 
impede and facilitate their helping clients was not limited to Chenggong. The local 
professor related to me 
In the neighborhood where I rent my apartment, the owner was doing 
something against the law and the contract. So we hired a lawyer who we had 
to pay. We also had to pay for his inviting various government and judicial 
76 While some lawyers in China are more independent, the majority work for the government as a part 
of the same government bureau as the police. Judges, police, and lawyers then are all able to work 
together much more closely than in the US system for instance. This closeness while handicapping 
lawyers in helping in trials, is significant in enables them to be more helpful in avoiding trials, lowering 
fines, and negotiating in one's favor. 
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p e o p l e ou t f o r d i n n e r t o c o n v i n c e t h e m of ou r case . In the e n d w e w o n , bu t no t 
only did we spend only a little less than we were given in winnings, but the 
c o m p a n y stil l hasn ' t p a i d us . 
R e s o r t i n g to f o r m a l m e a n s of d e f e n s e such as su ing o r t r ia ls a re cos t ly a n d the 
outcome is very much uncertain. Even in these instances a lot depends on the 
particularistic relationships that you or your lawyer might have in the government. As 
in the above case of Xiao Zhang and Wang Ge, the government and its ways of 
enforcing laws against daoban can change quite quickly and not always according to 
aspects of intangible property. It is here that Wang Ge's better connections allowed 
Chenggong to stay (only removing their DVDs for a short period) while Xiao Zhang 
had to move to a new location. To run an old business or to open a new business it is 
essential to have backing in the government or bureaus responsible for your type of 
business. This holds for all types of businesses, from those that sell legal products in 
legal areas to those that are in one way or another illegal7^ Those that are more illegal 
and a focus of current enforcement require relatively more backing to avoid being 
targeted for raids, but all require some. Many legal stores also bend or break the law 
in some way merely in the process of doing their day to day business: an Internet cafe 
might find a way around new restrictions on the age of customers or the number of 
77 While a Taiwanese friend and I ate dinner at a restaurant in Shenzhen (near Hong Kong), it was 
raided by police over its appropriation of the sidewalk for more table space. The police were followed 
by dump trucks which were piled high with pink plastic chairs and tables that had been confiscated 
from other restaurants down the street. Receiving a minute's advance notice, the restaurant staff (and 
some customers) were able to move all the outside tables and chairs into the space between existing 
tables inside. My friend noted that in Taiwan, such running from the police is also common. However, 
it is limited to night markets and illegal vendors there. In Shenzhen, she laughed, even the restaurants 
must run. 
Episodes like this also frequently occurred in Xi 'an and they illustrate another important point. 
Many legal businesses also seem to skirt the edges of legality in order to do business. The fl ip side to 
being allowed to do nearly anything as long as it is not asked about or done obviously, is that law 
enforcement have convenient (and generally legitimate) reasons to close you down i f they want to. As 
the owner of a dumpling restaurant explained to me, legal or illegal doesn't really matter so much. I f 
they want to close you down, then they wi l l close you down. Legality doesn't matter because i f you are 
open at all, then they can find a reason, some regulation you are breaking, to close you down. His 
restaurant had been ordered to shut down for a week to do some renovations meant to promote hygiene. 
He, however, was upset because his place was shut down while other competitors down the street with 
the same violations were not. 
1 3 5 
hours that they can spend on the computer; restaurants might violate a sanitation 
regulation or two; vendors might sell their wares without a license; and employers 
might not pay employees on time or might find new and creative ways to deduct from 
their workers salaries various "deposits" that they do not intend to return. The issue 
however, is that it is not breaking the laws or regulations that will get your business 
into trouble. It is rather the fact that your backing in the bureaus that count is not 
strong enough to protect you. Most businesses are in a position to be closed if the 
police wanted to, but few get caught. Those that do are punished severely as a lesson 
to those who did not, but the lesson falls on deaf ears because people already have a 
pretty good idea who will not be caught each time. 
Corruption 
While backing might be seen as straddling a line between the use of 
particularistic ties and corruption, there are other practices that can clearly be 
considered corruption. Corruption, according to scholars and the central government, 
has grown rapidly with government officials using their positions to get ahead in 
business or to reap some rewards from others' business success. Officials at village 
and provincial levels might have found access to funds and business ties through the 
management of cooperatives or communally owned factories. The central government 
in Beijing has attempted to get at corruption through crackdowns, various 
investigations, and making examples of prominent cases. One recent example has 
been the (not entirely successful) move to force individual officials to divest 
themselves from private coal mining ventures in the hopes that this will help to 
eliminate local government's interest in keeping unsafe mines open (Jiao 2005; You 
2005). Such anti-corruption actions however, are quickly stymied when they reach 
officials midway down who benefit from the work. 
1 3 6 
Though all of my informants were nationalistic, these stories of government 
corruption were, despite my being American, quite commonly recounted to me and 
recounted within my hearing. Their idea was not to denounce the government as 
criminal, but to point out that people in the government often do things that should be 
illegal. However, because the government sets the laws, only occasionally do they get 
caught for it. This type of illegality, according to the owner of another daoban shop, 
contrasts strongly with her daoban business, thereby justifying her petty illegalities. 
Very few people have a lot of money, especially in a private business like 
mine. The ones who have money are all government people. They are like the 
governor who can help the people he knows to get a loan for business from the 
bank. If the business fails, it still doesn't matter. 
While the idea of backing came up multiple times in interviews about daoban, 
corruption came up much less and primarily as a counterbalance to the illegality of 
daoban. The importance of corruption in understanding conceptions of the legality of 
daoban lies in how it is used to undermine the government's claim to be the definer of 
the legal. In the newspaper one morning Wang Ge and I noticed two small photos of 
two different cars with the same license plate number. The caption explained that 
these were both cars owned by the police. When I asked if this wasn't illegal, Wang 
Ge said with a bit of a grin, "of course it's legal. It is the police. They execute the law, 
how could it be illegal?" 
Similarly, as Wang Ge was a frequent lottery player, I occasionally asked 
about the differences between the legal welfare lottery and the illegal lotteries which 
had sprung up over the past years especially in South China. The lotteries were run 
locally (possibly with a backer with money in a larger city covering the local bookie 
in cases of big winners), but were based on the numbers drawn in the Hong Kong 
government's official lottery (called liuhecai). Though in a sense these private 
lotteries were competitors to the state one, the government has the ability to define its 
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own lottery as legal and the others as illegal. The people who run the private lotteries 
have been labeled zhuangjia, or bookies, and the government explains that closing 
them protects people from those who eventually would run away with their money. A 
friend of Wang Ge (F) and the owner (O) of a local Internet cafe's conversation about 
the official lottery however, can be taken as one example of how corruption and 
legality are tied together: 
F: Yes it is a business, but the money [from the state lottery] goes to people who 
need it. It is a "welfare lottery" (fuli caipiao) after all. 
O: Yes, but if they [the government officers in charge of the lottery] take in 
10,000 then 1,000 goes to the winner and they make 9,000. But that starts in 
the district, and then to the city, and the province and so on and each head 
official of a department takes a thousand. Then who knows if any of it is left 
to give to the poor? ！ 
F: [Agreeing] It is like giving clothes to the needy in North Shaanxi. You give 
three good sets of clothes and then only 1 bad set gets there, the others have all 
been taken by people in the government along the way. 
O: The government is the biggest money maker, the biggest bookie (zhuangjia) of 
all. 
This last part is as much ironic humor as it is insult, as the government in 
China has been trying quite hard to suppress such bookies while also drawing a clear 
distinction between their lottery and the government's, between illegal and legal. 
Calling the government itself a zhuangjia is perfectly logical, especially when 
accusing the government of siphoning off profits at multiple levels. It uses the 
government's own discourse against private lotteries to insult the state lottery. 
Meanwhile it serves to blur a distinction the government tries to make very clear 一 
the Welfare Lottery (fuli caipiao) is a legal, stable, state-run lottery and those illegal, 
. .pr ivate ones are performed by criminals who would just assume run away with your 
money. Again, being run by the government makes it legal, but due to corruption, that 
definition counts for less as it is often the government itself doing the illegal. 
Wang Ge also related to me several stories of corruption to make this same 
point of government illegality. This government illegality in turn was meant to 
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contrast with the relatively harmless illegality of his operation of Chenggong. The 
first was about shoddy concrete (worth a tenth of the price paid) said to have been 
used in the construction of the Sanmenxia dam. The official in that case was caught 
having stashed the remainder away for his personal use. According to his story at 
least, the Sanmenxia dam cannot now be fully used for fear that it will break^^ The 
second was of a man who the government had helped to set up a lottery business a 
few years ago: 
They lent him money and gave him an official permit, but he sold fake tickets. 
It was all fake. You couldn't win because the tickets were fake. The guy made 
5 million yuan before he was caught. A vice-governor was involved in it too. 
So as for real and fake, it is often the government that is doing the fake things. 
Daoban is not as bad as this, what I sell is good quality. 
Corruption and backing then are both involved in allowing illegal business to 
continue to run as well as in serving to justify what are seen as relatively smaller 
illegalities. It is not difficult then to see how, in this context, people look at 
government action against what are seen as only petty economic crimes as somewhat 
suspect. The government itself (or the officers themselves), my informants asserted 
quietly, were often guilty of significantly worse. 
Structural Issues: Officials and Enforcement 
Of course, much of the local government role in daoban is less a matter of 
corrupt officials involved in business or of business people seeking or calling on 
backing in the government, than it is one of the particular officials involved looking 
the other way as far as some practices go. This looking the other way, as well as the 
issues of backing and corruption described above, can be linked to changes in 
structures of promotion introduced in post-reform institutions. As I will detail in the 
781 searched for news articles on this corruption story in English, but found only stories about how the 
dam's poor design caused it to silt up within three years after it was finished (see MacDonald 2004). 
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sections that follow, these structural changes have had important consequences for 
how my informants perceive of daoban. 
Following the success of the responsibility system in agriculture and its 
application in many other Chinese institutions, government officials were no longer to 
be promoted through the ranks based primarily on their class background or their 
"redness." Rather they were to be promoted based on their ability to run smaller 
jurisdictions. This ability would then be judged based on factors of growth, the 
completion of projects, and maintenance of order. While this certainly has meant a 
more bureaucratically capable crop of leaders has emerged, it has also left some 
unintended consequences. 
This same contract system of promotion means that many officials are driven 
to accomplish some large task that will help them move up the ranks. A 
telecommunications worker I spoke with complained that he felt "officials look often 
only four years ahead for their reputation for building something, not 40 years ahead 
to see what is best for the city." A local professor lamented the same when he said 
that calls in the city for preserving its cultural heritage, historical buildings, and 
unique flavor were largely ignored by officials. These officials instead wanted to tear 
down the older two story buildings to construct modern multi-storied apartment and 
retail buildings whose construction would contribute more to the city's GDP. This 
tearing down would leave more room for wider roads which could ease traffic 
concerns in the city. Wider, cleaner boulevards that, though largely absent in the 
West, are thought of as key "Western" ingredients to being deemed a modern city 
could be constructed without ancient obstacles. The professor explained that such a 
construction project also would reflect nicely on their records and they would be 
promoted out by the time tourism revenues might falter. Creating a modern city to 
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these officials (as well as to much of the general population) means promoting 
economic growth and raising the population's cultural level (alternately their suzhi or 
wenhua chengdu). 
Linking this to daoban, some of my informants saw daoban also as promoting 
local development and, as such were certain that 
The local government definitely knows both about daoban and about daoban 
being imported into the city. But given the city's low technological level {keji 
shuiping di) and its people's low level of cultivation {suzhi di) at this stage of 
development they need it. They don't care. Besides, it lets the people be happy 
because they can see the things inside these discs, they can know these things. 
They can't buy the things advertised on TV, but they can buy the movies.[...] 
Also this is a private business, the kind on which the economy can take off. Its 
like in Wenzhou/^ they started out small and then with money they could buy 
better machines. After they buy the machines then [makes a flying motion 
with his hand]. Same here, they can use these copies to make money, then the 
money goes to local people. Not like what happened in Guangzhou. It used to 
be mainland's profit, but now it all goes to Hong Kong [Kong Ge, 50s, male]. 
Kong Ge thus believes that because daoban does not pay licensing fees which 
would transfer money out of Xi'an back to Hong Kong or the United States and tends 
to be sold in local shops rather than chain's whose headquarters may be elsewhere, 
more money remains in the local economy and can be funneled back into local 
development. It helps to boost the standard of living for retailers and small shop 
owners and their families. As a trade with a lot of small businesses rather than large 
capitalists, it benefits more people, brings in taxes, and so raises the local area's living 
standard as well. As all of these are the types of economic criteria on which 
government officials hoping for promotion depend, it is not that surprising that the 
local government might tacitly approve {moren) of daoban. 
79 A now famous example in Mainland China of a region of the country that has quickly moved from 
rags to riches based almost entirely in the garment industry (starting in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province 
and then migrating to Beijing and elsewhere). For more information on these Wenzhou migrants in 
Beijing who drove much of this growth in their hometown see Zhang 2001. 
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Policing Norms 
This same sort of responsibility system, meant to link performance to bonuses 
and promotions, was set up within policing circles as well. Dutton (2005) and Tanner 
(2005) describe this as a "contract system." The effect of this system was to force the 
police to make certain key achievements based on quotas and comparisons, both to 
other cities as well as historically within the same city. To accomplish this, crime 
reports often remain unopened until the police are certain that they can crack them 
and thus not lower their crime cracking statistics. It further became politically 
impossible to reform practices of inflating or suppressing statistics because any 
official beginning to report true statistics would inevitably look as though he was 
responsible for allowing the situation to deteriorate, thus ending his chances for 
promotion. The contract system, combined with shortages of funding from the central 
government has also led to the rise of private security companies—often wholly 
owned and operated by members of the Public Security Bureau—who now do 
approximately one third of all police work in Chinese cities. Policing units are 
increasingly dependent on insufficient local government funding and "extra-budgetary 
funds" (i.e. corruption, and privately paid policing) in order to continue to function. 
The police are therefore also increasingly subject to the enforcement (and non-
enforcement) whims of local officials (Bakken 2005b: 20). 
Working within this overall contract system of policing are also two other 
characteristics which have particular relevance to the enforcement of action against 
daoban: campaign style actions and the moral role of the police. Policing in China 
during the reform period has continued the practice common in the Maoist period of 
campaign style police actions. These yanda, or "strike hard," campaigns are meant to 
focus police and mass resources over a short period of time on a particular problem. 
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By highlighting one illegal activity at a time they are meant to have a large impact on 
that type of crime scene in the short term by making many arrests and successful 
prosecutions and in the long term by serving as a drastic warning to those who were 
not caught to give up the practice. 
Campaigns are characterized by large pressure on police to make many arrests, 
perform quick trials, and severely punish the guilty as examples. Instead, Tanner 
(2005: 179) finds that such "special struggles" become routine. In Harbin for instance, 
340 days in 1988 were designated as part of different campaign actions. Each day the 
police were meant to be fighting a different "key element" in crime. This focus 
actually diverts attention from the regular daily roles of the police in favor of 
concentrated action. Unfortunately, criminals tend to know when such campaigns are 
coming (often seasonally or centering on particular holidays or other announcements) 
ftn 
and structure their activity accordingly {ibid.: 179). Thus only marginal, non-career 
criminals with fewer connections and backing, like migrants (who are also often the 
most frequent crime victims), tend to be targeted and caught (Bakken 2005c: 75). 
The second aspect of policing concerns their traditional moral roles. While 
police everywhere, like other members of society, are influenced by local morals and 
norms, police in communist China were seen as needing to "take care of the moral 
order rather than the impersonal black letter law" (Dutton 2005: 83). They were the 
power that then helped define and enforce the morality of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Officially through 1997，though perhaps living on in practice, police were 
instructed to apply the law “analogously.，’ This means, for example, that although 
there was no law making adultery illegal, it was still seen as immoral and was still 
肌 The owners of several daoban stores that Mertha (2005: 144) spoke to during his research explained 
that during campaigns they would temporarily hide their illegal discs. After the campaign finished, the 
illegal discs would come back out and the status quo returns. One owner even told him directly to come 
back next week (when the campaign would finish and he could again sell daoban discs). 
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prosecuted. Police simply prosecuted adultery under the law against rape. Adulterers 
were sentenced according to the rape guidelines. Thus the law on rape was treated 
broadly so as to also cover adultery by analogy (Bakken 2005b: 2). With this type of 
moral mandate, local police had significant discretion to enforce moral and social 
norms much as local officials were given such power in dynastic times (Alford 
1995:24). In a sense, this discretion might work in reverse for daoban. While daoban 
is proscribed by law, it is not seen as immoral and thus police might not prosecute it 
(especially if pressed through funding by local officials). As an action that is not 
perceived as immoral, police might choose only to prosecute daoban cases during a 
campaign or when the boss also breaks more immoral laws like pornography. 
Norms of Copyright Enforcement 
As with the case of officials and police, the people within China's copyright 
enforcement bureaus also work within institutional structures. The overriding and 
determining aspects of copyright enforcement agencies are their limited budgets, their 
relatively weak positions within their parent bureau (the Press and Publications 
Bureau, PPB), and the fact that copyright enforcement is low on its list of goals. 
Although members may not like the idea of daoban publishers remaining unregulated, 
they also recognize that, in the face of resource scarcity, they have no way to 
completely enforce the law. Thus they tend to "pursue those pirated products that 
provide a clear threat to social stability and the political status quo" (Mertha 2005: 
19). Again, as with the police, this would lead them to concentrate on pornography or 
other types of censorship rather than regular daoban, concentrations which not 
incidentally also fit better with the larger bureau's overall goal. 
The PPB is split organizationally into five subsections including books, 
periodicals, anti-pornography and anti-illegal publishing, distribution, and copyright. 
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While several of these subsections and the PPB itself extend from the national level 
all the way down to local levels, the copyright subsection has staff members only 
down to the provincial level. They must therefore depend on other subsections' 
people (mainly the "cultural market" management group dealing with pornography 
and illegal publishing) to coordinate enforcement actions (Mertha 2005: 149). These 
subsections, however, have their own goals and must use their own limited resources 
to attain those goals first. It is thus that, as I go into below, pornography not only 
becomes a morally convenient target for police, but also an organizationally easier 
target to crack down on. According to a 1999 book by the Economic Intelligence Unit 
(Hong Kong), "the PPB, [the National Copyright Administration's (NCA) parent 
body,] is concerned mainly with censorship and has no interest in promoting the rights 
of authors or creating a free market in publishing. The [NCA's] lack of funding is at 
least partially because of a conscious decision by the PPB to ignore copyright issues" 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1999: 51 quoted in Mertha 2005: 140). 
Finally, as with the police units described above, some subsections of the 
copyright administration were turned into semi-private units which were told to 
become self-sufficient following an initial start-up period. Unfortunately, "some 
activities, like enforcement, do not easily lend themselves to legitimate money-
generating activities. As a result, it is easy to cross over into activities that de-
emphasize piracy enforcement in favor of income generation — taking a cut of 
legitimately imposed fines or even to outright extortion" (Mertha 2005: 163). Thus in 
the following two examples of enforcement actions we can see all of these structural 
components playing out: the organizational or institutional structures, the internal 
goals and rules for advancement, as well as the socio-cultural structure of morality. 
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Social Consequences of Enforcement 
Given these structural aspects of local government and policing which affect 
their goals, procedures, and chances for promotion as well as the importance of 
backing and corruption within the context of selling doaban, this section aims to 
analyze the social consequences of two enforcement actions, against pornography and 
vendors, which occurred or were ongoing in the summer of 2005. While both actions 
can be said to have been somewhat successful, they have had interesting unintended 
consequences on perceptions of daoban's own illegality as I will explain in detail 
below. 
Action Against Vendors 
The informal economy of vendors and stall owners of all sorts thrives in and 
around the formal economy of shops and stores in Xi'an. In most industries there 
seem to be formal options for buying things as well as informal (and thus cheaper, but 
said also to be less reliable) options. Daoban discs, the same as clothes and many 
other goods, can be bought from stores like Chenggong or just as easily from vendors 
on the street. Furthermore, both types of sellers are often in the same or similar areas. 
Thus many daoban sellers, including small wholesale-style vendor markets, sell their 
goods around formal electronics markets where the computer hardware and players 
for the discs are sold legally. People hawking mobile phones, phone number lists, and 
other phone accessories tend to sit on benches or squat on the sidewalk across the 
street from the formal mobile phone and China Telecom stores. Drink and newspaper 
sellers also often congregate around bus stops and busy street corners where, chances 
are, there is also a news stand selling a larger selection of the same things. And 
vendors selling Muslim foods and snacks line the streets of the Muslim district 
1 4 6 
alongside the formal stores and restaurants that cater to locals and the bus loads of 
tourists who come through each day. 
While many of these vendors appeared only every once in a while, and some, 
like the newspaper sellers I described earlier, moved away within a few weeks; others 
of these vendors have become much more integrated into the normal system of 
commerce in their areas. There is often a degree of order and regulation to where 
vendors can and cannot work which fits nicely into the earlier discussion of backing 
and corruption. As T rested against a bus stop in early June 2005,1 watched a 
confrontation occur between a vendor and a middle-aged man. The vendor, a young 
man in his twenties selling a canned product, was approached by the older man who 
came out of the department store across the sidewalk. After a short conversation, the 
older man produced badge of some sort out of his wallet. The young man pleaded that 
he had not made any money, had not even sold anything yet, and begged to be able to 
walk away with the products. In the end the young man was able to leave, but told 
never to come back. The older man walked calmly back into the air-conditioned store. 
Interestingly, none of the other vendors seemed bothered or even interested in the 
incident (a strange thing in China where crowds commonly gather within instants of a 
commotion) and ten minutes or so later, the older man returned to sit down with 
another vendor to drink free beer and share a cigarette. 
I have no way of knowing whether the older man was really empowered to 
stop people vending there or not. While I am fairly certain that the other vendors who 
were not approached also were not licensed to be there, I also had no way of knowing 
that for certain either. Regardless of this, it is quite obvious that this man had the 
ability to decide which vendors would stay and which would go. These particular 
vendors were in roughly the same places throughout my fieldwork and thus were 
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more physically stable than the drink vendors I described earlier. They maintained a 
connection with the man from the store at least through giving cigarettes and beer, but 
most likely also through monetary payments. The entire situation might be completely 
legal, meaning that the man was a plainclothes policeman (or government official) 
and that he merely worked to ensure that only those establishments that were properly 
registered were allowed to do business there. It is however, a part of the context of 
illegal or informal activity in Xi'an that it is difficult to tell. Some police wear 
uniforms, others do not. Some things the police do are mandated by law, others are 
done for themselves or in their private for hire capacity. Some payments are made to 
the government, others are made to private protectors or landlords (who may also be 
in the government). In addition although some fines that are paid to the police go to 
the government, there were always rumors that others end up in someone's pocket 
along the way. 
Many vendors in the Muslim district thus also were in the same places 
everyday or every evening. Some had been there for some 12 years, significantly 
longer than most of the current renters of shops in the same area. Many also had 
arranged a contract type of agreement with the owners of the stores they operated in 
front of to cover the rent for the sidewalk space they used, some space inside the 
formal store to keep their heavy equipment, and fees to cover their use of the store's 
electric outlets or other services. These vendors, though having no "inside," are more 
like restaurants as most have plastic tables and chairs set up on the sidewalk and use 
equipment that is not easily moved. Bare bulbs are strung from wires overhead and 
cooking is either done there on the street in coal grills or in a nearby building. The 
most famous of these are the many barbeque kabob (kaoroii) places in and around the 
Muslim district, but there are many breakfast stalls and snack stalls of this more 
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permanent sort in most other neighborhoods as well. While such outdoor vendors are 
thought to be less clean than indoor restaurants, they are also known as great 
environments to sit outside in the cool evening enjoying good food and activity. 
Nearly every guidebook to Xi'an mentions these kaorou stalls as places to visit and 
many foreign tours will make a stop on the street so that tourists can sample the food 
or at least the atmosphere. In this way, though they were not a part of the formal 
economy and had no licenses, they were a more or less permanent fixture of the local 
landscape and, as such, had significantly less mobility than newspaper or drink types 
of vendors. 
Although the police action against vendors in the Summer of 2005 seemed to 
be fairly large in scale (as friends of mine in the north as well as the south of the city 
had all heard of it), I was only able to find a small notice about it in the local paper. 
This notice applauded recent government action to clean up the city that especially 
targeted unhygienic restaurants and would force unlicensed vendors to register for 
licenses. The article made use of their lack of licenses (despite their long history 
locally) and common ideas linking modern, indoor, and hygiene in order to justify 
closing them down in favor of cleared streets and better traffic flow. Both permanent 
and non-permanent types of vendors were targeted, but the non-permanent vendors 
were better able to minimize the impact to themselves by keeping all of their wares on 
bicycles or carts on which they could quickly disappear. The brunt of this police 
action was thus largely felt by these more permanent vendors.®' 
Informants from the Muslim quarter explained to me that the government had 
worked through the other areas of the city first and only later went to close down 
For mobile vendors, due to their marginal economic status, getting caught, losing goods, and having 
to pay fines or bribes takes a heavy toll. However, the low cost of entry back into the sector means that 
other people can quickly f i l l the space they left. Many vendors only carry with them small portions of 
their wares so that i f they need to they can lose the load to a raid without losing the entire investment. 
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vendors there. They attributed this reluctance to deal with the Muslim quarter 
alternately as fear of a negative reaction and as an attempt to convince them that this 
was not an ethnically based action. One informant told me however, that since most 
such establishments were run by Muslims of various ethnic groups (a sort of 
economic niche), the action still had an undue impact on his group. He felt that the 
idea was to make the Muslim quarter more accessible to Han cars and building 
schemes — short term plans which would make officials look like they had promoted 
the successful modernization of the city. 
Illegal activity of this sort is illegal not because the goods that are sold are 
illegal or substandard in quality, but because they did not have the proper permits to 
sell what they sold in the place they sold it. The issuance of permits then also allows 
the government to collect fees or taxes as well as have a better handle on who is in the 
city and what they are selling. The necessary permits, however, are costly, and for 
various reasons (including migrant status) may be refused. As it was explained to me, 
in China (as in many countries), very few things are allowed if you ask openly for 
permission. At the same time, no one will bother you if you do the same thing without 
making it obvious. The ability of more permanent stalls to set themselves up in the 
open, enter into contracts with the formal stores whose sidewalk space they used, and 
do business as usual nearly every day of the week for years certainly is a testament to 
this. As my informant explained above, however, the enforcement of the law can 
change quickly and, as a result of this police action some stalls had their equipment 
(coal grills, tables, chairs, lights etc.) confiscated and the owners most likely were 
fined. Other stores with better backing were warned ahead of time not to open. An 
informant's friend who owns a breakfast shop outside the city was informed by a 
1 5 0 
contact one morning not to open their shop. That morning, those who did open were 
raided. 
In this example I believe it becomes more clear how the various factors of 
government connections, backing, corruption, and the ambiguity of future changes in 
law enforcement trends all play out in the informal sector of the economy. As it 
related to daoban, this police action seemed to reinforce my informant's view that 
vendors were dirtier and less reliable than more formal stores like Chenggong. Before 
the action, informants told me that they thought the quality of discs was definitely 
better in formal stores than vendors and this only confirmed what they thought. The 
vendors of food stalls were targeted because they were less hygienic than brick and 
mortar stores nearby. While this action did not cause a shift in opinion, it does 
illustrate one of the ongoing ways in which government and police enforcement 
centering around concepts of modernization in turn influence or reinforced my 
informants classification of shops. Specifically, it reinforced the idea that more 
modern shops were more legitimate (not targeted for raids) and thus more likely to 
have zhengban or better quality discs. Stores like Chenggong who sell mainly daoban, 
benefit from this more legitimate image and can thus maintain higher prices on their 
discs. 
Action Against Pornography 
Daoban was also intimately related to an ongoing campaign against 
pornography, a much more high profile offense. This campaign began officially in 
1989 and is known as the saohuang dafei (掃黃打非，sweep away pornography and 
strike down illegal publications) campaign. Especially since there is nothing about 
intellectual property per se that would link it or its absence to sexual displays, the 
connection between the two in China is quite interesting. Several people I spoke to, 
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when they learned I wanted to talk about daoban, immediately denounced it saying it 
is pornographic. One college-aged male told me that "daoban is like drugs, once you 
begin to watch them you cannot stop." A middle-aged female informant dismissed 
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those kinds of discs \nei zhong die] as yellow and immoral. Such comments 
confused me when they occurred because most informants generally described daoban 
in relatively mild terms. For this reason, I first assumed that the "those kind of discs" 
the woman was speaking about were pornographic discs; it was only later that I 
realized she meant that daoban discs were yellow and pornographic. She equated 
pornographic discs with "daoban." Even further on in these conversations, I realized 
that both the young man and the woman still purchased unlicensed copies of discs; 
they just only bought the "non-yellow" ones and, for that reason, they claimed that 
these were zhengban. The discs they bought were certainly not the immoral, 
pornographic kinds and thus, since they equated "daoban" with pornography, the 
discs they bought could not be "daoban" regardless of issues of licensing. By this 
usage daoban and zhengban, through daoban's association with pornography (and the 
relative confusion of the market in terms of licensing) lost much of its association 
with licensing. 
This perspective of consumers connecting pornography and daoban also rings 
true for retailers who stake out the relative morality of their shop based on the fact 
that they do not sell pornography. Wang Jie made this point explicit when talking 
about a competing shop that had just moved in nearby. 
The problem is that many men in their 40s want to buy those "Korean" 
movies, but we don't sell those types of movies; my husband only buys the 
Yellow (huangse), in Chinese is used as a euphemism describing anything to do with sex. You can 
have yellow movies that might translate into soft (or hard) porn, but a person can also be yellow i f they 
are "caught" thinking about sex. The term can be derogatory, but also can be used in a playful or 
teasing manner among friends. A lecherous man who is constantly trying to woo women to go to bed 
with him, or a "playboy" who just pretends he is that way to be cool, might be called a selang, literally 
meaning "color wolf," building on the same in “kuangse.” 
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kinds of movies that people will watch, then put away to show to their children 
later. Anyway, he sells these dirty (yellow) discs so they all go over there 
when they see I don't have them [Wang Jie, Chenggong owner, 40, female]. 
It is worth noting here that "Korean" movies are a specific genre of movie that 
has sensual images and partially naked women on the cover as well as woven into the 
plot lines. Many such movies are currently copied from those produced in Korea or 
starring Korean actresses and thus the genre itself has come to be synonymous with 
"Korean movies." While I would not rate these as pornographic, they definitely would 
have an "R" rating in the United States or a "Category HI" rating in Hong Kong. They 
also definitely appeal to sexual desire and the primary buyers, as Wang Jie described, 
are men. 
For the communist government in China, fighting pornography has a long 
historical precedent with it playing a central role in censorship at least since the Song 
Dynasty in 1009 (Alford 1995:21). Reflecting this goal and the perceived immorality 
of pornography, the subject of pornography was one of only two types of 
conversations (the other being about specific political figures) for which informants 
turned my tape off to talk about. The crackdown in China has been justified variously 
as a way to protect women from discrimination or objedification and as a way to 
maintain the spiritual purity (and thus the political purity) of the masses. Pornography 
furthermore is one of the few areas where neo-Confucianists in Taiwan, the 
Communist Party on the Mainland, and religious activists (in China as well as in 
countries like the United States) all agree. As such, when pressure mounted for China 
to crackdown on daoban goods (a relatively moral product), local law enforcement 
and local officials could usefully could usefully combine these two actions together. 
The national government could still please the international community with statistics 
of large numbers of daoban discs destroyed, while at the same time both national and 
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local officials would be pleased to get rid of a practice they deemed vulgar and 
dangerous by including many pornographic discs among those destroyed. All of this 
could be accomplished without the same international community decrying them for 
denying its people the right to freedom from censorship. 
Thus for China, this combination of pornography and daoban makes good 
political sense. Yet, for other parts of the world it seems to make less sense because it 
takes the emphasis off of respect for intellectual property and instead emphasizes the 
content of the discs and a right to censor. Given their opposition to the Chinese 
government's claimed right to filter musical and film content that reaches the 
Mainland market, it is surprising that such industries would support this connection. 
Yet, support it they do. According to a New York Times article by Saul Hansell 
(2003), the recording industry has purposely teamed up with groups against 
pornography to strengthen their moral hand against online file-sharing companies like 
KaZaA, Napster, and now BitTorrent. By labeling such sites as centers distributing 
pornography to minors, and alleging that they facilitate the trade of child 
pornography, the industry hopes to gain political traction in the United States against 
a practice that competes with their sales of physical discs (Hansell 2003). Both China 
and the recording industry use this convenient affiliation with pornography to 
strengthen their respective hands in other areas. For China, a crackdown on daoban 
products allows them to focus on pornographic products which, because China does 
not allow the legal production (and thus licensing) of pornography, all automatically 
qualify as daoban，）The recording industry, on the other hand, seeks to frame daoban 
While pornography counts as doaban among my informants as well as in statistics on destroyed 
discs, the letter of the Copyright Law seems to suggest that discs breaking other laws (like censorship 
laws or those against pornography), while still illegal for other reasons, do not qualify as doaban. See 
Article 4 in the 2001 amended Copyright Law translated at 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws 10.htm. 
1 5 4 
as a moral issue also in an attempt to gain more support in the United States from 
conservative activists against services that allow access to music sharing. 
At a local level this emphasis has indeed meant that daoban discs have 
somewhat successfully been linked to pornography. But, this did not make all 
unlicensed discs seem "yellow" or dirty. It did not give daoban, as defined by legal 
questions of licensing, the lower moral position of pornography. Importantly, these 
political moves have had an unintended social consequence: the definition of daoban 
does not rely solely on an understanding of intellectual property the way industries in 
developed countries would like it to. Instead, as is quoted above, people do not see all 
daoban as like pornography, but rather see pornography as the only kind of morally 
"wrong" daoban. Non-pornographic discs, to the middle-aged woman quoted above, 
were just varying qualities of zhengban discs. For most people, although the impact 
was not as strong, it was still present. Stores with pornography must be daoban, those 
without it then were probably better quality and might even be zhengban. In this way, 
"daoban" and "zhengban" have less and less to do with IP and more to do with their 
local contexts. 
On the business side too, this connection of pornography and daoban seems to 
have had an impact. One of the major differences I noticed between 2001 and my 
fieldwork in 2005, was that pornography was much more difficult to find in the center 
of the city. In 2001, nearly every daoban store had a small selection of somewhat 
hidden—but not so much that anyone would have to ask about it—videos. In 2005 
however, it was gone from the stores in the center of the city with the exception of 
some rental shops far from the main roads serving local residential communities. This 
is not to say that pornography was nowhere to be found however. Local shoppers who 
consumed it knew where to find it. Besides the rental stores, all of which stocked 
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daoban, many of the wholesale style vendors using space beneath or above electronics 
and computer stores (outside the city center) also had a wide selection of 
pornography. Also, further from the city wall within Xi'an as well as several stores I 
visited in a county seat neighboring Xi'an, a larger number of small daoban stores 
have adult selections. Despite restrictions on and surveillance around accessing 
pornography at Internet cafes, several younger men told me that that was still the 
primary place they went to watch. These places, however, with the possible exception 
of the Internet cafes, were not only geographically located on the edge of the city, but 
had older (or non-existent) decorations and were generally a more marginal sort of 
shop. The change from 2001, T believe, is a result of pressure from the stores' 
connections within the government, raids, and competition for customers who begin 
to define modern, non-pornographic shops as those whose discs are worth paying a 
higher price for. This pressure has then led to centrally located stores giving up 
pornography (just as they also have been renovating) in order to appear more 
zhengban and to be better able to avoid disrupting raids. 
As the New York Times article points out, forming an alliance with anti-
pornography groups did not mean that the music industry stopped using sex to sell its 
own products (Hansell 2003). In the same way, stores that have stopped selling 
pornography still must cater to the group of customers seeking such gratification. 
They do this in the same way that the film and music industries in the United States 
do. The jackets for DVDs and music selections use images (that sometimes are not 
even in the movie itself) of especially suggestive scenes to attract this group to buy. 
Experienced buyers however, must quickly learn to be wary of this tactic. On one 
occasion I found a movie in Chenggong with partially naked color screenshots on the 
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back only to look at the title and realize it was an early black and white Hollywood 
drama. 
To understand conceptions of daoban, it is thus important to put its illegality in 
the context of pornography's immorality and illegality. Through enforcement, the two 
have been linked together. By linking them, there has been movement by stores away 
from selling pornography as a step towards being regarded as more "zhengban." 
Furthermore, through pornography, the intersection of the contract system's 
requirement to crack large numbers of cases and the traditional role of police as 
guardians of public morality can be seen. This combination means that targeting 
pornography for raids allows the police and government officials to fulfill two quotas, 
as well as fulfilling what they may see as their "traditionally" correct role of 
defending public morality. Most daoban, some 80% according to one official, is 
"politically neutral." It thus lays outside of the spirit of the campaign and so is not 
targeted. Even were this type of "apolitical" discs to be seized, the seller would only 
be fined rather than receiving jail time or a possible death sentence as might be given 
to pornography offenders (Mertha 2005: 144). 
Conveniently, these two consequences mean that those stores that were 
already less marginal and better connected to the government (they have licenses to 
operate) are also less likely to be targets for such raids. Chenggong, as can be seen by 
the disappearing DVDs story, had connections in the government and the police 
bureau. Although I do not know much more about those connections (for obvious 
reasons), I do know that several of the people who stopped by every now and then to 
share a cigarette were affiliated with the local government and one was high up in the 
local police precinct. By not selling pornography (and by maintaining the proper 
certificates for their store), Wang Jie explained to me, they can make Chenggong look 
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more respectable, and thus more "zhengban" to customers and, perhaps, to the police. 
More marginal but less mobile groups of stores who happen to have less backing, like 
the wholesale vendors or some wholesale shops dealing in pornography, would be the 
most likely to be targeted as a single raid could bring in a much larger haul. 
It is thus important to realize that the same organizations which must 
cooperate to enforce IP laws also have other campaigns to conduct. Moreover 
individual officials and police have their own goals for advancement, ideas of 
morality, or desire for profit. All of these factors, reacting at the local level, then have 
the effect of bringing the moral sphere's relativity to interfere with the legal sphere's 
dichotomy of legal or illegal. Daoban thus becomes a relatively moral, petty economic 
crime. Furthermore, given corruption and rumors of illegality attributed to the 
government and government officials, Wang Ge and others feel morally justified in 
their own smaller illegalities. Who is "the government" (or are "the police") to decide 
what is illegal? 
Justifications and Responses 
My informants, especially Wang Ge and Wang Jie, often felt it important to 
justify or respond to criticisms that they had heard about daoban, especially those 
through the newspapers. On the one hand, I was someone to whom they could air 
their views and justify their actions. On the other hand I represented (despite my 
attempts at making it clear I did not) the American copyright holders who largely 
lobbed accusations at people like them. Perhaps it is precisely because many of these 
justifications would not hold water to Americans interested in copyright protection 
that they are so interesting. The justifications pull on a different context than the 
debate in the United States does, that presented in pieces throughout these last two 
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chapters. These justifications speak to cultural attitudes and to the morality of 
illegality, the merging in practice and discourse of the legal and moral spheres of right 
and wrong. 
Thus while both consumers and owners of daoban stores swore to me that 
daoban was illegal, and that legality was an either-or thing, they did so with a specific 
kind of illegality in mind. As the daily life is brought in, as in Chapter 3，the moral 
sphere's relativity also begins to blur this dichotomy. For locals this business is 
"against the law" (feifa) or perhaps "breaking the law" (weifa), but not "criminal" 
(fanzui). Daoban is a petty economic crime similar to plagiarism, copying paintings, 
and making fake clothing. It is more like vending without a license and selling goods 
in violation of a contract than organized crime or terrorism. Especially if your store 
does not sell pornography, there is nothing about its sales that will hurt your 
consumers. Far from what music and movie companies like to claim, that daoban 
sales hurt consumers by lowering the amount of new music and movies that can be 
produced, owners claim that they provide a service. Being relatively less illegal, 
especially in the context of larger illegalities attributed to the government and those 
who decide what is illegal, is to them a justification. 
As Kong Ge's quotation above (in the section on Structural Issues) suggests, 
many people also see a very clear connection between modernization and daoban. 
While some characterized that relationship as modernization leading to daoban— 
increased technology was what had allowed daoban to exist in the first place—others 
emphasized how daoban movies and music allowed more people to take part in the 
modern. By exposing poorer people to new ideas and attitudes contained in these 
"cultural" products, daoban satisfies the people's spiritual (jingshen) needs and helps 
to modernize their way of thinking. I was told further that people's standard of living 
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in Xi'an, but even more so in other parts of the country, is quite low. Daoban is a 
cheap way to give them a taste of what they see in advertisements and on the news. 
Eventually the conversation would turn back to economics justifying daoban as 
merely supplying a demand that people need filled. The demand is not just for stories 
and songs, but for the modern (or at least images of it), for new stories and songs 
distributed in an affordable format. Besides, as the last chapter fleshed out, daoban 
CDs are not like fake medicines or fake foods. People for the most part know that 
they are daoban, or at least that they might be, and yet they buy them because they are 
real — the stories and songs they hold are still consumable and enjoyable. It is 
useable and, unlike fake medicines (or pornographic discs in some people's minds) 
which are considered a grave problem, they do not harm the user. 
In response to my questions, one of the most common approaches informants 
took—and one I will return to in Chapter 5—was one that focused on nations, mine 
and theirs. No one made any references to the companies who hold the copyrights 
being rich and not deserving more money. In this way, my informants differed from 
the results of survey-based research conducted in Hong Kong and elsewhere which 
saw such a reaction as an important justification (see Kwong et al. 2003). Rather they 
emphasized that the United States, being rich, could afford to enforce such laws on its 
people. China, however must find its own policy which balanced IP rights with its 
people's standard of living. 
Wang Ge, with our frequent conversations, took this nation-based approach a 
step further. He wondered why it was that the US can get so upset about China 
stealing music and movies from them when the practice originated in the West. 
Where do you think the machines come from to make the copies? China does 
not have the technology to make such machines. What about the original 
copy? It came from the United States. Someone had to film it or copy it in the 
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United States and then bring it here. Chinese people couldn't do that, it has to 
be an American. So it is not just us, and it is not us who started it. 
While his analysis is not necessarily true (they could just as easily been copied 
in France, Canada, Germany, Thailand, or any other country with a suitably early 
release time) and he was not in any position to know where the discs came from 
originally (only buying them from a wholesaler), the view is not an uncommon one. 
Many people point to the arrest of two Americans in the summer of 2005 on charges 
of participating in a daoban operation in Shanghai (see Bodeen 2005). This was proof 
to them that the original copiers were not Chinese and to them the original copy is the 
most important one. That one was the one that was stolen and not paid for. All of the 
people after that, to some extent and more so the further away they were, could be 
seen simply as business people trying to make a living for their families. 
In other conversations, Wang Ge wondered why it was that I hadn't paid 
China for the paper in the notebook I was using. China invented paper. It was one of 
the four great inventions he was taught about in school, and yet the West does not pay 
China for that. What, too, about gunpowder or other things that originated in China? 
My first explanation that patents didn't exist at that time was not readily accepted. 
When I backed it up with the fact that patents (as well as copyrights for the moment), 
even now, are limited in time period and would have long ago expired, they saw it as 
a somewhat too convenient excuse. If T (the United States) wanted them to pay for this 
property, then why don't I (the West) pay China for what it invented? Did we simply 
make the rules up or institute them at a time when they would be in our favor? 
These conversations then also ventured beyond intangible property toward the 
tangible. My informants explained that all of this concentration by the West on 
daoban is only because it is in their interest. Spurred on by a series of articles in the 
daily newspaper, my informants insisted that returning China's cultural heritage from 
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Western museums and private collections is much more important. This is not 
something that was copied and thus "stolen," instead the original itself truly was 
stolen. While some collectors willingly admit that some pieces of their collections 
may have originally been stolen (or purchased from someone without the right to sell 
it) out of China, as precious parts of their collections which they want to see 
preserved, the current owners are quite reluctant to give them "back." To Wang Ge 
and many other informants, there is an essential difference between an original and a 
copy, between stealing the tangible object and only copying its contents. These 
emphases will be dealt with in much more detail in the following chapter, but here the 
reader will note that they also provided, to my informants, justification and a response 
to accusations that daoban was some sort of serious crime. 
Conclusion: Daoban and Illegality 
By looking at daoban as a kind of illegal activity, we can see that it is one 
among multiple kinds of illegal activity occurring simultaneously at the local level in 
China. Furthermore, in the context of petty economic crime, nearly all businesses, 
legal or illegal, have at least the potential to do illegal things in the course of their 
operation. These illegalities range from avoiding taxes, to shipping goods out of the 
areas they were contracted to be sold in, to setting up restaurants or vending without a 
license. These other types of illegal activity then form the context within which 
consumers and sellers place daoban. While some categories of daoban business fall 
into more marginal positions, especially those individual and wholesale style vendors, 
many sellers are located in brick and mortar stores. They pay and avoid taxes like 
other businesses. Those that are not in such marginal positions and who do not fit into 
another more serious category of illegality like pornography, tend to be allowed to do 
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business as usual. The perceived petty nature of daoban combined with its perceived 
economic and social benefits as well as backing or outright corruption in the 
government mean that cracking down on daoban would be a difficult and unpopular 
thing to do. The negotiations that necessarily go on within and between members of a 
bureaucracy and other parties involved has thus meant that the focus of the execution 
of the law has been on those people who are more marginal, both by their occupations 
and by their lack of connections or backing. 
Zeroing in on pornography has also moved the focus from one on questions of 
licensing to whether the content of the discs is good or bad. The consequences of the 
actions against vendors has reinforced the notion, discussed in Chapter 3, that more 
modern looking stores are more legitimate, higher quality, and more "zhengban." 
Similarly, action against pornography has meant that stores not carrying pornography 
appear more legitimate and thus consumers also believe such stores are more likely to 
carry "zhengban." Clearly, this use of the word "zhengban" no longer has much to do 
with the licensing of intangible property and much more to do with the local situation, 
the content, and the context of the store itself. It then also follows that the idea of 
"daoban" that my informants use (which becomes especially clear in the extreme case 
quoted in the pornography section) also has more to do with ideas of quality than with 
IP. While "pirated disc" in English still emphasizes who designed it and who has the 
rights to manufacture or copy it, "daoban" (though originally a translation of the 
English) has meanings and connotations specific to China. Through IP's 
commoditization as zhengban and daoban in China, it has been placed in local 
categories of consumer fraud and pornography; surrounded by local conceptions of 
corruption, backing, and the overall ambivalence of business; and defined in relation 
to different ideas concerning the morality of copying. As such, doaban certainly 
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carries its own, quite different, set of baggage from the English term. Indeed all of this 
has served to lessen the role that the idea of intellectual property has in the defining 
daoban as legal or illegal, moral or immoral. It also has contributed to the fact that IP, 
in China at a grassroots level, is characterized by its absence; except at the level of 
international relations, it is a non-issue. 
The next chapter then will investigate in more depth how Chinese people do 
see intangible property. Importantly, it may help to answer the one question that 
Wang Ge constantly brought up, his trump card of a justification. The key he asserted, 
is that people in the United States (except maybe for people who work for 
Hollywood) and we Chinese do not think differently about this. Foreigners 
come to Chenggong and buy daoban all the time. They buy to take home to 
their friends and for themselves. Why do they buy it? The same reason that 
Chinese do. Because it is cheap and of good quality. 
With Wang Ge's challenge in my mind, I aim to explore a bit further how my Chinese 
informants view what the law says is encased in each physical disc. 
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5 Daoban and Intangible Property 
Daoban and zhengban, as the commoditized version of IP music and movies, are 
defined to a large extent based on their contexts. They are thus, at the same time, both 
legal terms and locally used and contextually defined terms. Chapters 3 and 4 thus 
were meant to provide important ethnographic knowledge about how daoban is 
viewed in and interacts with this local context. Understanding daoban through the 
framework of business (in Chapter 3) and that of illegal activity (in Chapter 4) allows 
us to better situate this commoditized version of intangible property in a changing 
context of structures of policing and local government, of the local market's relative 
availability of zhengban, of the distinguishability of zhengban from daoban, and of 
business practices which include the necessity of backing to succeed. Within these 
local structures, consumers and retailers interact and react to one another's decisions 
based on practices like buying based on the store rather than the disc, definitions of 
modernity, and daoban's connection to (or relative disconnect with) ideas of 
consumer fraud. 
This chapter however, seeks less to look at the cultural conceptions of daoban, 
and more to those of the intangible property that daoban is lacking. Where the last two 
chapters sought to look at daoban from the same perspectives as my informants did, 
this chapter seeks to use daoban to look at intangible property. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, my informants were well aware of what intangible property was, but 
largely did not feel that they had anything to contribute to my research. IP, to them, 
was a political issue and not something of which they could claim and knowledge. 
Thus where the last two chapters began by relating daoban to business or illegal 
activity, this chapter begins wondering to what extent there is a connection between 
intangible property and daoban at all. 
The first sections here will attempt to get back to concepts of zhengban and 
daoban themselves seeking to define conceptually what exactly they are. Importantly 
for the goal of the chapter, however, these conceptual definitions are aimed 
specifically at understanding how much of a relationship the two terms have, within 
their local context, to intangible property as opposed to local categorizations based on 
quality and price. 
The next two sections take this discussion more broadly into overall Chinese 
conceptions of authenticity and intangible property by dealing with my informants' 
view of the symbolic importance of zhengban as well as some of the lines of 
difference among my informants. While there may be other lines of difference, this 
section focuses on the two I found most important: creators vs. non-creators and 
younger vs. older generations. Smalltime creators are structurally in a position where 
they may begin to receive some benefit from IP advocacy themselves. Young people 
are both the generation most impacted by IP education as well as the generation most 
in tune with new trends in popular music. To what extent are these groups' views 
different from those I've described earlier? How does this wider view of IP 
conceptions affect our understanding of the present and future dynamics of 
intellectual property in China? 
The final content section brings the discussion back to specific elements or 
themes, drawn from the field, that are key aspects of these broad cultural conceptions. 
First, following a short investigation of the role of "tradition" in conceptions of 
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daoban, I focus on performance. This focus echoes from an ethnographic perspective 
Alford's (1995) and Ivanhoe's (2005) stress on conceptions of a shared past by 
looking at how songs and stories are consumed through their performance. Second, I 
delve explicitly into my informants' insistence that IP was not a matter of individuals, 
but one of nations. These two themes provide a glimpse at an emerging view of IP 
which may be quite different from the individual-creator vision of the West. The 
conclusion then seeks to bring all of these cultural conceptions of IP together by 
asking the question many of my informants thought was most pertinent: to what 
extent are these conceptions of intellectual property actually Chinesel 
What is Daoban? 
One of the reasons that I have not provided more than a literal translation for 
the word daoban is that, as should have become apparent throughout earlier chapters, 
its definition in its local context is a confusing mixture of licensing and other 
elements. Newspaper articles and campaigns that attempt to promote the enforcement 
of intellectual property laws or to, daji daoban (strike hard against daoban), often fail 
to address what exactly daoban is. The nature of daoban, as a copied product that was 
copied or produced without paying for the right to reproduce the intellectual property 
within it, is taken as a given in many of these works. Daoban is thus simply the 
opposite of zhengban. It is, in actuality, nothing in and of itself: it is instead the 
� a b s e n c e of something (licensing) like cold is the absence of heat. But as the earlier 
chapters suggest, daoban has taken on its own meanings on a local cultural level and 
at this level the dichotomy between zhengban and daoban is not so dear. 
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Downloading and the Law 
Daoban, first of all is recognized as a legal term. The majority of people I 
spoke to, including poorer and more rural informants, knew the term and used it, 
although not entirely consistently. I say that it is a legal term then not because its 
usage is confined to a set of people knowledgeable about legal matters, which in 
China might entail a rather small minority, but because its definition is seen as 
intimately tied up with the law. The term daoban is restricted primarily to movies, 
music, and books and is rarely used to describe knock-off clothing or "pirated" bio-
materials like seeds. While dao (which literally means "steal" or "rob"), in this sense 
can be used as a verb describing the act of copying a disc, tape, or book, it cannot be 
used as a general synonym for "copy." 
As such, the way people define daoban was also proscribed by their beliefs 
over what the law about it contains. Through many interviews, especially with 
younger informants, I was asked if the United States also had daoban. I responded that 
yes, we did, but that the daoban issue we most talk about now is the illegal 
downloading of music and movies from the Internet. Upon hearing this, many 
responded with surprise like this high school female and, separately, a group of 
college women (M, J, C, and the Author (A)): 
That is not daoban here. They aren't the same thing. There's no law against 
downloading movies from the web so they don't count as daoban. The policy 
{zhengce) is important here [High school student, female, 16]. 
M: Does the US have daoban? 
A: No, not so much like here with stores selling discs, but we do have 
downloading that we count as daoban. Is downloading movies from the 
Internet daoban? 
J & C: Downloading doesn't count as daoban!! (with surprise) 
M: China doesn't have any rules like this. It has rules about downloading other 
things, but not music or movies. 
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While downloaded files do fit the Western intellectual property-based view of 
"pirated" products, they do not fit into the category of daoban in China, at least not 
yet.84 While my informants agreed that copying a CD and copying a T-shirt were 
similar, they maintained that they are not the same. As I described in more detail in 
Chapter 1, Chinese has different words to describe specific processes of copying and 
the copying of different kinds of things. None of these terms, however, can be used as 
broadly as the English word "copy." Another key differentiating factor (see Chapter 
3) was that copying a shirt pattern, a design, or a painting~especially for those 
designed to look similar to, but not exactly the same as a famous brand一the creation 
of the copy still takes considerable work and some degree of skill. Copying a book 
(envision sophisticated photocopying machines), a movie, or music does not take that 
skill. 
Perhaps because of the “ban,” meaning edition or version, in the term daoban, 
the word appears to refer conceptually to a physical object or representation (an idea I 
will return to below). Thus conceptually, downloading a digital file may not be seen 
as daoban because it lacks a physical representation, generally remaining on 
computers or MP3 players in digital form. Another possibility mentioned to me by 
several informants is that downloading is not seen as daoban because daoban is 
clearly associated contextually with business, but digital downloading does not work 
in this way. It is not performed for money and, in general, neither the uploader nor the 
downloader stands to profit beyond watching or listening to the music or movies for 
free. Judging from other discussions on the relative morality of daoban business 
84 This reaction also is not due to a lack of an understanding or practice of downloading music or 
movies on the Internet. Besides (or while) playing online computer games and chatting with friends 
over QQ or MSN messaging services, the biggest use of Internet cafes was for precisely this kind of 
downloading. Such cafe customers could watch movies and television series as well as listen to MP3s 
for a few yuan an hour and all of my college-aged informants had experience with this. 
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discussed in Chapter 3 and that of profits and business illegality in Chapter 4, this lack 
of profit motive also makes downloading significantly closer to moral no matter what 
the legal policy, in the end, decides. Regardless of why daoban and downloading are 
not linked together, the lack of a policy prohibition on downloading was cited as key. 
While there is no specific mention of downloading or online "piracy" in the 
Copyright Law (2001 revised version), there have been several cases related to online 
downloading of copyrighted music and movies where the service providers providing 
the links were fined. This type of action would be taken under provisions of the 
g C 
Copyright Law which reserve the right of copyright owners to "transmit [their work] 
via the Internet" (China TPR Law 2002). Tn addition, some judges interpret this article 
as implying a responsibility and liability on the part of ISPs (Internet Service 
Providers) in regards to copyright infringement occurring on their networks (Jiang 
2004). 
At the same time, however, downloaders and consumers of daoban (although, 
perhaps not uploaders or providers of the music) might be able to avail themselves of 
the first limitation found in Article 22, which allows the "use of a published work for 
the purposes of the user's own private study, research, or self-entertainment" 
(Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China 2001). While the term daoban, is 
then a term of common currency, its definition is not produced in the same way as 
other terms for copied products. Daoban is intimately connected to the law. Yet it is 
also less limited to the letter of the law, than to people's perception of it. 
1 believe that the article this statement referred to is Article 10，clause 12. It does not specifically 
refer to the Internet, but does refer to "networks" and to access based on the user's own preference for 
timing, both of which are characteristics of the Internet and downloading. This is also one of the 
sections which was added in the 2001 amendment of the original law. 
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Exceptions: Imported and Destroyed Titles 
Daoban is used in opposition to, and in relation to, several other key terms 
which can shed more light on its meaning and its relation to intangible property. The 
obvious first one, as discussed in Chapter 3, is zhengban. Zhengban discs are licensed 
ones that are said to appear in more upscale shops, especially those which are either 
chain stores themselves or rent space inside chain stores. They are then associated 
with Xi'an's "name brand" stores. If the real/fake dichotomy used in English 
newspapers and by copyright holders in the West truly maps directly onto a 
zhengban/daoban dichotomy, then these two categories should be mutually exclusive 
and, put together, all-inclusive. That is to say that a disc that is not zhengban 
(licensed) must be daoban (pirated) and one that is not daoban must be zhengban. 
To most of my informants this last point was generally true. Some, however, 
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pointed out exceptions. The first, imported titles {shuihuo), are titles that were 
licensed for sale in another country. They are then bought there legally and brought 
into China without paying (full) import duties. They then can be distributed and sold 
here despite never having purchased the right from the producer (or "author") to sell 
in China. Furthermore, because of different pricing agreements in different countries 
and their ability to get around import duties, it is possible to sell these discs more 
cheaply than regular zhengban. 
Although the rights to the reproduction of the music on the CD were paid for, 
, the interesting thing about those rights as they relate to intangible property at least, is 
that they can be divided up by country. Thus while the disc itself is zhengban, a 
licensed product, by selling it in a place it was not licensed for, it technically is 
unlicensed there like any other illegally sold daoban copy. While it is then also an 
This term, unlike daoban, is not confined to discs and is much more about contracts and licensing 
than Intellectual Property directly. Such products are also known as parallel imports. 
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unlicensed copy, it was not included by my informants as daoban or zhengban, but 
rather as a separate category. 
The second exception to the zhengban/daoban dichotomy comes in the form of 
destroyed titles (dakong). Destroyed discs are also a kind of licensed disc sold in an 
unlicensed form. Their producers had sent them to be destroyed so as to remove 
excess supplies of certain titles from the market. DVDs, CDs, and VCDs are 
destroyed by drilling a small hole through the disc that makes it unreadable in 
players.87 While this process probably makes the majority of such "destroyed" discs 
unreadable, for a portion of them the hole is drilled close enough to the center that— 
though weight imbalance or sharp edges may damage a player—the content remains 
accessible. Readable ones (and some that are not) then find their way to shops 
specializing in the trade and are sold at around the same prices as daoban discs. 
Both imported and destroyed titles were at one time completely legitimate 
discs. However, because of the way that intellectual property rules work, the same 
physical product can be legitimate in one place and illegitimate in another. The 
intangible content on the disc is what is or is not licensed to be sold in particular 
places. Thus regardless of the physical disc having been zhengban in the past, if the 
content cannot be sold in China, then the disc should (based on IP rules) be viewed as 
pirated. My informants instead followed the physical disc itself. They may view the 
importation methods as being less than legitimate, or see the destroyed discs as less 
^ desirable (more risky), but neither offense could alter the nature of the disc itself. The 
disc itself then remained zhengban. 
A college-aged informant revealed another interesting facet to the issue of the 
destroyed discs. He mentioned that even if you cannot call them zhengban, because 
Cassettes are similarly destroyed with a saw-like cut through their edge meant to slice the magnetic 
tape and/or reel at minimal cost. Books are "destroyed" by ripping their front covers off. 
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the content was not licensed for use in China, you also cannot call them daoban. 
Instead, he maintained, this is a sort of recycling, a reuse of something that someone 
had already thrown away. If the companies discarded their discs, then isn't it someone 
else's option to pick it up if they believe they can make use of it? To him, this was a 
person who had turned someone else's garbage into something that they could make a 
living off of. By destroying it, they must have given up their rights to it, right? 
According to an IP perspective, however, the company merely threw away 
copies, or physical discs, but certainly had not thrown away the right to the intangible 
content that had been on them. Thus reusing only the physical disc (perhaps by 
melting them down) certainly would be legal. It is the reuse of the intangible property 
on the disc that is illegal. IP allows products to continue to be owned and allows 
companies to maintain rights to them in some ways beyond their "death."'^^ 
Blurring the Line: Tom and Jerry 
The third exception to this strict zhengban/daoban dichotomy came in the 
form of a Tom and Jerry cartoon title that I found in the summer of 2004 during 
preparations for fieldwork. The original Tom and Jerry movies were produced and 
sold as animated films with accompanying musical scores but no dialogue. In Xi'an's 
disc shops they were now being sold with new voiceovers in various local dialects. I 
saw the largest selection—six discs (holding three or four episodes each)—in Xi'an's 
丁his aspect of IP might be drawn upon in the future (something like this is already in effect for cars 
and refrigerators in the EU) to assert that companies not only have rights concerning their products 
beyond their "death," but also to say that they have certain responsibilities for them as well. One 2005 
article in the South China Morning Post (Cheung 2005) proposed something along these lines as a 
possible economics-based solution to environmental problems. The idea was to make companies 
responsible for their products throughout the product's lifecycle and thus also responsible for the 
product's disposal after it has been used up. Interestingly, however this would lead to a similar erosion 
of consumer's ownership that we see with IP. With shrink wrap software licenses, music, books, and 
movies, the consumer retains only the right to use the software. They may own outright the physical 
CD, but the content on it remains entirely the property of the producing company. With this 
environmental scheme, the consumer would similarly no longer "own" the product, but rather retain 
"use rights" only. 
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Shaanxi dialect, but there were also several in Henan and Dongbei dialects. In 
addition to the music and moving images, the stories had been supplemented with 
yelling, laughing, and mild swearing that brought them significantly closer to local 
people's lives. 
They were a big hit too. Most stores I saw in 2004 had a version playing on 
their promotional televisions, and it seemed that parents and kids were impressed 
enough to buy all of them and then return to see if new versions had come in yet. The 
disc however, despite its high sales, was less popular among retailers. Wang Ge 
explained to me that the people who did the voiceovers (students from a local college) 
claimed that since they created it, it should be zhengban. This meant that they insisted 
on selling it at zhengban prices meaning that Wang Ge had to pay the wholesaler 8 or 
9 yuan per disc. Unfortunately, Chenggong，s customers did not see it the same way, 
insisting that it was daoban and refusing themselves to pay zhengban prices (Wang 
Ge was asking for 15 yuan). More than most titles, this one's price was the subject of 
negotiations and occasionally it meant that Wang Ge's profits per title were slim to 
none (selling it for 10 yuan at times). By 2005, the titles were still around, but had 
passed out of extreme popularity and were sold in packs of 6 VCDs that were priced 
the same as other daoban titles (somewhere between 30 and 35 yuan for the set). 
Interestingly, in 2005 even the Xinhua music store had a wide selection of them 
selling at around 8 yuan each. 
In 2004, Wang Ge, lamenting the confusion that was hurting his profits, 
explained to me that it was 
ridiculous for them to claim their product is zhengban. Sure, they wrote, 
performed, and recorded the voices in the VCD, but the cartoon and the music 
was all made in America. The American company made it. They just added to 
it. How can this be zhengban?! 
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Ill making his argument, Wang Ge interestingly has tapped into the same 
argument that many more established music and movie producers make in the United 
States. They explain that, to promote innovation, the original creation must be 
respected and all subsequent additions or modifications, which are merely building on 
the original, must first acquire permission. Lessig (2004) and Vaidhyanathan (2001) 
both would reply that, seen in this light, the original was itself building off of 
numerous previous creations that had been available in the public domain. To them 
there is little if anything that is made without building on something else. Thus they 
ask why an older creation should be privileged over a newer (or potential) one, 
especially when the ultimate goal is to encourage new innovation. While this 
represents only a small addition to the original voiceless movie (especially as 
compared to the work the animators put into it), in adding this little bit, they have 
made a 50 year old cartoon newly relevant to a new generation of children halfway 
around the world. Further innovation might entail creating a new episode where the 
characters have new adventures that might even be set in China and cater to a Chinese 
sense of humor. Following Lessig (2004), I imagine this type of innovation as the 
beginnings of the "remixing" that we should be promoting. 
These three exceptions then call into question the idea of a strict 
zhengban/daoban dichotomy. Looking more closely, it appears that there is room 
between (or around) zhengban and daoban for other categories of discs which do not 
^ fit nicely into either. The Tom and Jerry case exemplifies the confusion that can arise 
when the intangible content is indeed taken into account. The difficulty is that part of 
the content truly is new, and part indeed is a copy. Was it zhengban because the 
voices and script they wrote were their own work? Or was it daoban because the 
video, characters, and storyline were copied from someone else's work? Even the 
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original was building off of earlier works to a greater or lesser extent. In Xi'an 
however, the case remains contested, with consumers and retailers often taking the 
side of the argument that will allow them a better price. 
Real or Fake 
While in this case the intangible served as a basis for arguing over the price, 
generally it is not taken into account. Daoban and zhengban, as local contextual 
categories, seem to be describing less the content encased in the disc and more the 
physical disc itself. This is made more apparent when confronted with destroyed and 
imported discs, the first two exceptions. The focus on the physical disc is perhaps also 
why many informants associated zhengban discs, of higher prices, with more modern 
looking stores and more aesthetically pleasing packaging. They held to this 
association unaware that, in fact, the mainland zhengban {dalu zhengban) titles sold in 
Chenggong were the dirtiest discs on the shelves. This association may also be why 
informants were reluctant to completely associate real with zhengban or fake with 
daoban as I explained in Chapter 3. A local band member reinforced this idea in 
response to one of my questions: 
[Do zhengban and real have any similarities, are they the same?] 
I think that real and zhengban should not really be connected together. Real 
things are things that are done correctly. If it truly is this person who sings a 
song, say I sing this song, then it's called real. But daoban then, this daoban 
disc still is me that sings it, so it is still real. They are all real. It is just that 
their manufacturing channels aren't the same [a local rock band vocalist, male, 
20]. 
^ While daoban does fit roughly into the category of fakes, it does so only 
tangentially because daoban can be used just like zhengban can. Furthermore, through 
this categorization, daoban appears more legitimate as it compares favorably to 
instances of consumer fraud. Far from an association with fake products making 
daoban a more serious offense, it instead fits into an overall shift in focus from issues 
1 7 6 
of licensing to issues of quality. It is then partially due to this shift that more space has 
been created in which to define both daoban and zhengban situationally as I explored 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, it is thus important to emphasize that, even were 
zhengban and daoban strictly dichotomous with no overlaps or exclusions, the 
situation on the ground would remain ambiguous because they are also defined 
contextually. 
Keeping in mind these three exceptions then, most discs do not straddle the 
line between two categories. Most discs simply are daoban. Some discs must be 
zhengban. The problem is that, from a consumer's point of view on the ground, it is 
impossible to know for certain, based on licensing, which is which. Returning briefly 
to the Tom and Jerry example described above I cannot even be certain that the copy I 
actually bought was made with the students' permission, let alone that of the original 
Tom and Jerry writers. The students may have originated the new version but only 
made a few copies. The one I bought might have been copied from one of those 
without the student's knowledge (let alone that of the current owners of the copyright 
to the video) and sold to me. 
According to a well circulated AP news story by Christopher Bodeen (2004)， 
there were not only VCDs with dialect voiceovers, but also a television show that was 
to be broadcast in Shanghainese. Bodeen's article dealt specifically with the issue of 
dialects and the central Chinese government's ban on the show as a part of its 
^^  advocacy of Mandarin. If the article had instead focused on the tangles of IP involved 
it might have pointed out that, not only did the show and the VCD build off of the 
original American cartoon, but the show's producer may have built off of the VCD 
version or vice versa. As to who copied whom and whether or not the copy of the 
VCD we buy truly is zhengban, as consumers, we again cannot be certain. This 
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general uncertainty, however, was not as strong with regard to quality and, to most of 
my informants, this, rather than licensing, was what mattered. 
The Symbolic Importance of Zhengban 
Given the technological changes that have come about in the recent decades 
concerning digital mediums of creation and storage for movies and music, there 
actually need be no difference at all in the quality of a zhengban disc and its copy. 
This is a difference of great importance to the copyright industries as they used to be 
able to depend on the quality being a marker of distinction between the licensed 
version and the cheaper daoban version. Indeed the top end of daoban as far as 
picture, sound, and experience factors go for VCDs and DVDs has gotten 
considerably better, even between 2001 and 2005. Yet, there remains a large range of 
quality in the daoban market that may have less to do with the technology available 
(although there must be some degree of cost savings in making a poorer quality disc 
to make the price cheaper) and more to do with the idea of having the same type of 
product for sale at a range of prices and quality. This type of idea is the antithesis of 
the pricing methods that music and movie industries have supported: that of a single 
price for a good quality DVD without other options.^^ 
Despite this range of qualities and the fact that the highest quality of daoban 
are increasingly faithful digital copies of the original zhengban discs, some might 
think there remains a reason to think that zhengban itself might retain a measure of 
symbolic importance. Indeed, some people did tell me that they search for zhengban 
891 mean that Chinese look for a range of price-quality options for the same content. The music 
industry largely opposes this. They do, however, support differential pricing between DVDs from 
different artists or for DVDs based on popularity or how long since they have been released. Here 
again, though, Chinese daoban suppliers and consumers seem to disagree as prices in daoban stores are 
based on a flat per disc price regardless of content. Apple's iTunes store has similarly followed this 
route in pricing all of their song for download at 0.99 USD. (This service is not now available in Asia). 
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and many told me that, were they to have the money, they would certainly buy it. 
Also, in earlier chapters, I have related several areas in which stores actually attempt 
to influence consumer's perspectives such that they can appear more zhengban. If 
people did not care about finding zhengban, then there would be little need for them 
to have remembered or come up with their own particular methods for distinguishing 
it from daoban. The question is, however, to what extent is a symbolic aspect present, 
and to what extent is zhengban only about quality? This question is central to 
understanding Chinese conceptions of intellectual property: Do questions of licensing 
and authenticity play any role here?卯 
At first, guided by general ideas about branding and peer pressure, I thought 
that at least among certain segments of the population, buying zhengban should be a 
mark of status. Consequently, I believed it might be true, to a degree, that people who 
buy daoban would feel looked down upon should their friends discover the fact. A 
retired secretary illustrates this idea of branding as it relates to clothes in China, 
stressing that this is one reason people often buy knock-off clothes. 
Take clothes for instance. Too many [of them are fake]. Shoes or shirts or 
something, like Pierre Cardin, this kind of fake products. Young people like 
vanity much more, you put on a brand, like on a Rolex watch. They all have 
names [as in "brand names"] now. He uses it illegally (daoyong), but the thing 
inside isn't the right good at the right price {huozhen jiashi 貨真價實).But 
according to young people this conduct is..., they're willing to go use it. Why? 
One reason is to show off that what they use is name brand, but its quality of 
materials is not as good. Let's say for clothing, though the material's quality is 
not as good, the average person cannot see if it is or isn't real. It then is a kind 
of showing off, so they go and buy it and can accept it. 
Students of college age and under however, scoffed at the idea that their friends 
would look down on them for buying daoban. As they explained, when they went to 
buy CDs or VCDs most often they went with a group of their friends. Since everyone 
90 For a similar example from a Vietnamese perspective, see Vann 2006. 
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they knew bought daoban, there would be little basis for comparison. Most also 
denied that "true" friends would ever look down on another for wearing copied 
clothes unless they had lied, pretending that they were name-brand clothes when they 
actually were not.^^ Even those younger informants who agreed that wearing copied 
clothing might cause them to lose face, daoban CDs were another case entirely: 
Yes, (if you wear daoban clothes) they think less of you that you are not 
fashionable. They think you don't have any money and that you lack taste 
(pingwei). 
[What about for CDs or Cassettes?] 
No. It is not a problem because most people buy daoban. 
Further into the conversations, many of these younger informants claimed that, 
though they now buy daoban, if they had enough money (were rich) they certainly 
would only buy zhengban. In this case, they said, buying daoban might cause you to 
lose face among your equally rich friends. Again, however, it is uncertain if what they 
mean here is simply a desire to buy good quality rather than a desire to buy licensed. 
When I later spoke to informants who were older and had more money, they 
still did not see buying daoban as something to look down upon. The answer again 
was that everyone bought it so it did not matter. Furthermore, while younger 
informants bought music as groups and thus their peer groups influenced what they 
bought (they often shared tapes or CDs amongst group members) as well as where 
and when they bought (as they generally went in groups), older informants generally 
bought and consumed by themselves or with only a spouse. 
^ This type of difference in buying pattern means that for older people, friends 
need never really know what kind of music they buy. As music is, for older people. 
As this is the result of interviewing without significant longer term observations or participant 
observations, I cannot be certain if, based on behavior, their friends truly do not look down on those 
who wear copied clothes. Furthermore, though I interviewed more students than non-students in this 
age group, I believe that there may be a difference between the two groups. Non-students were more 
concerned about their appearance and generally responded that clothing did matter. Money conscious 
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more of a private consumption product which may not be conveniently visible to 
peers (as compared especially to clothes which can be an integral part of conspicuous 
consumption), there is little pressure for these people to buy the higher status product. 
The other aspect to consider here is that younger people were the ones who tended to 
be more interested in the content of popular music and movies. Older informants 
explained that they consumed for entertainment and relaxation, while younger 
informants often consumed to follow their favorite artists or, occasionally, to continue 
a collection. 
It was only in the county seat I visited that there was a higher degree of 
looking down on consumers who buy daoban. Several relatively better off informants 
there mentioned a guilty feeling when they bought daoban. This however has to do 
with many factors and not just with a symbolic advantage of licensed discs. First, as I 
discussed in Chapter 4’ much of this guilt springs from people's association of daoban 
with pornography and in several cases this meant that better quality daoban simply 
was called "zhengban." Thus anyone admitting to buying "daoban" might have been 
seen as buying the absolute cheapest version of daoban. 
Furthermore, zhengban, as I spoke of in Chapter 3 is also associated strongly 
with urban areas. When Shi Ge's wife told me about their CDs she said they were not 
daoban because Shi Ge had bought them all from the city. Xi'an then represents a 
more modern, developed place, and thus its products gain both a positive valence and 
a perhaps unmerited association with zhengban because of this. Thus while future 
studies which can incorporate more younger informants with the cash to keep up with 
the latest fashion trends (non-students) may turn up additional views on branding and 
clothes, I found little evidence for such a symbolic aspect to zhengban. 
students preferred to claim that it didn't matter. Regardless however, even those who responded that 
clothing did matter, still maintained that for music and movies such a distinction was non-existent. 
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It was only later that I stumbled on one type of purchase where buying 
zhengban actually might have symbolic importance. In certain types of gift giving, 
buying zhengban is important enough that, should it be found that the product is 
daoban, the giver would lose standing in the relationship. Buying zhengban as a gift is 
especially important if you seek to impress the receiver (as in a boyfriend or 
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girlfriend): if the receiver is roughly the same age or older than you, or if the gift is 
meant for a special occasion. In cases of older siblings buying for younger ones or 
parents buying discs for their children, however, the gift tends not to take on such 
significance and can be daoban without anyone mentioning the fact. Thus if you buy a 
daoban disc for yourself, no one seems to have a reason to look down on you. 
However, if you buy the same disc as a gift for someone else, depending on your 
relationship, you may lose face with them, their friends, and possibly your friends as 
well. This idea of gifting, though, has little impact on the overall market because a 
DVD (or even a collector's set of DVDs) would only be an acceptable gift of 
exchange for students; older informants never gave discs to friends, preferring instead 
to give more expensive items. 
A second area of symbolic importance, related to the gift, that may begin to 
apply to music and movies in the future is the idea of authenticity and originality. 
Very few informants, even younger ones who were much more into following artists, 
were interested in collecting and few also thought that the original was worth much 
more than an exact copy of a DVD. Yet, this was not the case for something which 
took more skill in creation or was perceived less as a commodity and more as a piece 
of art. In talking about the idea of copying a painting for instance, several of these 
This also holds for people of the same or higher status. 
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same informants told me that, no matter how well the copy imitates the original, the 
two are different and have different values. 
In another case, a friend of mine went to an antique dealing friend for help in 
picking out a present for his best friends' wedding. The idea was to employ his 
expertise to make certain that my friend got a real antique for a fair price. In the end, 
the antique dealer called his wife over and they gave my friend the bracelets directly 
off of their own wrists. These were "real" antiques, he said. My friend was extremely 
embarrassed saying that he had no idea how much to pay for such a thing. Stopping 
him, the antique dealer stressed again that these were "real," not replicas. He would 
not sell these to someone at any price, such things can only be given. While I doubt 
that he could not have found a price to sell them at (he was, after all a very successful 
business man), the point he made remains an echo of that mentioned in the paintings 
example. To him, there were some things whose authenticity (originality) made them 
worth so much that they were suitable only for gifts. While music and movie discs 
certainly do not have this type of "original" aspect to them yet, the idea of buying an 
original over a copy (or especially in giving an original) does exist. 
The symbolic importance of zhengban (even taking gifting into account) then 
does not currently seem to play a major role in purchasing decisions. While in the 
future, as this younger generation grows up, accustomed to consuming and giving 
music and movies, this symbolic aspect to zhengban may begin to take on a bigger 
role. In turn it is possible the ideas of branding, authenticity, and more conspicuous 
consumption may begin to associate a degree of guilt with buying daoban. 
At the same time however, a note of caution is important as well. While there 
might be something more to zhengban than the physical product, especially as 
reflected in the story of the antique dealer, it is not dear whether this has that much to 
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do with IP. I would suggest that most of this importance attributed to zhengban has to 
do with its perceived guarantee of quality and, most importantly, its higher price. This 
can be seen in the story of Shi Ge that I presented in Chapter 3. He bought a 300 yuan 
dress as a gift for his wife that a friend in the clothing business told him was only 
worth 50. Although he lamented strongly having paid so much for it, I got the distinct 
impression that this difference mattered little. Shi Ge was convinced his wife would 
find out how much he had spent, be impressed, and accept the gift gratefully. What 
might have lost him face, buying the dress at some 6 times what the friend said it was 
worth, in the end gained him face by allowing him a chance to show that he could 
afford to buy such an expensive gift for his wife. This idea also applies to zhengban 
gifts, the higher price (high enough for a student's gift though not high enough to be a 
decent gift from a wage earner) seems to be a much more important factor in showing 
the value of a gift than its intangible property or even its authenticity. 
A Wider View? New Generations and Smalltime Creators 
Much of this thesis has been concerned with the views of consumers and 
retailers of daoban products and thus has largely not focused on those people who 
might find more direct benefits from zhengban. This section seeks to see more of the 
breadth and variation (or at least potential for variation) within these cultural 
conceptions of copying and owning intangible property. I will first focus on the extent 
to which the younger generation may differ from their parents, an issue I began to 
deal with in the last section, before moving on to views of some smalltime creators I 
spoke with. 
The second dividing line for differences in views of intangible property that I 
saw in Xi'an is one between older and younger generations. As I mentioned at the end 
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of Chapter 4’ college-aged students and below have been learning about IP and 
reading texts of inventors in their schools. This indeed has had an impact and most of 
my younger informants were rather better informed about copyright issues than their 
parents. In several households, I was referred to the middle school-aged son or 
daughter as the expert on zhengban and daoban. 
These children were also often the experts on popular music in general 
because they have grown up interested in music and movies. As a part of this interest, 
this younger generation not only listened to popular music, but also gave it as gifts 
and followed specific stars and singers. Three middle school girls I spoke with 
claimed that, between the three of them, they were going to save their money up to 
buy one zhengban version of Zhou Jie Lun's new album because he was cute and a 
good singer. While him being cute has little to do with intangible property, the fact 
that these fans thought about saving money up to buy a zhengban disc does. This is a 
generation which, at least for their favorite artists, may be willing to spend more than 
the price of a daoban disc. 
Of course, as I addressed above, their seeking to buy zhengban may not 
actually mean buying licensed; though they talked of wanting to support him, in 
practice it may simply turn out that they buy a higher priced or better quality daoban 
version. Furthermore, none of these children were earning their own income and it is 
difficult to say whether such abstract thoughts about zhengban will translate into 
^ actually buying zhengban when they have their own budgets to balance. At the same 
time, given this generation's education in IP and that they are fans, there may also 
gradually be more of a sense of authenticity to buying zhengban. Watching them as 
they have to decide how to spend their own money will give us an idea of whether 
there starts to be more to "zhengban" than simply higher quality. 
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Lastly, this generation is not only growing up with more IP education, but also 
with the promise of digital technology and the challenges it has brought to this new, 
but already antiquated version of ownership. As I touched on above, downloading is 
not generally associated with daoban and most informants I spoke with saw it as more 
legitimate than daoban. While many people still buy daoban discs, more and more 
Chinese families can afford to buy computers at home. These families and these same 
members of the younger generation will find it increasingly convenient to download 
music for free off of the Internet. This aspect of the market already seems to have had 
an impact as a group of college-aged men told me (in a focus group) that they 
generally just used MP3 players loaded with music from Internet cafes. 
Such technological changes which in China are occurring simultaneous to the 
introduction of an IP system built before the digital age will also have an effect on 
movie buying. As a middle-aged male informant told me, though he is not very tech-
savvy, he has learned how to use his computer to watch movies: 
[Where are your VCDs now? In the trash?] Yes. Now there's no need for them, 
now I watch them on the Internet. After the Internet came, a lot of things were 
brought together. [So you can also watch movies then...] Yes, I can watch 
them when I want. There aren't all that many free movies. But you can watch 
them, even the new ones that are just out. 
Watching how these opposing factors of fandom, interest, IP education, and 
the digital challenge will not only be interesting, but essential for how cultural 
conceptions of intangible property change over generations. In the United States, the 
^ music and movie industries were built (as was the copyright regime) prior to the 
Internet. Their business models have largely been challenged by digital technology, 
downloading, and file-sharing, but they have a large amount of institutional power to 
fight off the challenge as they are already established and entrenched where they are. 
In China, the copyright regime on the one side faces pressure from the international 
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copyright industries, the United States, and increasingly vocal domestic adherents. 
Yet on the other side, it also must be built among a generation who simultaneously 
have been introduced to the benefits of the Internet. It is in this sense that watching 
this generation as they enter new life stages will be important to understand the final 
shape of copyright in China and the extent to which copyright (and IP more broadly) 
can be incorporated into their daily lives. 
While I did not have a chance to interview any large copyright holders, I was 
able to interview several smalltime or beginning creators. While one might suggest 
that such persons would be more inclined to speak harshly of daoban, they largely did 
not. For the DJ and radio show host I spoke with, the important factor of daoban was 
its speed. They need, for their jobs, to keep up with the latest music. In turn, they can 
then make their content (radio show and other mixes). In this way they depend on the 
producers of IP, but also 
The record companies give them out free to us. Those are zhengban. But to 
beat the daoban, they have to be fast. Say that you specialize in popular music. 
Even when the zhengban has not yet come out, it is already out underground 
(on the street) and is popular. If you were to play the artist's compilation hits 
again [rather than the new album], everyone will think your stuff is passe. Yet 
the zhengban hasn't even come out yet. So sometimes I must, even though I 
shouldn't, go buy daoban. For instance, the radio broadcasting station's 
machine is very good, top of the line, so it won't read daoban discs as well. So 
we bring in an older one, one that people use at home, and then we alternate 
between them. So sometimes it is really because the zhengban still hasn't come 
out, then you still must use daoban. 
While here he gave some of the professional reasons he must rely on daoban, 
later in our interview he added to this his own personal reasons for buying daoban 
music which fit quite well with the material from my other informants. He also said 
that, were someone to tape his own show, he would be ecstatic rather than angry.'^ ^ 
A friend I spoke to who produces documentary type dramas for CCTV told me that she and her 
colleagues constantly buy daoban discs to get an idea about new tricks and trends in the business. They 
also keep a look out for their own work as finding that your work has been copied meant that you had 
made it. Your movie was actually popular! 
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The only difference was that he maintained that he would go to lengths to buy 
zhengban of local musicians whom he knew personally. He spoke of this as 
promoting them, but also as a recognition of how difficult their lives are. 
Interestingly, he was the only one of my informants to complain about the money 
which big artists got paid saying, "Many now make in one day enough to support ten 
people's living for a year." Being closer to the industry, rather than making him more 
likely to support zhengban, instead prompted him to dwell (as with Hong Kong and 
the United States where such star status is more discussed) on the financial 
inequalities. 
The most different view that I found about IP was when I spoke with a local 
professor who, in addition to his teaching and research activities, also supplements his 
income with consultancy work on weddings. Specifically, as he does historical 
research, he redesigned an entire wedding ceremony to fit with dynastic practices: 
writing the script, consulting on costumes, and adding the important ritualistic 
touches. He had one particularly large ceremony in which he designed a special 
carriage based on historical texts to carry the bride out the door just after the marriage. 
The next year, the company who had hired him chose to stage the entire thing again. 
They used a video they had made to recreate his scripts, costumes, and other elements 
without his permission or compensation. His experiences led him to take a strong 
position against daoban as stealing. 
^ 111 supporting his position he also told the story of his new book which, 
published in Xi'an, was available three days later in a daoban version in Chengdu (a 
dozen hour train ride away) where he was attending a conference. Possessing an 
excellent sense of humor about the whole thing, the professor related to me another 
example about his colleague and friend, a Mongolian history expert. The friend had 
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just published a new book only to find that within a few days there were many daoban 
copies being sold. He was quite distressed as the zhengban version had not been 
selling all that well and now probably never would. When he found out that the 
daoban publisher was a university press, he threatened to take them to court. They 
settled out of court for thirty thousand RMB and when he brought the money home 
his wife was very pleased. Now, unfortunately, his wife is upset because his 
subsequent book still does not have a daoban version. 
Interestingly, although he had strong views on the matter that related 
specifically to TP, when we spoke of buying and selling daoban discs, he also placed 
both the stealing and the immorality only at the level of the manufacturers. As for "the 
others, buying and selling, I think I can really empathize with them. They have a need 
for discs but no money." As with other informants, he also drew a clear line between 
the immorality of fake medicines and foods and the relatively less immoral daoban. 
We further had a discussion over the difficulties of enforcing rights to authors that 
included him wondering how to determine the amount of money that should go to an 
author and whether tea shops (like the one we were in) would ever be willing to pay 
royalties for the music they use in the background. 
The IP holders I spoke to—a radio show host, a writer (the professor), an 
inventor,94 and a few aspiring musicians一all are near the beginning of Lessig's 
94 While T was in a county seat outside Xi 'an T had a chance to meet briefly a famous local inventor 
who had invented a flying contraption based on a small engine and a parasail. He was able to apply for 
and receive a patent for the device, dubbed China's "home grown plane," and several articles were 
written about him in local newspapers, which his wife has carefully clipped and kept in an album for 
him. The plane itself, however, is primarily a hobby and though some military officers had approached 
him early on, he does not think there is any serious possibility of making any money from his 
invention. At this point, he is most interested in procuring a more powerful engine that would allow 
him to fly further and higher than he currently can, but has met resistance because of regulations 
governing exports to China and his inability to meet overseas sales people in person. Were someone to 
copy his design, however, he thought that he would be quite flattered. The main thing he would ask is 
that that person gave him, a Chinese person, the credit as the inventor. He feels that this actually would 
help to improve the image of China in the world as a place where such things could be invented. As for 
daoban, he sees little wrong with it since the main buyers are poor and they too deserve access to 
entertainment. 
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(2004:19,67) stages of copyright advocacy. In such positions, they depend largely on 
copyrighted material for ideas and as a base to create their own works. The DJ from 
Chapter 3 needed compilation CDs, nearly all of which were daoban, because it was 
those discs that would allow him to put together the genres, speeds, beats, and 
currently popular songs to be successful. Also the two rock band members I mention 
in other places in the thesis, see themselves as imitating and paying tribute to their 
favorite musicians. They prefer to think of their own work ？isfanban (imitation), 
meaning that they emphasize the degree that their own voices, skill, and tweaking 
plays in making the final result. 
While none of these artists and creators may "make it big"—where they might 
become ardent copyright advocates—they have a connection to copyright and their 
responses to that are interesting. The professor, while denouncing daoban, also finds 
that he can understand people buying and selling it. Further, he highlights the 
practical difficulties that others had not even thought about. While the radio host had 
a different reason to buy zhengban based on knowing the life of the artists, he also 
had a different reason not to buy it based on the same inside knowledge. Overall, in 
his personal life and for his work, he still bought daoban with no guilt and for similar 
reasons as my non-creator informants. While there were some clear differences, 
especially based on the depth of their interaction with IP, their answers to my 
questions on the whole continued to emphasize common local cultural ideas of quality 
^ and access to intangible materials from which they can create new things. Differences 
by age were also apparent but they tended to be nascent, none of these students had 
had to make the economic decisions on their own that older informants claimed 
forced them to buy daoban. Here also, differences were more of a matter of emphasis 
than distinctly different outlooks. Both older informants and younger informants saw 
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daoban as illegal; it is just that the younger ones made this point more clearly and the 
youngest of them did not yet have to negotiate the practicalities of buying discs with 
their own money. 
Conceptions of Intangible Property 
Thus while smalltime creators and my younger informants were a bit more 
knowledgeable about intellectual property issues, their views were not substantially 
different from my other informants. Yet, as I outlined above in the sections on 
defining daoban and the lack of symbolic importance to zhengban, licensing issues 
were present only in abstract discussions of zhengban and daoban. Intellectual 
property and notions of intangible ownership were largely missing topics in Xi'an. In 
my discussions on IP on the other hand, it was often difficult to keep the interviews 
focused on intangible property. My informants sought to use their answers to my 
questions as opportunities to stake out their positions in a wide range of current 
debates in China, each of which seemed to them to be more relevant areas of research. 
IP here, was generally subsumed under or incorporated into other more locally 
relevant debates and issues. 
A discussion of intangible property, for instance, was not an end in and of 
itself, but rather it served to illustrate a point in a larger debate. A middle-aged male 
government worker explained that the reason people did not buy zhengban was that 
they followed their "traditions" (chuantong) rather than the law. Here they seek to 
present their position on the question of an emerging rule of law in China, a topic of 
much current interest. A middle-aged male government worker, for instance, used the 
preference for daoban as an example of how Chinese people do many things because 
that "is the way my grandfather did it" {wo yeye jiu shi zheme zuo de). Here he evokes 
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Lu Xun, an early century Chinese writer, not to present another way of looking at 
invention or ownership, but rather to link to the idea of China as backwards and of the 
Chinese people as carrying too large a burden of old customs to stand up in the new 
world order. They are thus not then able to accept, he said, new laws about property in 
knowledge which would allow them to move forward. The stress is thus placed not on 
supporting or opposing Western views of the ownership of intangible property, but on 
modernization, the rule of law, and on a long running discussion of the extent to 
which China should accommodate new Western ways of doing things. 
In explaining my research to friends, both Chinese and Euro-American I have 
consistently found two opposite reactions. My European and American friends felt 
that research into IP in China was an exciting project which has been long overdue. 
By contrast, my Chinese friends see little reason to research it at all, especially not at 
a local level. This Chinese reaction is, to an extent, the opposite of what Ellen Hertz 
found in her research into the early Shanghai stock market, also a Western concept 
which had been introduced into China. "For the majority of people I talked with 
during [1992], it seemed normal, and even desirable, that this historical moment be 
documented by foreign scholars. From the moment I set foot in Shanghai until my last 
day there, people from all walks of life wanted to talk to me about the market" (Hertz 
1998: 1). 
Thus where the stock market was characterized by its overwhelming presence, 
^ IP was characterized by its resonant absence. At the same time, this is not to say that 
people in Xi'an did not have thoughts on the ownership of intangible property. It is 
just that, as IP is not a common topic of conversation (in stark contrast to fakes), they 
had not addressed the issue of IP itself directly. In this section I aim to highlight two 
thematic elements, the centrality of performance and the importance of the nation, 
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which may help us to understand more broadly my informants cultural conception of 
intangible property. I will first focus on that of performance before returning in the 
next section to the importance of the nation. 
The Centrality of Performance 
Both older and younger generations in Xi'an are consistently confronted with 
opportunities to consume songs and stories in public and to do so actively by taking 
part in the performance. For current audiences, as well as for larger ones historically, 
singing and storytelling in public have formed an integral part of the fulfillment of a 
person's spiritual (jingshen) hunger. As I asked questions about how and to what 
extent a person could "own" a song, the ownership of intellectual property, my 
informants often fell back on this concept of performance as a way to sort out and 
frame their conceptions. 
For the older generation, in the early morning in parks and squares across 
Xi'an, people gather to do calisthenics, jog, and meet friends before going on to work 
or on with their days. The parks are public places, but on good weather mornings they 
are carved up by various groups practicing their particular form of exercise together. 
As the sun comes out, most of the working age adults and all of the children leave to 
go to work or school. The remaining older people, gravitate from their exercises 
toward several gathering points to listen to and participate in local, semi-spontaneous 
opera performances. Such groups are semi-spontaneous because although most are 
^ there each morning in similar places, their members shift in and out depending on 
who shows up that morning and who in the audience can be convinced to sing a song 
or two. The core members of the accompanists and the main singers all know one 
another by nicknames, occupation, or shortened forms of their real names, although it 
seems that outside of this venue many do not know each other's personal situations. 
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I watched one such group of retired people singing a cappella in a pavilion on 
a lake. The three core participants where a well dressed retired woman specializing in 
Shaanxi folk songs and some local opera, an 80 something year old "teacher" who 
also sang folk songs and opera, and a man who specialized in impersonating Mao 
Zedong's speeches and gestures. As they alternated performances they also enjoyed 
goading, praising, and critiquing each other and anyone else they could convince to 
take a turn. Everyone modestly refused the first few times they were asked and by the 
time they were finally "forced" to sing those who did often seemed quite pleased with 
the opportunity to show their skills. My arrival brought out several renditions of 
Mao's speeches, numerous Communist era folk songs, and a few Shaanxi style beat or 
rhythm works (one of which described Shaanxi，s Eight Strange Habits (badaguai) 
and another listed, with amusing comments, all of the tourist sites in Xi'an and 
surrounding areas). A 30-something year old music teacher from Gansu province's 
arrival brought out a Gansu folk song by the woman and the arrival of several middle 
school students induced pleas for the older teacher to do a heartfully exaggerated 
rendition of "As Mice Love Rice" {Laoshu Ai Dami), a popularly downloaded song 
which was added to all of the summer's greatest hits compilation discs. 
Another example of these performances occurs daily in the evenings in the 
public square south of the South Gate. In the northwest corner of this square*^^ a group 
of Henan opera enthusiasts performed. The group depends on a few frequent visiting 
^ singers, an older man who played the e r h u ” and another person beating a block of 
wood with a stick to keep time. Singers alternate performances of Henan opera 
95 The other corners of the park had their own performances going on including one doing Shaanxi 
style opera; a group of people singing Communist folk songs accompanied by a cassette tape played 
with high, but distorted amplification; and a crowd around someone who had brought a Karaoke 
machine and microphone. The singing group also occasionally performed dances with red fans and 
invited suggestions of songs (to be shouted out) from the crowd. Spectators moved from corner to 
corner as their interest took them or sat with friends on the walls around the square. 
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singing and dancing the parts of the opera for the audience. While in the mornings the 
main audience were retirees, in the evenings the audience included high school-aged 
dating couples, married couples, retirees, and a large number of male migrant workers 
who probably were working on one of the many construction projects nearby. 
The best part of the performance, to me as an anthropologist at least, was 
being able to watch the audience three or four rows deep tapping their feet, laughing 
together at the funny parts, and mouthing the words along with the singer. While 
Western operas, and operas in dynastic China may have been entertainment for the 
upper classes, local operas in China are performed in local dialects by local singers 
for free. More professional versions consistently show up on local television stations 
and occasionally a paid performance might also come to town. The stories they tell 
are stories familiar to most of their audience and the enjoyment comes not simply 
through the plot itself, but through the power of the performance — hitting the high 
and long notes accurately, proper hand gestures (especially for men playing female 
parts), and active engagement with the audience. 
At least for the older members of the population in Xi'an then, public 
performances are a central part of their consumption of stories and music. The songs 
and opera that are played furthermore are not something that looks for innovation in 
lyrics or tune. A retired secretary and Henan opera enthusiast told me that 
It is not possible to create a new Henan Opera. You can just adhere to the 
basic foundations of one and reform it a little bit. For instance, Henan opera 
used to use a reed instrument, a sheng (笛)，but we don't use it anymore. 
What makes one rendition better than another is not the newness of it, or the 
way it challenges convention, but rather aspects of the performer's ability as 
presented in the performance itself. Historically, also, several of the people I spoke to 
96 A two-stringed instrument played upright via a bow threaded between the strings. 
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who had grown up in communities outside the city mentioned traveling to other 
villages nearby as children to watch public performances of songs, outdoor movies, or 
one of the select few operas approved for performance by the party. For rural 
migrants working in construction, these opera performances are central to their idea of 
music as they may be one of the few types of entertainment that they can afford. 
Furthermore, as the dialects (Shaanxi and Henan) are often the local dialects where 
they might be from, this type of performance is one where they can fully participate 
and even show some expertise (these migrant workers enjoyed volunteering 
evaluations for me of each performer's attempts at a proper Henan accent). This, I 
believe is one of the keys to understanding this type of music consumption: the 
performance is the main element since most audience members already know the 
story itself. Furthermore, it is a sort of performance where the audience is given a role 
and audience members may quickly be goaded into performing themselves. The 
consumption itself then becomes a matter of performance. 
* * * 
All this is, however, initially easy to dismiss as ideas pertaining only to a 
generation of people (or class of people) who did not grow up with cassette tapes, 
CDs or DVDs.97 This group then may simply be an opposite of a younger consumer 
generation used to private consumption. Perhaps performance is important to them 
primarily because music and stories just were not performed for private consumption. 
^ They were not seen as commodities. Despite their disinterest in local opera styles, 
97 Tying into this, there is currently a debate in Chinese scholarly circles and among opera enthusiasts 
over the lack of any interest by the younger generation in learning local opera styles. A middle-aged 
friend I met during my fieldwork is working by himself to write down and preserve an opera style he 
learned as a boy. As of now, his written works and his own performing ability are the last remaining 
pieces his local opera style. He hopes to present the written work, when it is done, to the central 
•- government for preservation as a part of China's cultural heritage. As with many "traditional" aspects 
of Chinese culture there are many who worry that such traditions wi l l die with this generation. 
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however, the themes I have highlighted using opera performances are also themes 
echoed in the consumption practices of younger generations who do consume 
commodified music. 
For younger generations there has indeed been a growth of private 
consumption of songs and stories through commercialized music and movie products. 
However, as with their tendency to go in groups to buy and consume even these 
commercial products, I would maintain that these aspects of sharing and performance 
remain central. In many aspects of young people's lives, performances not only take a 
center stage, but also requires some degree of participation by the "audience." For 
students, birthdays and Christmas parties as well as Teacher's Day, Children's Day, 
and National Day celebrations all call for singing or dancing performances as the 
primary form of entertainment. Just as in the older people's performances in the 
parks, the same process of invitation to perform, suggestions as to what to perform, 
multiple refusals, and eventual modest acceptance prevailed. Teachers inevitably are 
called upon to perform as well, and students take no small delight in attempting to 
choose what their teachers will perform (not that the teachers always listen of course). 
Karaoke, as another popular way of consuming music, also plays an important 
role in entertaining friends, celebrating special occasions, and showing business or 
government clients around. The idea is to perform as much as to consume, and the 
genre's popularity (in the city as well as the countryside) perhaps stems from this 
^ larger cultural attitude. For businessmen, the singing can be mixed with social talk 
and drinking games and participants make the most of the chance to goad and be 
goaded into taking their turn at the microphone. Here too, it is important to play and 
sing songs that others know and the emphasis again is less on the song itself and more 
on its performance. 
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Besides these more private aspects, music is also publicly consumed 
throughout the places I visited. In the city, music blares outward onto the street from 
most clothing shops in the central shopping (walking, and dating) district downtown. 
Shop owners often go to the local daoban stores to update their collections every few 
months to make certain that they have the newest popular songs in order to maintain a 
"with-it" image. On the weekends, especially, there are often performances complete 
with stages, hired singers, and dancing women in costumes to promote a particular 
sale or the opening of a new store. On one occasion I passed a crowd gathered around 
a mobile phone store that had just opened. At the center of the crowd was a single 
man in his twenties playing an electric guitar and singing popular songs. The idea was 
to attract a crowd that created the sense of renao (heat and noise) which is necessary 
for their advertising message. It is thus essential that they not play songs that have 
recently gone out of fashion. At the same time, however, they must also play songs 
that enough of their audience already know the words to and thus might be drawn in 
further, tapping their feet or mouthing the words. While these more public aspects of 
performed music tend not to involve the audience as much as the opera or singing 
groups above did, they rely heavily on a common vocabulary based on the currently 
98 popular songs of that particular season. 
* * * 
98 In the county seat I visited, this type of public performance was also present. One night, there was a 
large free concert sponsored by a liquor (baijiu) company. The stage completely blocked one of the 
major roads through the town and there were thousands of people in attendance. The singers played 
double duty as they had to sing rock and rol l music for the younger spectators and also have enough 
physical acrobatics to amuse the older spectators who cared less for such music. The lead singer would 
occasionally punctuate his refrain with a series of back handsprings and flips that brought wi ld 
applause. On a more quotidian basis, each night around seven, a local English tutoring company put on 
an English dance "class" in the main square. They played a wom-out cassette of Madonna's "Like a 
Prayer" and led the women and children participants (no men joined in, preferring instead to smoke and 
watch along the sidelines) in various "modern" dance movements. The entire thing very closely 
resembled some of the morning exercise dance groups I saw in the parks in the city except that this was 
done purposefully as an advertisement for the company's English training. 
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Thus for both older and younger Chinese in Xi'an, the consumption of music 
and its performance are inextricably linked. Taking this a step further, this 
understanding of performing as a part of consumption also can help to understand 
how Chinese people see intangible property — the ownership of a song or a story. 
When I asked my informants whether or not someone could own a song, most found it 
quite difficult to answer. While the concepts of daoban and zhengban are well known 
and they do hold an idea of ownership in them, this is not something that has been 
thought about or discussed much in Xi'an. Thus while in other parts of China, such as 
Hong Kong, people might reply quickly with a yes or a no and then follow up with 
denouncements over the amount of profit they see large corporations making, in Xi'an 
this was generally not the case. Instead my informants thought about it and tended to 
fall back on the idea of performance to relate their views on ownership to me. 
[Can someone own a song?] 
No. Music is for everyone and is open to all people. You must give it to others 
to listen to it. 
[But if I write a song, or if I make a stool, how are these different?] 
You can sing it for yourself, or you can give it to others...this is what makes 
the song different, in giving it to others you don't own it anymore [A female 
high school student]. 
[Is it possible for someone to own a song?] 
Impossible. That's impossible to own. It is for everyone, if they want to sing it, 
they'll sing it. If they want to listen to it, they'll listen to it [A retired man I met 
in the park]. 
Informants thus stressed a right to perform the song. Tn this first case, she saw 
the song as a public thing, something that has been given to the public and thus can be 
performed by anyone who wants to. Several informants added on to this view by 
explaining that a writer who did not want her work to be public simply could keep it 
to themselves and not share it. Once shared however, it is no longer something that 
can be restricted into the realms of pure private consumption. 
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To at least one of my informants, the idea of ownership was a matter of 
contestation. Anyone should be able to perform the song and whoever performed it 
the best could be said to own it. Of course, since anyone can perform it (for this 20 
year old male) the idea of "ownership" was merely a form of recognition of ability 
rather than providing any particular rights. Money could be earned through 
performances and the best performer would earn more money because they (based on 
economic principles of supply and demand) would attract a higher ticket price and 
more fans willing to pay to watch. His points here also echo the stress placed on 
earlier times in China of attaching the name of inventors to what they invented. At the 
same time, as Alford points out (and I explain further in Chapter 1), this recognition 
did not change into an idea of promoting innovation or wider author's rights to profit. 
Furthermore, this more extreme view was present less strongly in other 
informants' statements as well. Many people felt that if one performer could sing the 
same song better than another (or in a different way), then they should be allowed to 
do it. Further, they should be allowed to make their own CD, and sell it. Higher 
returns would then go to the more popular (and so better) performer. This is also 
reflected in the informal way that people might refer to a specific opera piece as "Ma 
Jinfeng's signature work." Of course Ma Jinfeng (an 82 year old female Henan opera 
singer) didn't write the opera, but she is largely associated with it. The strength of her 
renown and the fact that her televised performances continue to be played and 
watched give her some degree of hold over the work as reflected in the apostrophe (or 
the possessive particle de). This gives her no other ownership rights to retaining 
money over other people's performance of the same opera, but since the opera itself 
was written so long ago it is largely seen as unownable (at least individually). 
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This historical aspect also plays a distinct role in my informants' views of IP. 
For operas, it seemed ridiculous to my informants that anyone could claim to own 
one. They had been around for so long that, like folk songs (and like the kungfu 
stories that form the basis for a plethora of television programs, comic books, and 
movies), they belong to everyone, to China, to the world, or simply cannot be owned. 
Similarly, more recent works also can be thought of as common property rather than 
available for individual ownership. One such example are the speeches given by Mao 
that many people seek to imitate. It would seem silly to my informants for someone 
descendant from Mao to claim that performers must pay him for permission to make 
money off of performing the speech. These speeches were given to the public and 
thus, like the gift of a song to the public, cannot be taken back. The public nature of 
popular songs, prevalent as background music in tea houses, shopping stores, karaoke 
clubs, and other performances then links them also to this concept. While their 
authorship is quite clear, through repeated performance of them, they too become a 
part of a shared background of songs and stories. There is here too an emphasis on 
performance ability rather than innovation in story or lyrics. 
Of course the issue is more complicated than this as well. These same 
informants understood that daoban was illegal and some claimed that it was stealing 
(although this at the original copying level or manufacturing level and not necessarily 
at the consumer or retailer levels). When I rephrased the question in more practical 
^ terms of the process of writing, recording, and producing a song, informants were 
willing to say that the person who did all of this could be said to own the song. 
However, this ownership did not necessarily amount to a view that this person had 
exclusive rights to the song itself. Many of my informants insisted (as does the law) 
that the owner could not prevent an individual from singing the song. Extending this 
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however, they felt the public performances described above to celebrate shop 
openings or sales also should not be restricted as there are no tickets sold (and thus no 
money directly made). 
This emphasis on performance, while not a physical thing in itself, is also 
analogous to an emphasis on the physicality of a CD I described when my informants 
spoke of daoban. By pointing to the right to profit from the performance of a song or 
story, informants were delineating a boundary between the aspects of an intangible 
thing that can be owned, and what cannot. This boundary is similar to the emphasis in 
American and other IP laws on a distinction between the idea and its expression. Ma 
Jinfeng can own her own performance of an opera, but not the story it was based on. 
The important difference lies in the fact that in the United States this distinction is 
steadily being eroded in favor of some degree of permanent rights over some "ideas" 
themselves. A writer can own his written story and, based on precedents, he is being 
more and more empowered to prevent others from writing the same story in different 
words, adapting that story into a video game, or adding to chapters to it in online fan 
forums. In China however, the emphasis remains almost entirely on the expression of 
the idea, with the idea, at least to my informants, remaining publicly owned or 
unownable. As a result, their view of ownership of intangible property allowed a 
much larger arena for public domain rights and many fewer rights to be given 
exclusively to individual authors, 
s. The Nation 
The second thematic element underlying these broad cultural conceptions of 
IP was my informants' identification of IP as purely a matter of nations. This, of 
course, is partly due to my being an American, but I believe that it also is a genuine 
reflection of how IP discourse is being internalized in China. My informants, like 
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Kong Ge, consistently placed the "problem" of daoban at the level of international 
f 
relations, not at one of economics or individual's property rights: 
[Does daoban count as a problem?] 
On the level of the country it counts because of the relations with the United 
States, it creates a relationship problem {guanxi wenti). But the common 
people won't listen to you. [They do not see daoban as a problem.] It's like 
Wang Ge said, 99 in a 100 people will buy the cheaper one and the others will 
look at that one person and laugh not understanding. 
IP was framed by them as a national problem affecting not domestic innovation (as 
music and movie industries would like to frame it), but one of international politics. 
They spoke of IP as belonging to America or as belonging to China, rather than to 
companies or individuals within those nations. When arguing against IP only one 
informant claimed that they were against it because of all the profits people were 
making, and even he didn't mention Hollywood, a common enough retort in Hong 
Kong and the US. 
Instead, they focused on America as a developed country and China as 
developing. This nation-centered perspective then also makes IP a less a question of 
"neutral economics" and more an obviously political one as the Han-nationalist boss 
(male, 30s) of an Internet cafe told me: 
The USA is trying to prevent China from advancing. Yes, the US may rely on 
China's economy [and its billion consumers], but overall the US is trying to 
subjugate (zhengfu) China's government, to make us and our country listen to 
and follow American wishes. This is just like what the US is trying to do to 
Iraq now. 
Thus he frames the problem as one of the United States trying to prevent 
China from copying its technology and its music. While this creates a problem for 
China's foreign relations, it also allows the issue to be framed as "us" versus 
“them.’，99 The United States seeks to prevent China from copying not for any noble 
99 This occurs on both sides. In the United States, especially around election time there are an 
increasing number of government officials who point fingers at China as a pirate. However, this 
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desire to protect the rights of an author (Chinese or American), but as a way to halt 
China's advance and its return to prominence from 100 years of humiliation. 
In many ways, this is a popular version of the same argument that political 
economists like Matthews (2002) make. It refuses to frame the issue as one of 
individual rights. It reframes it instead as one of nations competing to gain and 
maintain an edge. Intangible property here is seen as something of which United 
States has a lot and China has quite little. From this perspective, the United States is 
trying to keep China from building its own store of such property in order to control it 
economically like it seeks to permanently control Iraq militarily (most of my 
informants viewed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an effort to establish an oil colony 
of sorts). While this may indeed be closer to the truth than using the frame of an 
author and human rights, it also obscures the role that corporations and businesses 
play in the push. It masks the differences in positions within countries between 
businesses and individuals who would find IP protection as an advantage and those 
who find it an obstacle. 
On the opposite end from this Internet cafe boss, but still employing this 
nation centered ideal, was the local professor I mentioned earlier. To him, the reason 
that there is so much daoban was that "too many people now think from an 
individual's point of view and not from the perspective of what is good for the 
country." Here he views reframing the issue as one of the nation as a way to get 
people to quit being selfish and buy zhengban. He relies on nationalism and the 
common goal of many Chinese citizens to see their country advance economically to 
frame stronger IP protection as what is good for the country. The professor here also 
has taken on the role of a reformist intellectual, pushing China, the nation to adopt 
generally can be seen as an exception because the majority of people view IP as an issue of individual 
rights (i.e. Vaidhyanathan's (2001) trope of the author) and of companies. 
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Western IP laws. It is in this discourse, through a focus on IP as a matter of nations, 
that we again key into the longstanding debate in China over how much it must 
accommodate to the West. Adding to this long-standing debate is a similar, more 
recent one (since the 1970s) over how much of Western capitalism Communist China 
can afford to absorb. What is the balance (and is there a balance) between 
development and decadence? In his view, individuals should sacrifice what is good 
for them and instead go with what is good for the country, and, incidentally, good for 
copyright holders like himself. 
This resort to nationalism, the nation, and economic development is similar to 
other informants, like the government worker I interviewed, who saw people's 
continued buying of daoban as a sign of a failure to modernize. These were people 
who still only follow "tradition" and not the law and thus they are not promoting a 
modernized China. His view is important here because, given the high degree of 
nationalism in China, were the issue to be framed as protecting the nation's IP, people 
might indeed face moral pressure to buy zhengban, at least of Chinese products. 
As an issue of nations, IP then also fits with other such nation-centered 
property issues. I found myself discussing intangible property with my informants in 
the same conversations as we talked of Western countries' refusal to return tangible 
Chinese cultural and historical artifacts: 
What about stolen or improperly sold Chinese artifacts that are now in western 
museums? Americans always focus on their own daoban property problem, 
s but do not bother about the fact that these things belong to the Chinese people 
and they have them. Americans should start to see both [kinds of stealing]. 
This quote from a long conversation with Wang Jie and others highlights 
daoban's connection with a sort of national property rather than individual property. 
Furthermore, when you get right down to it, my informants felt that stealing a tangible 
artifact was considerably worse of an offense, and a considerably larger loss, than the 
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offense of copying someone's intangible property. This discussion was inspired by a 
newspaper article that day, but this framework of the nation played a key role in 
denouncing the United States' hypocrisy. I was then told the story of a statue that was 
made to teach acupuncture techniques to medical students in the Ming dynasty which 
was taken to Russia. A Chinese delegation was allowed to see the statue, but only to 
take a picture of it home with them. To Wang Jie, the important thing was not only 
where it was from, but who could protect it and make the best use of it. Chinese could 
do all three of these things best for the statue, especially since there are many students 
of acupuncture who could use such an historical introduction. By analogy however, 
Wang lie's "best use of it" argument also applied to daoban. This was a product 
which was copied to sell to people who, she claimed, could not afford the original. 
Through this larger category of nation-centered property issues, the intangible aspects 
of daoban disappear as its discs are made analogous to physical pottery, statues, and 
paintings. 
In a later discussion, issues of daoban and the rights of countries over property 
came up again in reference to a China Business Review story about NASA's fourth of 
July mission to shoot the comet Tempel 1. United States newspapers certainly saw the 
nationalist component, but saw the space fireworks merely as a celebration of U.S. 
technology and engineering. This article and Wang lie's family however, saw it rather 
as another American attempt to claim ownership over things that no one owns. They 
乂 asked me why it was that the United States could go and blast a comet without even 
speaking with the United Nations first. What, they asked, was to stop the United 
States from doing something which would break the comet into two and put the rest 
of the world in danger (a la Hollywood's movies "Deep Impact" and "Armageddon"). 
What kind of precedent was this setting? What if Japan were now to decide it could 
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do the same thing? Wang Jie continued asking if the United States could claim to own 
the comet just because it had the ability to attack Shouldn't any discussion on IP 
and daoban also include these other wider (and to her more important) aspects of 
national property that may have been illegally obtained, used, or destroyed? 
In this way, the idea of the nation that consistently appeared in my discussions 
with informants focuses on national disputes thereby bringing into light the political 
and power aspects of the IP debate while, at the same time, downplaying individual 
and business perspectives as well as the differences between tangible and intangible 
property. In this framework, it makes good sense to question the imbalance between 
the US asking for China to respect its IP while at the same time refusing to return 
priceless museum pieces. At the same time, such a framing obscures the fact that 
these museum pieces are owned by museums (not the US government) and that they 
each arrived there through different routes, some were properly bought while others 
were illegally dug up or stolen. The frame further introduces questions about why IP 
is to be enforced at this particular point in time, when the West would own most of it 
and China would not. It then makes a degree of sense to wonder why China must pay 
for music and movies, but the United States need not pay for gunpowder or paper. 
Although this nation-centered approach certainly has a lot to do with the 
degree of nationalism in China, that is not all there is to it. In the US, another country 
with strong nationalism, IP is generally still referred to as a matter of individual 
<i. rights. I believe in China the discourse people receive (and which they contribute to) 
focuses much more on the promotion of key companies as China's representatives on 
the world stage. Instead of the myth of a sacred author, there is a myth of companies 
and scientists working for the good of the sacred nation. Given the technological 
While Locke, at least, would vote yes, especially since there still remain so many comets in the 
commons, her point of the absurdity of such an ownership claim was much more convincing. 
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advances that slowly are building up in Chinese businesses, if, as Lessig suggests, this 
will mark a shift in those businesses attitudes toward IP, nationalism may bring the 
same shift to consumers. When enough companies can claim that disrespect of IP 
hurts Chinese companies, then they, and the government, might be able to make a 
successful pitch to consumer's patriotism — their desire to see China as an economic 
and political world leader. This nationalism would also mean that a China interested 
in protecting its own IP might do so without resorting to the trope of the author or 
individual rights at all. Given such a difference and the strong nationalism that could 
promote it, there is no reason to believe that, when China itself becomes an IP 
promoter, that the version of IP China adopts will resemble those found in the West. 
Conclusion: A Chinese Conception? 
Where previous chapters sought to frame the issue of daoban within different 
metaphorical perspectives according to local views, framing daoban in terms of 
intangible property, a feat which should be easy, turned out to be quite difficult. 
Instead, this chapter sought to investigate the degree of intangible property that people 
see in daoban as well as how they see the ownership of intangible things. The most 
important relationship between daoban and intangible property is in how the concept 
is tied intimately to the law. Thus downloading, despite being illegal in the revised 
2001 Copyright Law, could be denied as daoban because the majority view of my 
s informants did not believe there was any law against it. As it is linked to the law, 
neither daoban nor related verbs are as flexible terms as "copy" in English and my 
informants tended to reject their usage outside of a few well-known areas. Adding to 
this, several informants commented that people would rather follow their traditional 
beliefs rather than the law. A characterization of the law in mainland China (as related 
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to cheating on computerized tests) made more directly by a GRE prep instructor in 
Taiwan seems apt here: "everyone knows the law is only for reference" (falu zhishi 
cankao yong de). 
These complications go further when we realize that the terms daoban and 
zhengban, which might refer to the absence or presence of licensing, also share 
territory with other terms like imported {shuihuo) and destroyed (dakong) discs which 
once were completely zhengban, but now are not really even daoban. Between the 
two main terms there is also an area of ambiguity formed by hybrid creations like the 
Tom and Jerry cartoons in local dialects as well as, to a lesser extent, new 
compilations of the most popular songs of the last few months on a single album. 
These examples suggest a blurring of the line between what is copied and what is 
original which, in an era of digital files and increasing computer savvy, may only 
become more blurred. While the Chinese terms remain fairly unanimously applied, 
how neatly they fit into Western IP categories based on intangible property is more 
difficult to see. 
As could be seen in earlier chapters which emphasized the importance of the 
physical disc's quality and price in helping consumers decide which is daoban and 
which is zhengban, in the confusion of the marketplace, price seems to rule. In a 
similar way, although I found that consumers did attribute some symbolic importance 
to zhengban as a gift, it seems to be less attributable to its original, "authentic" status 
s. or its license to the intangible property it holds, and more to its higher price and better 
quality. Furthermore, while smalltime holders of IP were more likely to know a bit 
more about the issue and be more likely to lament the lack of protection, they also 
were quick to point out an understanding for both those who sell and those who buy 
daoban. Fitting with Lessig's views, several of these informants' job situations 
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required them to keep up with new trends and thus also made them buyers of daoban 
products. 
Through this research, I came to see the centrality of performance and the 
nation, both historically and currently, in people's perspectives on the ownership of 
these things. Both of these themes help to reframe intangible property as somewhat 
more tangible. Performance focuses the consumer's attention on the conceit, the 
singing itself, or the moment in time, as well as encouraging the consumer herself to 
perform. The stress on such performance in consumption requires a wide background 
"library" of shared songs and s t o r i e s w h i c h a stress on individual authors rights 
tends to downplay. The importance of the nation in turn places the debate over 
intangible property as part and parcel of other debates over accumulations of national 
property. While the United States may have a lot of intellectual property being stolen 
by China, it also has a lot of tangible property of real historical and cultural value that 
was stolen from China. Nationalism and a de-emphasis on the intangibility allows 
these two forms of property to be seen as a part of the same discourse. 
Repeatedly through my conversations with informants, and especially younger 
informants, they came up with answers that struck me as very neo-classical in 
orientation — they tended to reduce everything to economics, rational individual 
choice, and supply and demand. To them, daoban is supplied because there is a 
demand for it and people buy it because of their budgeting choices. Thus several 
college students and others of a similar age who did not go to college maintained that 
the solution to intellectual property was not to move toward more sharing of 
knowledge (like is prevalent in discussions over file-sharing in the West), but rather to 
allow the laws of supply and demand to do their job. If someone can make a product 
1 ⑴ Think back to Ivanhoe's (2005) description of knowledge sharing and the Dao which I referred to in 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
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cheaper but of good enough q u a l i t y / t h e n they should be allowed to. This 
competition, in the end, would benefit consumers. 
Yet, when I raised the common pro-IP argument that without IP no one would 
buy zhengban, inventors would not get paid, and innovation would end, they 
disagreed. Such a situation might slow the pace of innovation, but singers and 
scientists do not simply create for money, they also do so for fame, to better their own 
lives, and to better their country. As an added response, many told me that the 
situation I outlined was not possible. The world is so big and there are so many people 
with different desires that it is impossible that everyone would buy daoban. 
These informants, having lived the last twenty years in reform-era China, 
embraced the idea that the market was the answer and, rightly, saw IP as something 
that was working against strict notions of supply and demand. Economics and the 
market represented the modern for these consumers, and daoban essentially does 
follow the rules of supply and demand. The modern itself is a goal and thus doing 
things based on the market and simple ideas of supply and demand are charged with a 
moral valence; this despite the fact that stealing and kidnapping (which are immoral 
to them) also count as following supply and demand. 
While looking for cultural reasons or historical explanations from my 
informants, they mentioned a Chinese predisposition to copying, a philosophical view 
of the world that prevents longer range dreaming (preferring to do so instead based on 
"•i smaller well defined steps), an educational system built on memorization, and the ever 
present population issue. While each of these ideas certainly may impact current 
views on IP and innovation, it is important to recognize that they are called on 
because of China's current structural position in the world system. Each of these 
Here again the issue is that they focus on a physical product rather than the intangible aspects that 
went into the original. • 
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debates, in turn, focuses on different aspects of the long running question in China of 
to what extent Chinese should adapt to Western (or "modem") ways of doing things. 
Were China's structural position to change, however, other aspects of Chinese culture 
(truly old as well as invented) will be invoked instead. This is perhaps what Wang Ge 
emphasized when he implored me to look into Western views as well, saying that we 
are not that different. 
To what extent are these cultural conceptions of intangible property and 
daoban actually unique to Chinese people? On the surface, this account has attempted 
to remain firmly in the local circumstances of Xi'an and particularly in the 
experiences of my informants. Yet, consumers in Vietnam also separate real, fake, 
original, and mimic (Vann 2006) and I found numerous similarities between the 
trading markets of Lithuania described by Hohnen (2003) and the situation of the 
illegality of daoban shops in China. At the very least, then, we must acknowledge 
that post-socialist countries may share many of these cultural conceptions. It is not, 
however, merely post-socialist countries whose people share some of these. Nigerian 
consumers of video tapes and VCDs saw a similarly ambiguous position for the 
business of pirated tapes which challenged Nigerian people's marginality by bringing 
them new films almost simultaneous to people in the Untied States while also 
threatening local film producers (Larkin 2004). Institutional and structural issues of 
development and local protection of industries'^^ certainly play an essential role 
s interacting with and being influenced by cultural attitudes. 
Some of the themes I discussed also resonate with the situation described by 
Lessig (2004) and others in the United States during its period of piracy. 
Vaidhyanathan (2001) describes how Mark Twain began his career against copyright 
103 France too has a similar debate as to that within China over how much of American films and 
culture can be allowed in without threatening the essence of what it means to be "French." 
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basing many of his stories on tales and tidbits of knowledge that were a part of the 
public domain. In effect, as a starting artist he borrowed heavily from others and then, 
only later in life when he had his own works to protect, he shifted to a pro-copyright 
stance. Hollywood made its start in California precisely as a location where lax police 
enforcement allowed them to freely make (unlicensed) use of Thomas Edison's 
patented projector as well as materials from other earlier stories and films. The United 
States, like China now, followed a pattern (with pressure from abroad) from piracy to 
TP advocate based on their relatively high stake in the "knowledge economy" (Lessig 
2004). 
Public performance also was a primary facet of American (and European) 
historical associations with music and storytelling. An early daoban-like issue was the 
illegal copying of sheet music for pianos (and other instruments) that was 
popularizing musical performance but leaving the writers of it with little money (and 
the publishing companies who bought their rights to it with little profit). Musicians, 
up until the century did not make money from recordings, but rather from live 
shows and often their musical styles showed this. Recordings of Louis Armstrong 
playing with his band were meant as promotional materials for the main event, which 
was to see Armstrong improvising in person as he did so well. As recordings have 
become more and more important however, music and movies have become affairs of 
private consumption with some even predicting vast drops in movie theatre 
% attendance due to the price, convenience, and quality of home DVD viewing. Thus 
many of these characteristics, while they may have been culturally different in their 
expression could be said to be backed up by a similar structure. When the United 
States was in an analogous position to China now, it also was known in continental 
Europe as a "pirate." 
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In both my time in Xi'an and conversing with Western exchange students in 
Hong Kong, I have found that these Westerners also buy daoban, although with (at 
least expressed to me) somewhat more guilt. Chenggong would sell DVDs and CDs in 
the dozens to foreign teachers and tourists coming through Xi'an. During one of my 
conversations with Wang Ge, I tried to explain why I thought there was a difference 
between Chinese and American ways of looking at daoban. I mentioned that, in 
elementary school many of us have dreams of inventing things that everyone would 
need and making a living off of that. I said that I felt this was a common view for 
many Americans and that this might also impact how we see intangible property 
under some reverence for the inventor. The ideologies to which I and he were exposed 
are, to an extent, different. Even if as the practice of downloading music and movies 
is challenging copyright in the West, the ideology of rewarding the author remains 
powerful and largely accepted. While I felt that Americans still see IP, overall, 
as good and necessary to protect, Wang Ge disagreed saying, 
Many things like this are hard to be clear about. In the US it is only those 
people in Hollywood who think this way and who care about [intellectual 
property rights]. The regular workers and farmers they care about the 
cheapness [and so will buy daoban if they could] just like us. 
Our good-natured argument still stands. I cannot argue with the fact that his store 
receives a good deal of one-time business from foreign tourists. Further, given the 
prevalence of downloading in the United States as well as a recent study by the 
MPAA (2006) which points fingers at England and France, rather than China, as the 
largest copiers based on total losses of "potential profits" (China remains largest 
copier as a proportion of its domestic market), his point has merit. Yet, at the same 
time, as Vaidhyanathan (2001) has explained, the umbrella idea of IP and the 
framework of the author/inventor do have a greater hold over much of the United 
States both culturally (at least prior to the onslaught of the digital challenge) and 
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institutionally. This ideal of the creator in the United States has not only promoted 
inventors, but also has been used to justify Madonna and Mickey Mouse's copyrights, 
something entirely different. 
While structural issues of development are essential, the ideology and culture 
thus also play a role. Based in China alone, however, my research unfortunately 
cannot answer Wang Ge's question, but some sort of similar anthropological study in 
the United States or elsewhere would certainly go a long way. Particularly useful 
would be anthropological research providing some basis for comparison between 
China and India, a similarly large developing country with contrasting institutional 
influences in its vibrant software and movie industries. Such comparative in-depth 
research could also focus on new generations of people growing up with file sharing 
and other innovative technologies, as well as an antiquated copyright regime 
advocated by powerful interest groups, which will make this question even more 
interesting. 
The above commonalties thus are not to say that there are not any differences 
in the two cases. Chinese people do indeed have their own cultural views on 
intangible property that have been shaped by China's own particular blend of history, 
politics, and economy. The emphasis that the communist era government placed on 
mass education and public performance certainly has played a significant role in 
maintaining the role of public consumption of performances of many kinds. The 
Communist revival (and sometimes rewording) and propagation of older local folk 
songs and stories as well as, more recently, of local opera styles has meant that there 
is a set of such entertainment that is deep in content and shared quite widely. 
Moreover, the majority of these works can claim a long enough or ambiguous enough 
past that, in addition to having been nationalized by the party to serve New China, 
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their authorship is irrelevant. New popular songs quickly become a part of this set of 
shared elements (at least for the length of a season) through their presence on the 
street, in restaurants, on the radio, in Karaoke bars, and other participatory venues. 
These aspects make music in Xi'an more publicly consumed than it is in the United 
States (at least currently) and thus equally effects a more public performance oriented 
view of ownership. 
The roles of faith in the market which has also lead to the "rise of the 
individual" (Yan 2005) and a long standing cultural view of a need to stay out of other 
people's business, may mean that the perceived size of a public domain needing 
protection is smaller in China. Young people see the market as capable of regulating 
things through competition. People thus can focus on making the choices that are right 
for their own particular economic position based on cheapness and quality. On the 
other hand, besides a focus on the individual, there is also a rise in the importance of 
the nation. This may, rather than appeals to the public domain and innovation or the 
rights of the author/inventor, be the way that China begins to move towards advocacy 
for IP. A China which can tout several of its own internationally successful companies 
that rely on IP would be in a position to ask its citizens to buy zhengban in support of 
their country's modernization and position in the world. Such a basis for IP, however 
may lead to a more nation based, rather than individual rights based, system of 
protection for intangible property, 
-"i Through this exploration of intangible property and daoban it might be useful 
to question whether such research should indeed be focusing on daoban at all. Friends 
of mine from Taiwan engaged me in a discussion of fake products and the difference 
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between a "fake product" (jiahuo) and a "blackheart product" {heixin chanping).^^ It 
used to be that all these things, both jiahuo and heixin chanping, were merely fake 
products (jiahuo). Now, however, there is a term, blackheart, which specifically is 
used for products that might threaten one's health. While my Xi'an informants also 
seemed to differentiate among fake products by risk, none made use of a separate 
term. Interestingly, these Taiwanese friends felt this latter term only came into usage 
as a response to the opening of the mainland in the 80s (and thus a rise in cheap 
imported foods which brought competition for local produce). 
Analogously, before the promulgation of more Western style IP laws defining 
zhengban and daoban in China, there already were copies of music and movies 
around. Perhaps then, our focus should not be on piracy, licensing, and intangible 
property, but rather on the creation of these new categories out of a larger category of 
consumable songs and stories. On the ground, this early in the enforcement of non-
indigenous IP laws then, it is not surprising that while all knew the general laws, the 
terms themselves were defined by concrete examples and within local contexts. 
Division of the larger category of music and movies was based on ideas of quality, on 
usability (and thus consumer fraud), not on licensing. Thus my informants led me not 
into discussions on intangible property and the difference between it and physical 
property, but rather to the differences between zhengban and daoban that they saw as 
important. In this way, the concept of daoban is intimately linked to performance, the 
^ nation, pornography, modern looking shops, price, and quality. Except within the 
context of the law (which, of course, is only for guidance), daoban is not framed as 
intangible property at all. 
104 The term heixin chanping was not used in Xi 'an by any of my informants in the summer of 2005 
despite our speaking at great lengths about exactly the kinds of products it would describe. Instead, I 
heard only descriptions of "fake but not inferior" vs. "fake and inferior goods." 
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Conclusion: 
6 Cultural Conceptions, 
Structures, and Agency 
In the background of this thesis, underlying my discussion of Chinese conceptions of 
daoban, zhengban, and of the ownership of intangible property, is a concern with 
understanding or evaluating change. The question, "What are Chinese people's 
conceptions of intellectual property?" must be recognized to be posed in the context 
of a push by external forces to change those perceptions. Furthermore, at a broader 
level, the entire expanding project of this new regime of ownership over intangible 
things is a process of complex change which involves people on numerous levels, not 
just the laws and their enforcement, but also individual interests and cultural 
conceptions. This question then is also concerned with another, "To what extent have 
these conceptions of ownership changed and how have they changed?" In the case of 
IP in China, these non-indigenous laws are being employed by outside powers to 
effect a radical shift in people's everyday behavior. In this conclusion then, I aim to 
bring together the main points from earlier chapters as a way to, starting from 
ethnography, examine how this complex change is and is not occurring. 
When Wang Ge repeatedly asserted to me that Western and Chinese views of 
IP are not all that different, he was advocating for the importance of an economic 
interest-based explanation of behavior, a materialist approach. When other informants 
spoke of educational differences, Chinese emphases on copying and memorization, or 
of cultural attitudes toward step-by-step innovation, they referred to cultural or 
ideational explanations of behavior. Again, however, when Wang Ge and most of my 
other informants first answered why people buy daoban in China, they explained it 
was because they were poor, another clearly materialist explanation. Ideational 
approaches generally rely on the importance of culture and ideology, forces which 
shape behavior and decisions "naturally" from within a person, while materialist 
approaches depend on economic structure, external force which also shapes and 
constricts behavior. These two approaches, to a degree, also reflect past scholarly 
debates within anthropology as might be seen by comparing Harris's (1966) 
explanation of why people in India do not eat cows with Sahlins' (1976) explanation 
for why Americans do. 
Of course, asking which of these explanations, ideational or materialist, 
provides the answer is a fruitless question. Each provides a different level of 
understanding to the case and while we may prefer one over another in any particular 
case, the conceptual closeness of an animal to humanity (Sahlins 1976:175) and the 
amount of energy it can give us (Harris 1966) both have some merit. In the case of IP, 
if this is merely economic structure, then why are there differences in laws among 
Western countries? Why was it that, with such a long history of invention (quite a bit 
earlier than the West), China was not the one to invent this IP system? On the other 
hand, if everything is cultural, then how can we explain historical examples where 
specific actors' changing positions are strongly linked to changes in their own 
' i n t e r e s t s and thus their structural position? Thus here also, neither ideational nor 
materialist positions are easy to hold at their extremes. 
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Furthermore, both types of explanation are often apparent in any one person's 
understanding of complex change. Vaidhyanathan (2001), for instance, stresses the 
role of the ideology of the author/inventor in making the ownership of an idea 
accepted and "natural." Besides this ideational approach, however, as I described 
before, he also details how Mark Twain began his career pulling extensively off of 
other author's ideas and works only to become a more and more militant critic of lax 
copyright laws and enforcement when he himself was copied, a materialist 
explanation. This thesis, also, has presented both materialist and ideational ideas in 
regard to people's practices. While I have stressed Lessig's (2004) view of stages of 
IP advocacy which, as they are based on interests and the accumulation of IP, are 
materialist, I have also emphasized the importance of a cultural emphasis on 
consumer fraud or quality rather than IP or licensing when understanding daoban. 
It is then essential that we employ a theoretical tool which can help us to 
combine both the ideational and materialist elements together to gain a more complete 
understanding of the situation. At one level, we might envision the economic structure 
as helping to determine an interest-based position within a person, company, or state, 
on whether or not to advocate for IP. On the other hand, cultural (and here I include 
historical as well as ideological aspects of it) factors retain a large degree of 
determining power over the shape or expression that this advocacy or non-advocacy 
will take. Institutions and their interaction, as described by for the case of piracy by 
Mertha (2005), are central elements which help to create the abstract structure within 
which consumers and enforcers act. Yet these institutions are made up of people who 
often are themselves consumers and also have their own personal interests and 
cultural conceptions surrounding any issue. There is then a two-way relationship here 
I 
too between cultural conceptions and the action advocated for by such institutions as 
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emergent domestic trade groups, the National Copyright Administration, and its 
parent bureau which places priority on censorship. 
It is thus that, in addition to understanding Lessig's (2004) idea of stages of IP 
advocacy, we also pay attention to Alford's (1995) focus on Chinese cultural ideas of 
censorship and imperial control, copying as a sign of respect, and the importance of 
the past. It is based on these cultural elements of IP implementation that Alford calls 
on us to investigate more than just the laws in a country, but also the cultural 
component or, "rights consciousness" (1995:117), that can translate law into specific 
daily practice and thus social reality. 
Structures, Agency, and Daoban 
Before I return to the specific situation of daoban in China, however, there is a 
key aspect of this theoretical perspective that needs to be addressed: neither culture 
nor economic structure are generally thought of as institutions which promote or help 
to analyze change. While we generally acknowledge today (at least in academia) that 
cultures are constantly changing and that structural economic positions, especially as 
seen in Lessig’s examples, also change, both culture and structure are more 
commonly thought of as forces for the reproduction of the status quo. Culture, called 
upon in its guise as "tradition," and structure, seen to be shaping or restricting human 
agency from outside such that agents often reproduce these same structures, are not 
^ agents of radical transformation. Meanwhile, though, societies do change and the 
situation of IP expansion in China is no different. When culture is called upon as 
ideology, the United States and its copyright industries expect also to be able to force 
changes in Chinese people's "rights consciousness." To understand these existing 
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aspects of complex change our combination of materialist and ideational approaches 
must include an idea of agency. 
Practice Theory: Structure and Agency 
It is thus that the case of IP in China, at least because of its status as a foreign 
imposed law, seems ripe for an analysis based in practice theory. Practice theory, as 
described by Ortner (1984) and in Bourdieu's idea of habitus (1972; 1990), was meant 
to be a method of linking together social structure^^^ with human agency. It also was a 
way to envision an end to the discussion above as culture and economic structure, the 
bases for the ideational and materialist approaches respectively, both became a part of 
the social structure within which this agency can occur. As Ortner puts it, "Modern 
practice theory seeks to explain the relationship(s) that obtain between human action, 
on the one hand, and some global entity which we may call 'the system,' on the other. 
[It is concerned with] the impact of the system on practice, and the impact of practice 
on the system (1984:148). This theory, as Ortner narrates it, grew out of efforts to 
understand how individual actors act strategically for their own interests and thus also 
how these actors can effect change. At the same time, the theory recognizes a 
significantly limited arena for this agency as actor's choices are shaped and to a large 
extent determined by the social structure into which they were born: 
What is practice? In principle, the answer to this question is almost unlimited: 
anything people do. Given the centrality of domination in the model, however, 
the most significant forms of practice are those with intentional or 
unintentional political implications (Ortner 1984: 149). [...] The irony, 
although some may not feel it as such, is this: that although actors' intentions 
are accorded central place in the model, yet major social change does not for 
the most part come about as an intended consequence of action. Change is 
largely a by-product, an wnintended consequence of action, however rational 
action may have been (Ortner 1984: 157). 
105 Seen as the accumulation of past individual's decisions~embodied as culture, history, and 
institutional inertia among others—which serves to guide and constrain present individuals' decisions 
and behavior. 
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Practice theory began as a method of understanding how individual 
strategizing could lead to changes in the larger structure. However, due to the strength 
of the social structure that each actor is born into, change in this model seems very 
difficult to purposefully effect. Each person is limited by the culture they grew up 
with and, by enacting that cultural model in her daily life, the person helps to 
reinforce the culture and to pass along its constraints to the next generation. 
The theoretical system it describes is therefore a fairly static one. If people are 
shaped by their culture and their economic positions of relative power, then when they 
act in their lives how could they help from recreating this same structure? The 
situation practice theory seems to describe is one where change occurs either based on 
outside influences which can jolt the social structure (such as capitalism or 
colonialism's entrance into an already existing system) or, as Ortner describes above, 
the cumulative, largely unintended effect of many people's choices. She gives here 
the example of indigenous Hawaiians killing Captain Cook, who they saw as a god, 
but who had violated the order of their world by returning to the islands during 
another God's season. This choice, though meant to preserve the native social 
structures and hierarchies, also served to bring about colonial presence which 
eventually ended that same system. Here both the outside element as well as the 
unintentional elements are pivotal in causing such dramatic change {ibid.: 157). 
One of the key aspects that prevents change from occurring through 
intentional action within the system is that Ortner envisions this system, or social 
structure, as an integral whole rather than something which can be broken up into 
separate categories like "base and superstructure" or "society and religion" {ibid.: 
148). Individual actors clearly can have little effect on the entire social structure and 
the structure itself also can have no effect on itself. Thus the world it describes is one 
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where actors have very little power and where little change can occur: once the 
processes of globalization have brought formerly separate (or at least what were once 
relatively more autonomous) social worlds together, there remain few people or things 
which could be counted as "outside" the system. Without these outside influences, 
change is left only to occur based on the momentum of actors' accumulated decisions 
in largely unintentional directions. 
An Actor-Oriented Approach 
Perhaps one of the aspects that is missing from this theory then is more of an 
understanding of how actors actually do effect changes from within the system. Long 
(2001), a scholar of development, sought to break the impasse presented by overly 
structural views through a focus on bottom-up rather than top-down theory. By this he 
means less a need to ground theory in ethnography—although that is certainly 
something it appears he would promote一and more the vast change in how an issue 
looks when it is viewed from the perspective of local actors rather than from the 
perspective of policy makers. Policy makers promote one project at a time which 
generally makes its appearance as a neat and tidy report which "summarizes" its three 
stages of "policy, implementation, and outcome" (Long 2001: 25). From this view, 
things seem uncomplicated and the causes and effects are clear. If they were to look at 
this from a local level however, it is immediately clear that nowhere, other than as 
created in this annual report, is the process so easily separated from its context. Local 
actors are influenced not only by their culture, but also by other simultaneous 
projects, their own personal interests, and their duties in their jobs, to their families, 
and to their friends. 
All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing lifeworlds of 
the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way they are mediated 
and transformed by these same actors and structures. Also, to the extent that 
large-scale and 'remote' social forces do alter the life-chances and behaviors 
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of individuals, they can only do so through shaping, directly or indirectly, the 
everyday life experiences and perceptions of the individuals and groups 
concerned (Long 2001: 13). 
Through this quotation on the importance of the local level, we can see that 
what Long advocates is not so different from the ideas of practice theory described 
above. Practice theory also would say that it is only by shaping the everyday behavior 
of people that social structure (or any other force for change or reproduction of the 
status quo) can have an effect. The main difference is less in an overall idea of 
structure and agency (Long also sees the importance of structures，especially noting 
the issues that dependency theory brought to the fore in development circles), and 
more in a focus on actors within the structure as possible agents of change rather than 
their only being able to reproduce the structure. This perhaps is a result of a focus on 
variation rather than on Ortner's focus on the reproduction of social structure: "One 
advantage of the actor approach is that one begins with an interest in explaining 
differential responses to similar structural circumstances, even if the conditions 
appear relatively homogenous. Thus one assumes that the differential patterns that 
arise are in part the joint c r e a t i o n � 6 of the actors themselves" (Long 2001: 13). 
Where Ortner sees an integral whole (perhaps in response to theories which 
separated culture from politics, economics, and society), Long, working from the 
bottom up, sees an untidy space characterized by overlapping projects, overlapping 
relationships or networks between actors, and overlapping intentions and interests. In 
^ this space, all actors do then have a degree of agency. Of course, international actors 
or government officials with more power also have a relatively stronger ability to 
exert their agency, but all actors (including international corporations and government 
1061 take this to imply a sense that collective actions of networks of actors can actually result in some 
change. 
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officials) still must act within the constraints of a structure. Quoting from Latour 
(1986), Long explains that 
The ability to influence others or to [get them to accept a particular message] 
rests fundamentally on "the actions of a chain of agents each of whom 
'translates' it in accordance with his/her own projects" 一 and "power is 
composed here and now by enrolling many actors in a given political and 
social scheme" (Latour 1986: 264). In other words, agency (and power) 
depend crucially upon the emergence of a network of actors who become 
partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the "project" of some 
other person or persons (Long 2001:17). 
I believe that it is this description of networks of actors working 
simultaneously on their own projects and, to varying degrees, other people's projects 
that we can see how change might begin to occur from within the social structure. 
While the social structure is certainly an integral whole on one level, at a local level 
when we examine the structural restraints and controls on individual's and group's 
actions these structures overlap each other and the actor must negotiate his or her own 
way through them. By combining the ideas of practice theory with insights from 
Long's description of how networks of individuals can induce change, we can come 
to a theoretical way to understand both the overall reproduction of the status quo as 
well as the continuous complex change which occurs within both cultures and 
structures. 
This actor-oriented practice theory then also points out the qualified 
importance of the law. The law serves as one way in which higher levels of 
government (and often specific classes or interest groups) seek to influence or 
constrain behavior. In this way, at a local level, it is a part of the social structure that 
is equally difficult (as other parts) for individuals to change. Yet, the law is not the 
only source of authority or of norms. Echoing the view outlined by Alford (1995) 
above and the idea of legal pluralism as described by Moore (2001), there are also 
local moral and social norms. These extra-governmental structures also are very 
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difficult for individuals or even networks of individuals to change and, as I have 
highlighted throughout this thesis, they often have a larger effect in shaping daily 
behavior than legal norms. In the absence of constant enforcement by force (which 
itself may not work as police often share the same moral norms as those they are 
policing), it is these ideas of morality which offer the law legitimacy (Mansell et al. 
1995: 29). Thus while at one level social structure is a single beast, on the level of 
individuals there are different sets of structural constraints (within a single culture 
itself there are generally also simultaneously held contradicting ideas) so that actors 
can make use of some to justify violating others. This plural view of structures and 
agency then allows us to understand how the cumulative actions and decisions by 
networks of (relatively more and less powerful) actors, even within the same social 
structure, do constantly spark small changes to those structures and thus to the overall 
social structure into which the next generation is born. 
Structures and Daoban 
Beginning at the level of the nation, the level which my informants found most 
important in the study of Intellectual Property, we can see the political economic 
structures of the world system which effectively constrain China's actions. 
Interestingly however, these constraints are not structures which help to reproduce the 
current social structure, but rather ones which are attempting to force Chinese people 
to change their behavior. While pressure from copyright-rich nations and industries 
^ through bilateral (Section 301) and multilateral (WTO, WIPO) mechanisms as well as 
dispersed pressure exerted in the expansion of global capitalism have forced China to 
adopt non-indigenous IP protection laws, this does not mean that Chinese actors did 
not attempt to maneuver within this structure. As Alford explains, early Chinese 
copyright laws allowed for the claiming of a patent for the first Chinese person to 
2 2 7 
copy foreign inventions (1995:46). Later laws also maintained the importance of state 
censorship and retained large exceptions clauses which would allow the government 
t o copy a s "necessary" f o r i ts own duties.⑴？ A t the same time, the government has 
enacted the laws and does seek to enforce them to a certain extent, especially as its 
own interest (or those of individuals within the government) are served such as in 
cases of censorship or to prevent the unlicensed copying of Beijing's 2008 Olympics 
mascots (Ma 2006).— 
At the local level however, things are much less clear. As with other laws, and 
as in past dynasties, the central government largely leaves things to the local 
government to handle, either for lack of interest or for a lack of power to constantly 
enforce its will. Yet, it is only at the local level that, following Long above, we see the 
policy (and thus the international pressure) being implemented in concert with 
multiple other simultaneous actions. It is at this level also where perceptions of IP as 
well as consumers' and retailers' behaviour, within the bounds of various local level 
structures, become key elements in the reproduction and change of this same 
structure. 
One of the most important structures in which individuals must make their 
decisions is that of the overall market. For IP in the form of discs, this means the 
structure of the market for music and movies in Xi'an. As I explained in earlier 
chapters, if one was to try to buy based on IP issues of licensing one would be left 
^ with a confused picture of the market. My informants had widely ranging estimates of 
the percentage of discs that were zhengban in the city. Though many claimed that 
more modern shops were more likely to have zhengban, they also cited numerous 
I*" See The Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China 1990，Article 22, clause 7 or the 
amended 2001 version for a toned down exception in the same place. 
For an in-depth look at these pressures, Chinese responses, and the cumulative slow (often 
unintended) changes that have resulted, see Mertha 2005. 
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rumors that even disc sections in top-end chain stores had only daoban. The market 
does have a wide diversity of sellers ranging from mobile street vendors to brick and 
’ mortar shops like Chenggong. Since consumers lacked a way to determine licensing, 
they instead made decisions based on quality and price. In this way, zhengban 
essentially was good quality daoban. Given this perspective of quality and price rather 
than licensing, the two are the same. Consumers also preferred less to look at 
individual discs and more at the stores themselves, and perhaps as a consequence of 
their cumulative decisions, old style shops like Chenggong have increasingly 
undertaken renovations to make themselves look more modern. 
A second aspect of consumers' expectations is the ideal of a market for music 
and movies where consumers of different economic levels can all participate. In this 
model一quite a different one from that of the music and movie industry which would 
like to see a single price for each title, take it or leave it一there is meant to be both 
cheap, low quality versions and more expensive, high quality ones. Between these my 
informants thought there should be a range of options based on quality and price. 
Interestingly, while the market is does not directly conform to this ideal (the range is 
not that large as daoban tends to concentrate on the cheaper end), it looks more like 
their view than that of the copyright industries. Whether consumers created this 
confusion of the market through their preferences or merely acted within existing 
structural constraints is of little consequence. In either case, the market does constrain 
^ current consumer's behaviour and their past behaviors do in turn affect the structure 
of the market. This dialectical relationship means that stores with better quality discs 
increasingly seek to have the newer looking stores which will allow them to sell at 
slightly higher prices. 
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In another case of actor's cumulative choices effecting change is in the case of 
pornography described in Chapter 4. The police working at a local level have a duty 
to enforce the law and, to maintain their employment or to receive promotions, they 
must follow the structural codes set for them by their superiors (including Beijing). At 
the same time, they are also influenced by their culture, their duties to their own 
families and friends, and their own personal projects. Furthermore, there is rarely only 
one law that they are meant to enforce and where the goals of different projects or 
influences on their decisions overlap, they must negotiate a solution perhaps by 
playing one set of structures against another. Also important in this situation is the 
idea that the police were explicitly to perform the role of enforcing morality in a not 
so distant past. 
In the case of daoban, police who share my informants' view of it as not 
immoral (or who have connections with shop owners) may choose to crackdown 
instead on dealers in pornographic daoban. This satisfies their quota of seized discs 
and thus allows them to keep their jobs (and possibly get promoted) while also not 
sacrificing their morals or connections. The cumulative actions of the police then can 
have an effect on store owners and customers behavior and thus, over time on the 
market itself. Over the past years my retail informants all agreed that there has been a 
large increase in competing shops. At the same time, these brick and mortar shops, as 
compared even to as recently as 2001，are much less likely to carry pornography. 
� Consumers of pornography I spoke to say that they now go almost exclusively to 
clusters of semi-permanent vendors near electronics shops for pornography. While the 
availability of regular daoban has perhaps even increased, pornography is now 
significantly less available. Furthermore, as I described in Chapter 4’ this campaign 
has also had an unintended consequence. Tying together pornography and daoban has 
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actually legitimized non-pornographic daoban and thus made the stores which do not 
sell daoban appear both more moral and more legitimate to consumers. Changes in 
police actions thus eventually also change the shape of the market (often as Ortner 
points out however, in unintended directions). This thus also changes the structure 
within which consumers may make their own choices of what and where to buy their 
discs as well as within which police must perform their own duties. 
By applying a practice type of analysis to the disc market, rather than seeing 
only the reconstruction of past structures, we also see considerable amount of change. 
Changes from the past by retailers have an effect on the police and consumers' actions 
which in turn help to recreate a somewhat new structure. It is when we ground 
structures and agency "on a moving earth,，，�9 that we recognize the importance of 
understanding how local people conceive of questions of intellectual property and of 
daoban, its more prominent commoditized version. At this local level, the discourse 
on intellectual property is received among other discourses on striving to be modern, 
to take part in China's development, and to protect China's status and emerging 
position on a world stage. All of these (and others) are then negotiated within a 
framework of individual interests and structural constraints with regard to prevailing 
moral and legal norms. The cumulative result of these negotiations then helps to 
reproduce (or change) the rates of "piracy" which, along with international pressure, 
form the structure within which China conducts and constructs its foreign and 
^ domestic policy. 
1091 like this phrasing from Clif ford (1986) and thought it fits nicely into this quite different situation. I 
do not, however, claim to use the phrase following its authors' original intentions. 
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Creation 
It is also important to note that the project to create new categories of IP occur 
in China at a particular historical time. In the United States and Europe, IP laws came 
about through concerted pressure orchestrated by networks of IP-rich authors, 
inventors, and industries at the same time that these same industries were emerging. 
Rules protecting intellectual property based on its commoditized form (as sheet music 
and then later as recordings for instance) where negotiated along the way. They were 
later challenged by the development of the Internet and digital technologies but, since 
the industries were already powerfully developed, they have had a relative advantage 
in tackling these challenges. 
The major difference in China is that the governments (and industries) 
involved are trying to build a copyright regime based on a blueprint developed prior 
to the digital age in a place where the Internet and digital technologies have already 
begun to take root and spread. Educational initiatives aiming to teach students to buy 
zhengban are aimed at the same generation of computer-savvy consumers who may 
choose to download music instead of buying either kind of disc. The emerging market 
of consumers interested in owning music and movies are the same people who are 
most attuned to its "free" alternative. In this aspect of the disc market, large zhengban 
companies in the United States, Hong Kong, or mainland China are in the same 
position as stores like Chenggong who sell mainly daoban discs. Downloading is a 
^ potential threat to both. Where the copyright industries already are powerful enough 
in the West to refuse to change their business models (or at least drag their feet while 
knocking out less powerful start-ups), in China the structures are different and if they 
do not adapt they may lose an entire generation of music and movie enthusiasts. Here, 
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the digital challenge to the current IP regime has occurred simultaneous to and even 
prior to its establishment. 
Commoditization 
When I introduced the concept of commoditization in Chapter 3,1 did it to 
stress two primary aspects of IP: first, its ability to change something from being 
unownable (at least individually) to being a commodity; and second, that the major 
form in which local people interact with TP is in that of a physical product or disc. 
Interestingly, while in English our broad conceptual terms like "copying," "piracy," 
and "intellectual property" have the linguistic ability to cover wide ranges of products 
combining them conceptually into a single group, Chinese terminology is much more 
specific. As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, the terms for copying tend to be specific 
to the type of product as well as to the process of copying. This means that Chinese 
speakers may be less likely to generalize all copying as piracy. Copied discs involve a 
different process than copying a painting. There are varying amounts of labor that 
goes into them and varying social positions of the copier and copied which should be 
factored in. 
Given the strength of the trope of the author/inventor and the length of time 
that it has been at work in the United States, Americans frequently hear reports and 
arguments about "intellectual property" in general which often gloss over the 
differences between copyright and patent protection. Furthermore, within the 
dominant trope of the author/inventor, patents and copyright are the same as both deal 
with "encouraging" the creation of intangible property which eventually will be sold 
as a commodity. My informants in China, however, were much more inclined to see 
gaping differences between the motivations of musicians writing music or performing 
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songs and scientists conducting research. Especially in the absence of an overall 
ideological category of intangible property, the linguistic separation of different kinds 
of copying without an overall term may make Chinese speakers better able to 
recognize the importance of the commoditized product. 
Mertha (2005), approaching this same issue, explains that, organizationally, 
Chinese agencies involved with patent, trademark, and copyright enforcement not 
only each have their own separate vertical units (extending from the national 
government down to local administrations), but also belong to completely separate 
clusters of bureaus. Patents are handled within the Science and Technology cluster, 
copyrights within the Propaganda and Culture cluster, and trademarks within the 
Finance and Economics cluster. "Grouping patents, copyright, and trademarks 
together from an organizational standpoint makes as much sense as placing molecular 
physics, pornography, and foreign investment within the same policy area" (Mertha 
2005: 28-29, emphasis in original). Combining this institutional approach, the cultural 
and linguistic data, and my informants' stress on relative rather than absolute 
morality, and the construction of an overarching system of intellectual property under 
a single discourse appears much more difficult. 
Long (2001: 97-98) also talks of commoditization. His version of 
commoditization however, dealing with development and the imposition of capitalism 
on non-capitalist systems, more closely resembles Marx's view of it than the 
^ definitions I have used in this thesis. The third meaning of commoditization then is 
the process by which value changes from being determined primarily by use-value to 
it increasingly being determined by exchange value. The use-value becomes much 
less important as the society moves from a system of reciprocity to one of money 
centered transactions. 
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As this relates to music and movies, however, things become somewhat more 
complicated. The problem is that though songs and stories certainly have some value, 
it is neither purely use-value nor purely exchange-value. A story has no use unless 
vocalized, given, or performed. It is a social thing product. Even in reciprocal 
societies intangible things have only exchange value (if they have value of this sort at 
all). It is not like a chair which can be used and its use-value can be seen as roughly 
equal to the amount of work that went into creating it. It can then be sold to someone 
else who, depending on how much they need a chair will pay money for it (the 
transaction sets its exchange-value). 
Even stranger, the physical version of TP (discs), when sold as zhengban does 
not establish an exchange value because the rights to the IP on the disc are not 
transferred. The physical disc itself is bought, but the consumer merely rents the 
intangible property on it. They can use the music for a while, but cannot make copies 
or share it with friends. They own the physical disc, but they are only permitted to use 
the IP on it for the life of the disc (here it is more like renting than owning). This can 
be made clear with by the example of destroyed discs from Chapter 5. Although the 
physical disc is destroyed (and discarded) and should be salvageable, selling the discs 
again involves also selling the intangible property on them which is illegal. The IP 
was never discarded because it was never exchanged. 
Marx talks of the exchange-value of things as concealing the labor behind the 
� commodities being exchanged. He sees the fetishization of commodities as the 
process by which people forget about the labor relations of the object thinking that the 
object itself has value. This is supposed to be how capitalism works and something 
Marx would have liked to see demystified. In a way, though, this mystification is also 
exactly what happens in the process of the disc trade in Xi'an. The exchange-value of 
2 3 5 
the physical discs themselves is quite low and thus the price on the street is low. IP 
laws, though, are trying to take into account the labor of the knowledge producers that 
went into the production of that knowledge. By adding this cost into the disc's price, 
this implies that labor should help to determine the price rather than simply the 
product's exchange value. Interestingly, this links the IP industry more to fair trade 
movements than to any idea of a "free trade" liberalism or opening of the doors to fair 
competition which some think they might be advocating. Just as fair trade coffee is 
priced higher than its physical exchange value would suggest, IP advocates seek to 
add into the price of their products the cost of their labor (and some profit). 
Thus when I talk of the commoditization of IP, I am also talking of the process 
by which the commodity helps to obscure the labor that went into it. People see the 
disc itself and think only of the physical disc's value. As with physical products 
described by Marx, its commoditization prevents people from seeing the labor 
necessary to create the intangible part of it. This is a fascinating reversal. Part of the 
good that a knowledge economy does for the expansion of capitalism is that it gave 
multiple faces to a single product. A thousand discs may be the same physically (and 
thus no one would buy more than a few), but the intangible aspects of them make 
them different and people can be induced to continuously consume and collect them. 
This is similar to how branding could create a desire for more shirts than one 
physically needed to wear based on a desire for the distinct "image" a brand could 
give. 
At the same time, to protect this possibility, these knowledge producers must 
convince people to pay more than they would for just the physical disc (much like you 
pay more for even a generic-brand shirt than for a plain white one). Capitalism here 
actually relies on an idea of de-fetishizing the commodity to ensure that elite 
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knowledge producers do not get exploited the way that factory workers' labor does. In 
this sense then, consumers who buy daoban are to be framed as exploiting the 
producers of the intangible property they enjoy. The irony is that the majority of 
consumers of daoban are relatively poor, especially as compared to the production 
companies they are exploiting. Poorer people exploiting rich laborers is not usually 
what we think of when we think of exploitation. Perhaps it is this irony which has 
meant that there is a politically powerful movement to demystify IP commodities that 
never occurred for other physical products. 
Passive Contestation 
The institution of TP laws does not constitute a "natural right" justified by 
authorship or economics but rather, as I laid out in Chapter 2, is a politically created 
policy. More than simply a political construction, it also has a cultural or ideological 
element to it wherein people learn to frame一following Lakoff and Johnson (1980)一 
creation in metaphors of mythical authors or inventors whose inventions come to be 
seen as analogous to their children. When I first began to look into IP in China, given 
China's long history of invention as well as its lack of any Western version of IP, I 
thought I might be able to find an indigenous version of it. I envisioned this to be an 
alternative system which might emphasize Chinese cultural views of sharing and 
copying more than Western IP's emphasis on individual authors. I，perhaps naively, 
^ thought such a version might look something like the creative commons movement 
(or the copyleft movement) which has been gaining some ground in the United States. 
What I realize now though, is that these newer movements, while challenging some of 
the tenants of IP, still have maintained the framework it uses. By mounting a direct 
challenge to IP, their views are also shaped by this frame and thus are a result of the 
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construction of the IP system itself. Arguing that some authors make too much money 
or that the public domain is diminishing both already assume that authors can make 
money and that there is a difference in the world of ideas between public and private 
domains. 
In Xi'an then I did not find active contestation of this new IP regime's views 
of ownership of intangible property. Certainly, as the MPAA's figure claiming that 90 
percent of copyrighted materials are "pirated" in China indicates, the IP regime is 
hardly accepted. Yet, resistance does not take the form of blatant "anti-anti-piracy 
campaigns," anti-zhengban movements, or even much denunciation (in Xi'an) of 
Hollywood's excessive profits. Instead it takes the form of alternate local 
categorizations of products which not only do not follow IP's lead, but also do not 
react against IP's categorization. Looking at daoban in terms of consumer fraud rather 
than IP does not solve the issues of power, monopoly, and promotion of innovation 
raised by IP. It does not really even address these issues because such a framework 
does not see innovation as something that is controllable. This framework does, 
however, allow us to question why it is that the West has determined that, because we 
need to promote innovation in some areas by way of IP, and that other areas also have 
a sort of copying of intangible things, we should protect them also. 
In this way, my informants did not frame the questions about daoban products 
in terms of individual's rights or even in terms of CP. While they did recognize daoban 
^ to be illegal, the framework they used to describe this illegality (and thus the 
framework within which they decide what should be done about it) is one of petty 
economic crime rather than one of organized crime or terrorism. Furthermore, the 
dominant framing of daoban business was as a retail business like any other operating 
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in the city where one assumes that the boss will try various ways, some skirting 
illegality, to ensure his and his family's profit and livelihood. 
These conceptions are also supported by a different local categorization of 
daoban as a product and of daoban as a problem. The first categorization centers 
around daoban as a tangential part of "fake" products. In China, while my informants 
knew that daoban officially involved "stealing the fruits of someone else's labor," at a 
practical level most did not see its retail or purchase as stealing. Even those few who 
did see it as stealing made a clear distinction between stealing intangible and tangible 
things. While daoban is against the law, in practice my informants framed it as a 
relatively moral business like any other. Daoban was framed or categorized as a kind 
of consumer fraud or "fake" rather than having its own category of "pirated." As such 
it was lumped together and compared with fake and inferior medicines and foods 
which can and have recently killed people in China. This local categorization places 
the emphasis, as my informants did in their shopping, on quality as well as on the 
tangible aspects of the product rather than its intangible ones. 
The second way in which IP is categorized is as an issue involving nations and 
thus as one wrapped up in the politics of a China which they see as only now 
beginning to return to the world stage from having been humiliated and colonized by 
Western powers and the Japanese. As such, the political connotations, which are 
easily removed in the United States by emphasizing this is about individual authors' 
， rights rather than political economy, are much more apparent. The "stealing" of 
America's IP is seen in the same context as America's stealing of Chinese cultural 
heritage for display in their museums. Given that the United States stole the original 
and Chinese are merely making a copy, which of these is worse? As a result of this 
focus, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) point out, while these aspects come into focus, 
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certain other aspects of the issue are obscured. For instance, the structural differences 
between consumers and producers of IP within China could be hidden by pulling on 
currents of nationalism. This framework would allow the government to claim that its 
"key" companies are working for the nation and, thus consumers should buy these 
companies' zhengban products. 
None of these local frames and categorizations necessarily provide a viable 
alternative to the IP system because they do not rely on IP's initial assumption that 
invention needs to be promoted through monetary rewards. They do show, however, 
that there are other ways to focus on such issues than one stressing the ownership of 
intangible property or the importance of individual authors. The framing of intangible 
things as alienable, private property is only one way of looking at it. 
These local categorization of discs and of IP issues are further supported by 
indigenous cultural conceptions of morality and copying which do not necessarily fit 
with those of the copyright industry. For my informants, there are two systems 
available for deciding right and wrong. On the one hand, the moral sphere guides 
daily practice and stresses relative rather than absolute right and wrong. Daoban is a 
business and, as compared to the flood of dangerous fake medicines and foods or as it 
appears in the context of the overall ambivalence of retail business, it is a relatively 
moral one. On the other hand, the legal sphere lays out a binary difference between 
legal and illegal. In practice, however, the moral sphere also encroaches on 
^ perceptions of legal issues. While stealing both phones and IP are illegal, the first is 
also clearly more immoral and thus wrong. Government campaigns against 
pornography have meant that stores not selling pornography but still selling daoban 
are seen as less illegal and more moral. 
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The future enforcement of current IP laws depends largely on aligning these 
two separate spheres of right and wrong. In this way, the law could rely on social 
norms for legitimacy, without which no rules can be adequately enforced (Mansell et 
al. 1995: 29). One way to do this, of course, would be to change the laws to fit better 
with indigenous conceptions of ownership. Unfortunately, due to international 
pressure, this is not much of an option. As a part of this process, the law's ideas of 
legal and illegal, promoted via television, newspaper articles, and middle school 
textbooks, indeed have been accepted by people in Xi'an. At the same time, this is 
only at an abstract level. At the level of daily life there is contestation as it is instead 
ideas of moral and immoral, based primarily on proper business practices, which are 
the rule. 
As for views of copying, this new commoditized version of songs and stories 
has been introduced alongside already existing norms of the public performance of a 
suite of well-known works. The Chinese landscape of creative works is characterized 
by a heavy leaning on a large shared repertoire of long dead authors. This 
characteristic means that claiming authorship for most of these is impossible. 
Additions to them or re-adaptations have a lot to gain by identifying themselves as a 
part of the same body as the original rather than trying to distinguish themselves as 
wholly new creations. The only ownership that people could claim, as my informants 
saw it, was one based on performance. This idea carried over to modern music where 
^ several informants pointed out that, once a song or a movie was given or performed, it 
was no longer an individual's thing to be owned; it became public. 
These different methods of categorization and different cultural views of 
morality, copying, and performance combine to provide another element to the social 
structure which guides consumers' behavior. While the younger generation does seem 
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to have taken more to the idea of IP, they too will have grown up in this structure and 
as they make buying decisions they most likely will be affected by it. Furthermore, as 
a part of the social structure which affects individual's habits and thus the structure 
within which the Chinese government must make and adjust policy, it is probable that 
these aspects will continue to shape views of IP even as China itself becomes an IP 
promoter. It is thus important to recognize that there are multiple sources of authority 
here including those which are external to the government. The establishment of an IP 
system in China, as well as the shape that system takes will depend on the interaction 
of the legal and moral spheres as well as structural and cultural factors within which 
actors (including the government itself) make their decisions. 
The Law as a Tool for Change 
In Sally Falk Moore's (2001) article on surveying the history of legal 
anthropology since 1949 (through 1999), she describes three general interpretations of 
what law is meant to represent and how law is related to other aspects of a society. 
These include a perspective on "law as culture," where the law is a part of traditions 
within any society expressing those traditions and social norms; a perspective on "law 
as domination," where the cultural aspects of law are ideological, seen as masking 
elite interests and, in a globalized world, especially the interests of capitalist elites; 
and a perspective of "law as a problem-solver," where the law is viewed as a tool for 
^ dispute resolution and the minimization of conflict and violence (Moore 2001: 96-97). 
Throughout the remainder of the piece Moore than goes on to show how these three 
views of the law have each been denounced as too simplistic, in turn been modified, 
• and, in their current manifestations, interact with one another. 
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In this thesis I also have been dealing with a legal question in ways that fit into 
all of these perspectives of law. My informants speak of the cultural differences 
between Chinese and Westerners that they see have meant that their views of daoban 
or of copying may be different from mine. This would then partially explain why a 
law that was politically constructed in the West is not followed in China: this law is 
not their culture. At the same time, the very fact that the law is being applied in China 
reflects also the nature of law as masking an ideology of domination whereby nations, 
industries, and individuals (including foreigners like the MP A A and the United States 
as well as, increasingly, domestic IP holders) use the legal sphere as a method of 
imposing their interests on others. At the same time, speaking to smalltime IP holders 
like the professor, I found a view of IP as a problem solver whereby this law was a 
way that his interests could be protected and problems concerning the balance 
between private innovation and sharing public knowledge could be balanced. 
Moore also uses her analysis to press for an important modification to the idea 
of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism was a movement which sought to recognize that 
the legal or normative structure of societies had more than a single—thus more than a 
governmental—point of origin. The law co-exists with other normative structures 
which also guide behavior at all levels, including the behavior of those people 
responsible for making and interpreting the law. This is, to a large extent, the same 
distinction which I make in Chapter 3 and 4 between a moral and legal sphere of 
^ authority. Both have a hold on people's behavior, from consumers to IP holders to 
retailers, government officials, and the police. Many of the legal pluralists, in 
stressing the equal importance of these extra-governmental sources of authority, 
sought to "refer to the whole aggregate of governmental and non-goveramental norms 
of social control, without any distinctions drawn as to their source" (Moore 2001: 
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106). Moore, however, while seeing a multiplicity of origin sites for norms, also sees 
a need to make a distinction between different sources of norms and controls on 
behavior. She asserts that "to deny that the state can and should be distinguished from 
other rule-making entities for many practical purposes is to turn away from the 
obvious. And if one wants to initiate or track change, it is not only analytically useful 
but a practical necessity to emphasize the particular sites from which norms and 
mandatory rules emanate" {ibid.: 107). 
When Moore describes the workings of the law and litigation process, she 
makes use of this framework of legal pluralism in speaking of the existence of 
contradictions between being rule-governed and those rules being negotiable: 
I argued that the sociology of causality was ill served by a conformity-
deviance model of the place of rules of law in societies, as if there were a 
single set of rules, clearly defined, totally discrete, and without contradictions 
or ambiguities [...]. "The social reality is a peculiar mix of action congruent 
with rules (and there may be numerous conflicting or competing rule-orders) 
and other action that is choice-making, discretionary, manipulative" (1978: 3). 
What also matters is that the choices and manipulations are not only made by 
the litigants in dispute situations, they are also made by the authorities who 
decide what the outcome shall be, and who make reference to norms and 
normative ideologies in other contexts (Moore 2001:102). 
This idea of separate sources of authority becomes a useful device for uniting 
the importance of structure, culture, law, and morality in the case of daoban in China. 
Each of these aspects of the legal sphere and the moral sphere, for instance, exert a 
degree of influence on actors. At the same time, these actors also must act within the 
structural constraints placed on them by their socio-economic position, their relative 
amount of power, and their balancing of sometimes conflicting duties within their 
jobs and other roles. These conflicting and often contradicting sources of authority 
coexist in individuals and the negotiation between them that occurs is what helps the 
individual to make choices. It is this negotiation that also allows my informants to 
rely more on the legal sphere when telling me that daoban is stealing at an abstract 
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level, while also maintaining that on a practical level (calling on the moral sphere) 
that it is not, without feeling any contradiction. 
This same set of conflicting sources of authority and conflicting structures 
within which actors make their decisions also provides the groundwork for 
understanding and investigating change. Although Moore does not mention it 
explicitly in her article, the idea of law as a tool for change could easily have been her 
fourth perspective. In fact, law as change lies at the heart of many of her examples in 
the article, not least that of the idea of law and research on law being focused on 
examining and learning to remove the obstacles to democracy in a given society. 
Drawing on this underlying focus on change, Moore identifies the future of legal 
anthropology as concerning "a much wider vision of the political milieu in which law 
is imbricated. [These future studies] inspect the legal data for inputs and events in the 
global political turbulence of the day. Whether it is the law-related control of 
intellectual property, the definition of human rights, or the accountability of persons 
for the policies of regimes, it is evident that nothing is merely local in its formation or 
in its repercussions" (Moore 2001: 110). Local studies are then to have bearing on 
national and international levels and this bearing, at least for IP in China, relies on the 
fact that the cumulative choices made based on conflicting sources of authority at the 
local level indeed do influence and constrain actors at a national and international 
level thereby recreating and changing the structure itself. 
^ The importance of this underlying idea of law as change cannot be 
underestimated in Asian societies. Over the past few centuries, as countries like Japan 
and China have attempted to react to the invasion of a technologically superior and 
aggressive West, they have sought a balance between taking on the technology and 
institutions of the West and taking its culture as well. One of the first (not exclusively 
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technological) areas that the Japanese, the Qing, and Republican governments adopted 
were ideas of Western law. They certainly did not take things wholesale; most sent 
delegations to pick and choose pieces from different systems and this process resulted 
in the laws being able to reflect somewhat more indigenous values. Despite this, 
adopting these laws was seen by many (including those in the West) as the beginnings 
of an inevitable process of cultural and broadly institutional change. 
While this fits with most adopted laws, for IP the situation is even more 
dramatic. Although it may be advocated for by some members of the Chinese 
domestic political establishment, it is largely an outsider imposed system. The idea of 
these outsiders was to impose the "correct" laws (and this has become the role of 
WIPO and the WTO), maintain pressure to be certain those laws are enforced and to 
help set up a judiciary system in which those laws will be interpreted the way that 
those outsiders wish. Here we see much more of the idea of law as ideology than law 
reflecting indigenous culture. Here also, however, is this latent sense that law can be 
used to radically change behavior. Given its establishment a century ago (albeit with 
significant upheaval and changes since then including a period of Communist state-
centered IP), many are surprised that this change in behavior has not yet occurred. 
Yet from Moore we see that the law is not the only source of morality (and of 
authority) and it cannot be enforced purely by force. Using force as advocated by 
many copyright industries who press for tougher penalties is one way to do so in the 
^ short term. The problem is that in most cases (but not in a colonial situation for 
example) the police are also affected by the same alternate sets of moral authority. In 
the long run the law needs a situation where the law does reflect culture and thus 
people regulate their own behavior through social norms. When these different 
sources of authority do not match, actors have the ability to play one off of the other 
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in situations according to their own interests and needs. Alford's (1995) search for a 
rights consciousness is the search for these extra-governmental sources of authority, 
the moral sphere, which could supply social norms to support the law. 
Changes of a small sort can be effected by laws relatively easily, but even 
these must play to contradicting social values. To take an example from the United 
States the passing of seat belt laws has, over time changed people's behavior. Even 
for this small type of behavior change the government had to pit one cultural value, 
that of safety (especially of children), against another, the idea that the government 
should not interfere in family decisions. By pulling on safety values, the government's 
law could be justified within an indigenous network of morality (even though, 
importantly, not all indigenous ideas of morality would have supported it). As in the 
case of intangible property, when the new law is so radically different from the 
existing social norms, however, there is little to pull on to legitimize it and it effects 
little social change. 
Final Thoughts 
Legal institutions (the law itself, but also the police and the judiciary who 
enforce or interpret it) are a part of the puzzle, but so are aspects of economic 
structure, like an actor's relative stake in IP advocacy, and cultural aspects, such as 
views of copying, business, performance, and the past whose specific combination is 
^ unique to each society. Given the international structure of pressure for IP, the 
cultural norm of nationalism, and Lessig's assertion that as entities build up their own 
IP, they too will seek to protect it, I believe there is little reason to suggest that China 
will not in the near future become an IP advocate. 
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The decisions made by actors in local areas, however, will help (along with 
member's of China's government's view of their and the nation's interest) to shape 
the version of IP that China advocates. Given the focus both currently through ideas 
of performance and historically through the importance of censorship and the past, I 
do not believe that China's version of IP will be one centering on individual 
authorship and individuals' property rights. Instead the role of the state as promoter of 
innovation and of inventors as performing a role as representatives of the state will be 
more important. Furthermore, given China's focus on science and technology, as well 
as my informant's view of scientists, as opposed to song or story writers, as the 
vanguard of China's advance into modernity, it seems likely that the IP it first begins 
to promote will be patent-based (and perhaps in agriculture). Cultural views of the 
ideal market and of sharing knowledge will also be essential in defining the 
acceptable limits of ownership and the size of the public domain. Future studies of IP 
in the realm of music and movies (or elsewhere) could focus longitudinally on many 
issues touched upon in this thesis, but also on relations and conceptions surrounding 
the production of intangible property in China. 
While there may be expressions of law that are specifically human rather than 
merely "Chinese" or "American," especially given social science research which 
points to our species' overall similarity regardless of cultural difference, the right to 
exclusive ownership of ideas is not one of these. It is a policy which purportedly was 
^ created for a purpose (to promote innovation) for which, in many cases, it appears not 
to be working. My personal view is that, though I hold little love for censorship and 
to some degree fear the type of IP that China might one day choose to advocate, I do 
not see adopting (or being forced to adopt) the United States' current version as the 
answer. China, and other developing countries, have the opportunity (would other 
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nations and pressure groups allow them) to tweak, revise, or wholesale reinvent this 
policy such that it addresses the concerns and goals of both indigenous consumers and 
creators while also fitting with a new digital world where the benefits of sharing 
knowledge can be achieved at an incredibly low cost. 
Whether these types of broad predictions have any truth to them or not, I 
believe that change (though perhaps unintentional change) is coming. China is a place 
where continued study of changing cultural attitudes toward IP provides scholars with 
an opportunity to understand how the law does effect change. It also provides, for 
legal anthropology, a place to understand how these separate sources of authority, the 
moral and legal spheres, interact over the longer term, especially in relation to non-
indigenous laws. At the same time, the subject matter itself, understanding how new 
regimes of ownership are installed, challenged, legitimated, and come to be seen as 
"natural" is essential for an understanding of changes in the larger capitalist system 
and in relative inequality in the world. With the growing reliance on capital in the 
form of knowledge and the inequality that such a reliance brings, I believe studies 
which look at the relationships between culture, economic structures, politics, and 
legal structures by crossing the boundaries between anthropology's sub-disciplines 
and joining in discussions traditionally left to other disciplines will be increasingly 
necessary. 
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Appendix I: List of Chinese Terms 
Romanization Characters Page 
badaguai 八大怪 186 
beijing 背景 123 
chai 拆 74 
chao f 少 16 
chaoxie f少寫 16 
chuantong 傳統 183 
congming 聰明 110 
daji 打擊 159 
dakong 打空 164 
dalu zhengban 大陸正版 168 
danwei 單位 23 
dao guo lai 盜過來 15 
dao 盜 25 
daoban 盜版 14 
daode 道德 95 
daoyong 盜用 15 
de 道 25 
erhu 二胡 187 
falu zhishi cankao yong de 法律只是參考用的 200 
fanban 翻版 15 
fanzui 犯罪 120 
feifa 非法 151 
fuli caipiao 福利彩票 132 
fuyin 複印 16 
fuzhi 複製 16 
getihu 個體戶 82 
guanxi 關係 ’ 101 
^ heixin chanping 黑心產品 208 
huozhenjiashi 貨真價實 171 
j ia Cheng 家成 25 
jiahuo 假貨 208 
jianquan 健全 100 
jingshen 精神 71 
kaobei 拷貝 15 
kaorou 烤肉 141 
keji shuiping di 科技水平低 135 
261 
kelong 克隆 16 
kelu 刻錄 15 
laobaixing 老百姓 65 
laodong chengguo 勞動成果 95 
laojia 老家 98 
li 禮 25 
linmo 臨摹 16 
liuhecai 六合彩 131 
mofang 模仿 15 
moren 默認 135 
nei zhong die 那種碟 144 
piaoqie 劉竊 16 
pingwei 品味 172 
qianlima changyou, er Bole buduo 千里馬常有’而伯樂不常 93 
rang women sixiang wang qian zou 讓我們思想往前走 71 
renao 熱鬧 190 
renshan renhai 人山人海 111 
reqing 熱情 110 
saohuang dafei •冑字了多戶 153 
shanliang 善良 110 
shouru 收入 70 
shuihuo 水貨 163 
suzhi di 素質低 135 
suzhi 素質 134 
tiangao huangdiyuan 天高皇帝遠 26 
tianli 天理 25 
weifa 違法 120 
wenhua Chengdu 文化程度 134 
wenhua 文化 87 
wo yeye jiu shi zheme zuo de 我爺爺就是這麼做的 184 
wushang bujian 無商不奸 97 
xiangyao 想要 70 
xiangyue 鄉約 25 
xinyong 信用 101 
xixu 習俗 ’ 25 
^ xuyao 需要 70 
yanda 嚴打 136 
yi fen jiaqian, yi fen huo 一分價錢一分貨 65 
yinzhi 印製 15 
zhengban 正版 14 
zhengce 政策 160 
zhengfu 征服 195 
zhifa 執法 124 
zhuangjia 莊家 131 
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